PERIODICALS

Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 45, Number 4, Fall 2001

Frederick R. Dickinson On Japanese History

THE CANT AND CAN'TS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Adam Garfinkle on Its Diplomacy

Michael C. Desch on Its Politics

Jacques deLisle on Its Legal Standing

Sam C. Sarkesian on Its Military Dilemmas

James Kurth on Its Typology

with an introduction by *Alexander M. Haig, Jr.*

RUSSIA AN ENIGMA NO MORE

Rajan Menon on Moscow's Constraints

Simon Serfaty on Russia and the West

Foreign Policy Research Institute / Pergamon

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Founded in 1955, the Foreign Policy Research Institute is an independent, nonprofit organization devoted to research, publication, and education on international affairs. It brings the insights of scholarship to bear on the development of policies that advance U.S. national interests abroad.

Current research projects examine new directions in U.S. relations with Russia, China, and Japan. Other projects focus on American military policy, Gulf security, Indian-Pakistani relations, nuclear crime, and sources of instability in Latin America.

FPRI's Marvin Wachman Fund for International Education promotes international and civic literacy. Its Wachman Fund activities include the *Templeton Lecture on Religion and World Affairs*, the *Cynthia P. Robinson Memorial Lectures on International Affairs*, the *Bobby Hall Luxenberg Memorial Lecture on Japan*, and the *Perlmutter Lectures on Ethnic Conflict*—all for scholars and the interested public; *Global Classroom* and *History Academy*, for secondary-school teachers; and the *Internship Program*, for students contemplating a career in international affairs.

The Institute also publishes the following bulletins: *FPRI Wire*, a two-page commentary on world affairs; *Watch on the West*, on issues concerning America and the West; *Peacefacts*, on the Middle East peace process; and *Footnotes*, for educators. One other FPRI bulletin, *E-Notes*, is available exclusively by E-mail or fax.

To inquire about membership, write or call the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, PA 19102-3684, Tel: (215) 732-3774, ext. 105, Fax: (215) 732-4401, E-mail: fpri@fpri.org. All contributions to FPRI are tax-deductible to the extent of the law.

PRESIDENT
Harvey Sicherman

VICE PRESIDENT
Alan H. Luxenberg

BOARD OF TRUSTEES
John H. Ball
Chairman
Bruce H. Hooper
Marvin Wachman
Vice Chairmen
Charles B. Grace
Treasurer

S. Michael Alexander
W.W. Keen Butcher
John Gilray Christy
Robert A. Fox
Robert L. Freedman
Barbara J. Gohn
Susan H. Goldberg
J. Eric Greenwood
Alexander M. Haig Jr.
N. Peter Hamilton
Kenneth D. Hill
Bobbie Hillman
Tatnall Lea Hillman
Graham Humes

Scott M. Jenkins
John F. Lehman
David Lucterhand
Martin Meyerson
Stephen S. Moody
Ronald J. Naples
Paul C. O'Grady
Frank N. Piasecki
Samuel J. Savitz
Harvey Sicherman
Robert Strausz-Hupé
John M. Templeton Jr.
Bruce D. Wietlisbach
William H. Wurster

BOARD OF ADVISORS
James Courter
Midge Decter
David Eisenhower

Samuel P. Huntington
Bernard Lewis
William H. McNeill
Martin Peretz

James R. Thompson
Richard Thornburgh
Murray Weidenbaum

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 45, Number 4, Fall 2001

MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE

SEP 27 2001

LIBRARY

On July 4, 1994, Czech president Václav Havel (above) stood on the steps of Independence Hall to receive the Philadelphia Libèrty Medal, one of the many honors awarded to the playwright turned dissident turned head of state. The 1989 Velvet Revolution that ended Communist rule in Czechoslovakia and the equally velvet "divorce" that later split the country in two stood in remarkable contrast to the violence and turmoil that accompanied the disintegration of so many other states in the 1990s. Those emergencies also demonstrated to the international community how difficult it was to remain unmoved in the face of humanitarian disaster—and the complexities of becoming involved. Is it logical or ironic, therefore, that the 2001 recipient of the Liberty Medal was Kofi Annan, the secretary-general of the United Nations and foremost advocate of humanitarian intervention? (Photograph by Gerald S. Williams, *Philadelphia Inquirer*. Used by permission.)

Published for the Foreign Policy Research Institute

by Elsevier Science Inc.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Orbis®
A Journal of World Affairs

Editor
WALTER A. McDOUGALL

Managing Editor
STEPHEN WINTERSTEIN

Manuscript Editor
TRUDY J. KUEHNER

Contributing Editors
BRUCE D. BERKOWITZ
PAUL BRACKEN
PATRICK CLAWSON
MARK FALCOFF
MICHAEL RADU
HARVEY SICHERMAN
VLADIMIR TISMANEANU

BOARD OF EDITORS

STEPHEN E. AMBROSE
University of New Orleans

PAUL BALARAN
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

RICHARD K. BETTS
Columbia University

HENRY S. BIENEN
Northwestern University

PAUL BRACKEN
Yale University

ELIOT A. COHEN
The School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

STEPHEN P. COHEN
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

L. GORDON CROVITZ
Hong Kong

ARTHUR I. CYR
Carthage College

PETER DUIGNAN
The Hoover Institution

MARK FALCOFF
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

ALTON FRYE
Council on Foreign Relations

AVERY GOLDSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

COLIN S. GRAY
University of Hull

PAUL HOLLANDER
University of Massachusetts at Amherst

IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ
Rutgers University

CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER
The Washington Post

EDWARD N. LUTTWAK
Center for Strategic & International Studies

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM
The School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

JOSHUA MURAVCHIK
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

WILLIAM E. ODOM
Hudson Institute

RICHARD PIPES
Harvard University

BARRY R. POSEN
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

PETER W. RODMAN
Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO
University of California at Berkeley

RICHARD F. STAAR
The Hoover Institution

SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI
Foreign Policy Research Institute

MARC TRACHTENBERG
University of Pennsylvania

STEPHEN VAN EVERA
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

GEORGE WEIGEL
Ethics and Public Policy Center

SAMUEL F. WELLS, JR.
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Editorial Assistant: Jessica Warren

Articles appearing in *Orbis* are indexed and/or abstracted in *ABC Political Science; Academic Index; America: History and Life: Articles 1st; CARL UnCover; Contents 1st; Current Contents: Social and Behavioral Sciences; Historical Abstracts; International Political Science Abstracts; (Newspaper and) Periodical Abstracts; Public Affairs Information Service (PAIS); Social Science Citation Index (SSCI); Social Science Index; U.S. Political Science Documents.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 45, Number 4, Fall 2001

Editor's Column Walter A. McDougall 485

A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Introduction Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 495
Strategy and Preventive Diplomacy Adam Garfinkle 503
Liberals, Neocons, and Realcons Michael C. Desch 519
Legality, Morality, and the Good Samaritan Jacques deLisle 535
The Price Paid by the Military Sam C. Sarkesian 557
Lessons from the Past Decade James Kurth 569

Structural Constraints on Russian Diplomacy Rajan Menon 579
A Euro-Atlantic Ostpolitik Simon Serfaty 597
Better Ways to Fix U.S. Intelligence Bruce Berkowitz 609
Indonesia's Grim Outlook Paul Dibb and Peter Prince 621

Review Essays

Crumbling Pillars of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance
Frederick R. Dickinson 637
Post-Cold War Europe Up Close and Personal Stephen Winterstein 648

Errata 657

Index to Volume 45

Articles, Authors, and Subjects 659
Books Reviewed 665

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CHINA JOURNAL

The world's best journal on contemporary China.
Ezra Vogel, Harvard University

The liveliest periodical in the field of contemporary Chinese studies. Feisty, enterprising, informed, and current.
Andrew J. Nathan, Columbia University

The single best scholarly journal on contemporary China. If one has to limit oneself to one journal on China it should be **The China Journal.**
Edward Friedman, University of Wisconsin

Has recently become the hottest, most-cited journal on contemporary Chinese affairs. Wide-ranging and timely.
Thomas Gold, Berkeley

Fast becoming *the* leading journal of contemporary Chinese studies. This is one of the few journals that I read cover to cover.
James L. Watson, Harvard University

Now clearly the best journal in the field. Consistently insightful.
Frederick Teiwes, University of Sydney

SPECIAL OFFER
1½ years
for the price of a 1-year subscription
TO NEW SUBSCRIBERS

Subscription Rates (two 230-page issues per year — **plus** a free issue for new subscribers): *Within Australia:* $25 per year, students $20, institutions $40. *Outside Australia:* US$25 per year, students US$20, institutions US$40; or the equivalent in other currencies. New 3-year subscriptions: $60/US$60, institutions $100 — plus 2 complimentary issues.

I would like a: ☐ 1-year ☐ 3-year subscription
☐ Enclosed is my check (payable to **The China Journal**)
☐ Please charge to my ☐ Bankcard ☐ Mastercard ☐ Visa

Card No. _____ Exp. Date _____

Name _____ Signature _____

Address _____

_____

_____

Payments to: Contemporary China Centre, RSPAS, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200.

ANU 1261

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Editor's Column

During my tenure with *Orbis* I have been blessed with a series of excellent managing editors, most recently Steve Winterstein. By the time this issue appears he will have departed after three years during which he never ceased to display keen intelligence, patience, dependability, good judgment, and unflappable good cheer. I expected him to move on to a major newspaper or magazine, but true to his generous spirit Steve has chosen to devote his life to educating young children. This fall he enters the prestigious Bank Street College in New York to take a master's degree in elementary education. We thank him for all he did for the FPRI and wish him the joy a teacher (or parent) knows whenever young eyes flash with curiosity, new knowledge, or wonder.

Accordingly, we also welcome a new manuscript editor with impressive skills and experience of her own. Trudy J. Kuehner graduated in 1991 from the University of Pennsylvania with a bachelor's degree *summa cum laude* and Phi Beta Kappa in history. She was immediately hired by Penn to serve as executive assistant to then-president Sheldon Hackney and then assistant secretary of the university, and has subsequently worked in health care–related publishing. Given her editorial skill and experience and abiding interest in American politics and foreign policy we are delighted that she has chosen to join *Orbis* and believe authors will enjoy working with her.

In These Pages

Have OOTW already become MEGO? That is, have military "operations other than war" been so much discussed and debated since the end of the Cold War that "my eyes glaze over" upon reading the phrase "humanitarian intervention" on the cover of a policy journal? I feared that might be the case when we agreed to publish a cluster of articles on the subject. Wars, after all, are far more exciting than peacekeeping missions, and in any case the wisdom and modalities of humanitarian intervention had been so belabored that it seemed unlikely that anything new and insightful remained to be written. Upon receiving the contributions of our distinguished panelists, however, I realized that serious analysis of humanitarian intervention has only just begun, is critically important to the United States, and is anything but boring.

An address by Alexander

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Haig, the former secretary of state and supreme allied commander of NATO forces in Europe, introduces the inquiry into humanitarian intervention that follows in these pages. Adam Garfinkle, the new editor of *The National Interest*, discusses the diplomacy lurking behind the decisions of states and multilateral organizations to intervene in local ethnic conflicts, and Michael C. Desch describes the political ideologies and pressures that prompt or discourage intervention. Sam C. Sarkesian assesses the common allegations made about the damage that frequent and lengthy peacekeeping missions have done to U.S. military preparedness, and Jacques deLisle (our resident legal eagle) focuses on the many, often contradictory appeals to international law that are devised to justify violations of national sovereignty in the name of human rights. Finally, political scientist James Kurth offers a lucid categorization of the disparate phenomena that go under the rubric of humanitarian intervention. What the reader will glean from all the above is an appreciation of how confused and sometimes counterproductive the theory and praxis of international do-gooding have been in the past, and therefore a sounder basis for deciding whether and how to pursue "humanitarian" missions in the future.

U.S. policy toward Russia attracted interest again in the wake of the first Bush-Putin summit in June 2001. But irrespective of whatever personal rapport may have been established between their leaders, the old Cold War adversaries will find their bilateral relations constrained by geopolitical and economic structures of long standing. Thus, Rajan Menon advises us not to become too excited or chagrined over President Vladimir Putin's rhetoric and instead focus on the strategic and financial woes bound to drive the foreign policy of any Russian leader. One of the structures to which Russia will have to adjust is the European Union, which stands between it and the United States. Can Europe function as a bridge between East and West, or will it constitute the third side of an unstable triangle? That is the question Simon Serfaty addresses. But of course the answer will depend at least as much on the Europeans themselves as they struggle to persuade the world that they exist as a unitary actor. Steve Winterstein assesses the hopes and disappointments of post–Cold War Europe in a valedictory review essay.

Rounding out a packed issue, Bruce Berkowitz pronounces on the reforms needed in U.S. intelligence gathering and analysis, Paul Dibb and Peter Prince warn of the regional consequences of an Indonesian crack-up, and Frederick R. Dickinson takes a critical look at the history of modern Japan as written by two generations of American scholars.

Night Thoughts of an I.R. Professor

The "back to normalcy" promise made during Republican

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Warren G. Harding's 1920 presidential campaign meant all things to all men—and women, who had just won the right to vote. To some it meant putting an end to the ubiquitous government regulation imposed during the Great War. For others it meant putting an end to the thirty-year flood of "unassimilable" immigrants from southern and eastern Europe and Asia. For still others it meant putting an end to the Democrats' free trade policy and raising tariff barriers to protect domestic producers. For most it surely meant putting an end to the promiscuous involvement in world affairs symbolized by Woodrow Wilson's crusade for U.S. membership in the League of Nations. So effective indeed was the vague campaign slogan that Harding went on to use the terms *normalcy*, *normal*, and *abnormal* a half-dozen times in his inaugural address, a fact later noted by the acid-tongued journalist and linguist H. L. Mencken. "In all the history of words there have been few records of deliberate inventions that have been so quickly successful. . . . It was thus, for example, with the late Mr. Harding's normalcy. The truth is that he did not invent it at all, but simply used it ignorantly, or perhaps I should say inadvertently. The word he was fishing for was normality, but somehow he got hold of the rare mathematical term, normalcy, and so stuck it into his inaugural address. The next day all the intellectual snobs of the country were cackling over it—but by the end of the week it was in common use, and it retains a certain vogue to this day."[1]

The most striking observation to be made about Harding's *normalcy*, however, is that the various norms it conjured in the heads of the electorate are in every case the opposite of what most Americans consider normal today. Though we still consider ours to be a free-enterprise system, the power and reach of the federal government in 2001 are elephantine compared to what they were under Wilson, when income tax returns were filed on a single 5 x 8 postcard. Likewise, liberal immigration policies, global free trade, and U.S. diplomatic and military engagement overseas, all considered abnormal in 1920, are taken for granted today, however controversial they have become in some quarters.

So what's in a word? In the case of *normal* the answer is nothing and everything. With regard to the domestic political and cultural debate, the politically correct position today is that notions of normality are exclusive and oppressive since they damage the self-esteem of anyone deemed abnormal and discourage creativity and diversity. Accordingly, those who call for the abolition of all standards in academic performance, personal appearance and dress, religious and political belief, and sexual behavior insist that norms themselves are, or ought to be, abnormal. And yet,

[1] H. L. Mencken, "Making New Words" (1935), in *The Impossible H. L. Mencken*, ed. Marion Elizabeth Rodgers (New York: Doubleday, 1991), p. 482.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with regard to the international political and cultural debate, the same champions of radical self-expression are usually the loudest advocates of the imposition of strict norms of behavior on other countries and governments. Thus, China must embrace international norms if it wishes to join the World Trade Organization or host the Olympic Games. India and Pakistan must honor the normative regimes established for nonproliferation of nuclear weapons if they wish to avoid sanctions. Rogue and failed states had better reform themselves top to bottom if they wish to escape international ostracism, armed intervention, and the extradition of their leaders to international courts for crimes against humanity. In short, democracy, the rule of law, environmental sensitivity, and respect for human rights (as defined by a self-appointed community of Western, secular nations) have become universal norms to which all states are expected to adhere.

The contemporary liberal discourse on norms would thus seem to be contradictory inasmuch as it extols diversity at home but insists upon uniformity abroad. But in practice it is not contradictory, because it is not really sincere in either arena. As we all know, the politically correct leaders of American education, media, government, and the corporate world promote diversity and liberation through rigid codes of speech, behavior, re-education, discipline, and punishment that are potentially as restrictive of true individualism as the racial and sexual discrimination and prejudice they mean to combat. Likewise, the liberal internationalism that interventionists trumpet is nowhere near as consistent as they would have us believe. If it were, not just Serbia, Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti, but 90 percent of the nations on earth would be the targets of American bombs, sanctions, or both. Indeed, so vast and elastic have international norms on human rights become that virtually every nation, including the United States itself, is in technical violation of one or another of them.[2] And yet, the United States, NATO, and the United Nations intervene against only a small portion of nations, which means that in global affairs the enforcement of supposedly universal norms is itself abnormal.

For their part, conservatives and self-styled realists often cling to notions of what's normal that fly in the face of historical evidence, something they claim to respect. Thus, we have heard calls for Russia, China, and the United States to become "normal nations" again, meaning that those nations ought to jettison their ideological pretensions born of the Cold War and just pursue their interests in normal fashion in a normal, multipolar system of states. We have also heard calls for Japan and Germany to be-

[2] Palestinians have already petitioned Belgian courts to indict Ariel Sharon for "war crimes" allegedly committed in Lebanon back in 1982. Will George W. Bush be indicted at the International Court at The Hague for presiding over capital punishment, oil pollution, and public use of tobacco in the medieval duchy of Texas?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

come "normal nations" again, meaning that they ought to jettison their parochialism and self-imposed restraint born of World War II and assume international military and political responsibilities commensurate with their economic strength. But the implicit norms behind such calls for nations to become normal again are derived from a nineteenth-century model of international relations. What was normal then cannot, by definition, be deemed normal in any era before or since without ignoring or denying the meaning of history itself, which is perpetual change. The world wars, fascism and communism, the Cold War, and serial revolutions in technology, weaponry, and economics have so changed the fundamentals of international relations that behavior once considered normal, such as colonialism and secret alliances, would seem bizarre and threatening today.

The point is made even more strikingly if one peers further back into the past. What, for instance, would a "normal China" look like? Would it be characterized by unity or volatile disunity, bold imperialism or contraction and even conquest by foreigners, xenophobia or eager absorption of foreign influences? All those opposing characteristics have been the norm at one or more times over the millennia of Chinese history. What would a "normal Japan" look like? Would it be fiercely cohesive or rent by feudal disorder, economically dynamic or stagnant, militarist and imperialist or disarmed and docile, isolationist or greedy for foreign technology? We think of today's Japan as an aberration, but it might not seem so at all to an official of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1600–1868). What is the normal condition of the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, or for that matter Europe? Norms and patterns may be discerned in those regions if one only goes back fifty years or so. But the establishment of nation-states in the postcolonial world and the partial transcendence of nation-states in the European Union are, from the standpoint of history, wildly dissonant phenomena. Indeed, a return to normalcy in those regions could only mean that various Mogul, Assyrian, Turkish, or Persian empires are soon to arise and that the European Union will soon go the way of the Holy Roman Empire.

We observed at the start that Americans' notions of what constitutes normal or normative foreign policy have also reversed themselves over the past eighty years. So have their attitudes toward what constitutes normality elsewhere. For instance, was it normal for Germany to be divided during the Cold War? Arguably, it was, because Germany had been divided politically throughout most of its history, and everyone agreed that the career of the unified Germany from 1871 to 1945 had proven disastrous. Despite that, all the former victims of German aggression plus the United States acquiesced in Germany's reunification in 1991. Was it normal for Korea to be divided? Arguably, it was not, because Korea had almost

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

always been unified albeit often under some other empire's suzerainty. Despite that, all the powers interested in Korea today dread the uncertainties that would be posed by Korean reunification. Is the autonomous limbo in which Taiwan exists normal? Perhaps, because the island has often escaped effective rule from Beijing over the centuries. But if unification with mainland China or national independence represents what the international community considers a normal outcome, how much risk would any party to the dispute be willing to run in order to return to such normalcy?

In sum, while everyone likes to assert that their preferred models for the organization and behavior of states in the world are normal and, being normal, ought to be the standards for others, no one has even the slightest epistemological basis for that assertion. "Whatever is, is rational," said the German philosophers, not "what we wish were the case" or "what might be the case under different circumstances." So unless and until all great nations can agree on normative concepts derived from first principles in religion, philosophy, or law (in which case lions will lie down with lambs, swords will be beat into ploughshares, and righteousness and peace will kiss each other), any assertion of "normality" can only be a conceit or a dodge.

* * * * * * *

The Clinton administration's foreign policy team was frequently faulted for concentrating its energies on crises in small countries while allowing U.S. power relations with China, Russia, Japan, and Europe to drift. But has George W. Bush done any better over his first six months? By the time this column appears Bush's inaugural trip to Europe and June 15, 2001, speech in Warsaw will have been analyzed, criticized, and spun into oblivion, so there is no point in doing so here. But however anodyne and ephemeral the sound bites and snake bites delivered by European, Russian, and American leaders during that tour, the bizarre behavior on all sides suggests that playground antics now constitute normal relations among responsible, consenting adults.

First, the United States' supposed allies, led by the British, French, and Germans, almost unanimously criticized Bush's positions on, for instance, missile defense and the stillborn Kyoto environmental treaty before he even had a chance to explain himself. Worse still, high-level European spokespersons gratuitously mocked Bush before and during his visit and encouraged their official press organs to caricature the president of the United States as an ignorant, blathering, born-again, gun-toting cowboy, polluter, and hanging judge: that is, everything associated with heartland America (those "red states" on the electoral map) and everything sophisticated Europeans are not.

Next, Bush returned the insults by skipping London, Paris, Berlin, and the European Union's own heartland in favor of visits to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Spain, Slovenia, and Poland, and delivering a speech in Warsaw that must have shocked the self-styled Gladstones and Talleyrands in the foreign ministries of northwestern Europe. Bush named Poland the center of the continent, insisted that the Baltics, Balkans, Ukraine, and even Russia belong in the new Europe, spoke of free markets, democracy, diversity, and strong civic cultures in a Europe currently run by a heavy-handed, unelected, centralizing EU bureaucracy, and defined Euro-Atlantic civilization in terms that challenged "materialism in all its forms" and resurrected a spiritual vision of Christendom. Bush singled out Pope John Paul II for praise—no surprise given his Polish audience—but also concluded with a reference to the nearby statue of Christ bearing the cross above the words "lift up your hearts"—the *sursum corda* and ancient invitation to holy communion.[3] Nothing could have more clearly signaled to the EU's hypersecular leaders that a yawning cultural gap exists between them and many Americans, not to mention Poles.

Were Bush's indiscretions just payback for the indiscreet insults of the Europeans? Perhaps, as Vice President Cheney declared in an interview soon after Bush's return, the Europeans will "get over it" and "get used to George Bush. He's a very straight-speaking, tell-it-like-it-is kind of guy. I think there's probably a big adjustment for our European friends after eight years of Bill Clinton."[4] Perhaps that was indeed all there was to it. But what does one then make of the amazing conversations Bush had with Vladimir Putin during his trip? Was the American president serious when he asked Russia's president to look into his eyes and trust him, when he entertained the idea of having Russia join NATO (albeit he had not "thought about the nuance of it" yet), when he urged Putin to approve a one-on-one dialogue on missile defense so that their respective bureaucrats could not "jabber it to death," when he admonished Putin to fear China more than the United States? What conclusions were Russian, European, and Chinese leaders supposed to draw from such remarks? Still more amazingly, upon his return to Washington the president granted an interview in which he offhandedly recounted the most intimate details of his conversations with Putin, the very leader (and ex-KGB man) from whom he had asked for trust.[5]

But Putin had been at least as indiscreet at his own news conference in Europe when he announced that Chinese president Jiang Zemin had asked him to de-

[3] "Remarks by the President in Address to Faculty and Students of Warsaw University," White House Office of the Press Secretary, June 15, 2001 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010615-1.html).

[4] "Dick Cheney, the interview," *The American Spectator*, July–Aug. 2001, p. 29.

[5] See Peggy Noonan, "A Chat in the Oval Office," *Wall Street Journal*, June 25, 2001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

liver a personal message to Bush. It seemed the Chinese wanted the Americans to know that they considered the spy-plane incident overblown and over so far as they were concerned. What was Putin thinking? Either his claim to be the intermediary between China and the United States was false (let us say it was very exaggerated), in which case his boast would be acutely embarrassing, or his claim was true, in which case, by going public, he would only forfeit the trust the Chinese had placed in him.

Are the world's great leaders now given to talking behind each other's backs, tattling on each other, trading insults, and courting or betraying best friends in the manner of jealous children on the playground? Or is it just possible that a grand (one is tempted to say Nixonian) strategy lay behind the farrago that played out in June?

Try this on for size. George Bush never claimed to have great expertise in foreign relations, but he knows who his political adversaries are, at home and abroad, and what it is they believe. He knows that former president Clinton toured Europe himself just in advance of his own trip, and the warm reception Clinton received from fellow "Third Way" social democrats such as Tony Blair, Lionel Jospin, and Gerhard Schröder contrasted sharply with the cold shoulder they gave him. Bush knows, in other words, that the post–Cold War Atlantic community is cloven by an ideological divide. On one side of the barricade stand not only the portions of the United States that went strongly for Al Gore—California, the Rust Belt, and the Northeast—but also much of Canada and the northern members of the European Union from Britain to Germany. That transnational political bloc stands for multiculturalism, multilateralism, environmentalism, feminism, redistribution, government regulation, socialized medicine, and consumer values. On the other side of the ideological barricade stand not only the portions of the United States that went strongly for Bush—the Mountain West, Great Plains, and South—but also parts of western Canada, northern Mexico, and the southern and eastern nations of Europe. That potential transnational bloc—Bush's bloc—stands for individualism, sovereignty, cheap energy to fuel growth, more or less traditional religious and family values, free enterprise, limited government, and producer values.

Now, cold wars do not break out with countries that have no fifth column in the United States itself. Americans may despise and even fight against Iranian mullahs or Saddam Hussein, but no cold war can break out with regimes such as theirs because they are so foreign to American ways that they may as well be on Mars. Cold wars *do* break out with countries that have powerful advocates inside the United States, such as the Communists and fellow travelers of the 1930s and 1940s, and thus have the potential of "perverting" or "sub-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

verting" truth, justice, and the American way. Accordingly, the strongest candidates for America's next ideological enemy are not Russia (a model for what?) and the alien civilization of China, but the very nations Cheney describes with a wink as "our European friends." They are assuredly not President Bush's friends, whatever they think of America. They are friends of the Democratic Party that Clinton reinvented and welded into a Third Way "international" that is hostile to the values Bush would defend as normal.

Don't get me wrong. There is no chance a cold war will be waged between the United States and the EU on the scale of the Soviet one with its arms races and espionage. But an ideological contest has already begun within the Western world that, if it continues, will eventually render NATO a farce. Nobody wants such a contest, except perhaps for a few frivolous Frenchmen. But the potential exists, and if there was any method to the madness of Bush's first tour of Europe, it may be explicable on just those terms. First, the president threw down the gauntlet (in his own charming way, to be sure) and let Europeans know that *they* will determine the future of the alliance according to the choices *they* make on issues he takes seriously. Secondly, the president reminded the EU leadership that America has friends elsewhere in Europe, even in Russia, that Europe needs the United States more than the United States needs Europe, and that Washington may have to engage in an "agonizing reappraisal" of the alliance should the Third Way leaders of Europe choose to snub U.S. interests as they snubbed the U.S. president.

Finally, it is quite possible that Bush does not believe Europe is where the action will be in the next era of history anyway. The old continent's birth rate is negative, its economy stagnant. It shows no sign of becoming a major military player beyond its own borders and, far from welcoming dynamic American leadership, often inhibits it. European institutions and attitudes are therefore an anvil around the ankles of the aspiring nations on Bush's side of the ideological barricade. Where will the real action be in the coming era of history? In Russia and Eastern Europe, possibly—Bush told Putin they were both young and capable of "making some fabulous history." But otherwise, Mexico and Latin America more generally are the regions most threatening and promising to the domestic character of the United States, just as Hispanic voters will likely determine the imminent fates of the Democratic and Republican Parties. Perhaps it was no accident that the influential and well-connected *Wall Street Journal* had little to say on its opinion page about Bush's tour of Europe, but did suggest in insistent terms that the United States open its border to Mexican immigrants, assimilate those fellow Americans, and make NAFTA a human, not just

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a commercial, union.[6] Mexico, not NATO, will determine America's future, either because its people will "annex" the American Southwest or because the United States will, for all practical purposes, "annex" Mexico. And if visionary American leaders choose to pursue the latter strategy—in cooperation, of course, with visionary Mexican reformers such as the businessman-president Vicente Fox—guess who will fight tooth and nail to frustrate it? The Europeans will, just as they meddled in U.S.-Mexican relations during the Texan fight for independence in the 1830s, the Mexican War in the 1840s, the American Civil War in the 1860s, and World War I (remember the Zimmermann Telegram?).

Bush, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and Dick Cheney have no desire to alienate Europe. But the Europeans implied that they consider the Texan's administration to be alien, if not illegitimate. No doubt they hope that American voters will "deport" Bush in 2004. But if that does not happen, Brussels may yet make "Yankee Go Home" the new EU slogan. Is it indiscreet to publish such night thoughts? Perhaps, but indiscretion is normal these days. Trust me.

[6] Robert L. Bartley, "Open Nafta Borders? Why Not?" *Wall Street Journal*, July 2, 2001. Perhaps Bartley was inspired by Anthony DePalma's provocative new book, *Here: A Biography of the New American Continent* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), which cites President Fox's call for NAFTA to become a full economic union with open borders.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Humanitarian Intervention

Introduction

by Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

The most serious decision a president can make is to commit American troops to possible combat.[1] In his eight years as president, Bill Clinton sent American forces into harm's way more than any president before him, all on behalf of what has come to be labeled humanitarian intervention. The roll call of the most significant is familiar: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo. Today, even as we meet, the United States and our NATO allies have committed some 100,000 troops, including reserves, to Bosnia and Kosovo. And NATO went to war over Kosovo for the very first time in the history of the alliance.

As the new Bush administration assesses the appropriateness of these interventions, the president and his team should avoid the old argument over burden sharing. Washington should know, and every American should know, that some 80 percent of the forces in the Balkans are European. Our allies also bear 87 percent of the cost. So it is truly a profound commitment by the Western alliance, not only by the United States. And this reminds us that NATO only works when the principle of shared risks and shared burdens is observed.

What does humanitarian intervention mean today? Apparently, it implies the use of military force to rescue people at risk from political causes, such as the actions of dictators, even if the American national interest does not appear to be meaningfully at stake. It thus appears to fall in that sensitive area where our humane values and our sense of geopolitics—what we believe to be right and what we judge to be prudent—rub uneasily together.

[1] This text is taken from the keynote address delivered at the Foreign Policy Research Institute conference "The Question of Humanitarian Intervention," Philadelphia, Pa., Feb. 12, 2001.

Alexander M. Haig, Jr., was U.S. Secretary of State and Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces in Europe. He is a trustee of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and co-chairman of its Project on Humanitarian Intervention.

© 2001 Foreign Policy Research Institute. Published by Elsevier Science Limited.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As such, it often leaves us divided about the course of action and wary of the precedents that may be set.

Let me make the following observations. First, the American people will not support a policy that leads to intervention everywhere. Nor will they support its opposite, a policy that abstains altogether. A balance must be found that comports with both our ideals and our sense of reality. Secondly, humanitarian intervention as we have known it over the past decade has been neither just nor practical. We must break with a policy that does not act until after a human catastrophe and then assigns to our troops objectives they cannot achieve. Both are the products of a dangerous populism amplified by the media and the related explosion in information sciences. Finally, there is an alternative. We can work to prevent the problems that give rise to such interventions, and if that fails we can guide our interventions with common-sense criteria and reasonable objectives.

Of Cuckoos and Ostriches

Let me begin with the very basic issue of whether humanitarian intervention fits into American foreign policy. Our debate today tends toward two extremes. One school puts American values at the top and argues that we should use military force in defense of human rights around the world. Some would even argue that we should go further and use such occasions to impose our democratic values on societies that have no historical experience with democracy. The record suggests that this cannot be achieved, Haiti being a case in point, as we shall see in a moment.

Nonetheless, we should recognize that both types of intervention are sustained by powerful currents of American idealism. They are the lineal descendants of Woodrow Wilson's ringing declaration: "All shall know that America puts human rights above all other rights, and that her flag is the flag not only of America but of humanity." Some are even willing to subscribe to a variation of Wilson's mystical belief that, as he put it, America was created "to show the way to the nations of the world how they shall walk in the paths of liberty."

It is amusing, of course, for this old general to see so many of the doves from the Cold War era suddenly reborn as hawks in advocating the use of American military power without applying the test of whether it is in our national interest. Perhaps we should follow the great Cold War historian Robert Conquest, who suggested that one must consider not only hawks and doves but also cuckoo birds and ostriches. Surely those who would use the bayonet to remake the world in America's image qualify as the cuckoos. I would agree with George Kennan, who wrote back in 1993 that "to see ourselves as the center of political enlightenment and as teachers to a great part of the rest of the world . . . is unthought through, vainglorious, and undesirable."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The American people are much too sensible to support for long either version of humanitarian intervention, because they rightly suspect the crusading arrogance of it, the moral overreach of it, and the inevitable rebellion against it. It will multiply adversaries and sour our friends. John Quincy Adams put it best as long ago as July 4, 1821, when he said: "America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy." He added that doing so would involve the United States "beyond the power of extrication . . . she might become the dictatress of the world. She would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit."

The excesses of the Clinton years, in dialectical fashion, have called forth an opposite school, now gaining strength from the evident failure of perfectionist interventionists to produce perfection. These are the abstainers. They would have the United States stay aloof from humanitarian disasters in the name of the national interest. But their idea of the national interest is an imported one, drawn from the realpolitik of a vanished pre-1914 Europe. They ignore the fact that for Americans, the national interest is not simply a calculation of material interests, but also a moral one. After all, we do stand for certain values: democracy, respect for individual rights, the settling of disputes through diplomacy rather than force, and the rule of law rather than that of the jungle. Who among us could stand idly by if we saw our neighbors, or even a stranger, assaulted by thugs? We resent such assaults upon our values, and our innate decency as a nation demands action to prevent massacres. A policy of abstention is thus the policy of the ostrich. The American people will simply not support for long a policy so at odds with our fundamental values.

I know, of course, that I have set up a pair of straw men, or at least a pair of straw birds. But we all know that each of us bears a little sympathy for these positions. Yes, we would like to right the wrongs of this world, especially on the cheap. Yes, we also resent the idea that we should straighten out the messes made by others. That is why the American national interest, properly conceived, encompasses not only ideals, but also reality, not only the world as we would like it to be, but the world as it is. On balance, humanitarian intervention can be just, but it must be leavened by prudence. We should seek to prevent massacres and genocide through diplomacy and other actions, including the use of the bayonet if necessary. But this should never be a crusade and should never be undertaken in the absence of careful calculations that include costs and benefits.

In 1981, concerned about this very debate following my experiences in NATO during President Carter's term, I observed that a foreign policy that pursued ideals while ignoring power would offend America's sense of reality and probably would fail. Equally, a foreign policy that pursued power while ignoring ideals would offend America's sense of right and in the long run would also fail. Only a balance between the two would merit consistent

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

public support. Every generation of American statesmen has to decide the balance to be struck. Ours is no exception.

Humanitarian Intervention in Practice

With this in mind, let me turn now to my second observation, about the practice of humanitarian intervention as we have conducted it over the past decade. Have we struck that balance between ideals and reality to which I just referred? My answer is no. Our interventions have been neither just nor practical. A brief review of the facts will make the case.

In Somalia, the Bush administration intervened in late December 1992 with 30,000 troops to prevent a widening of an already severe famine. That mission was expanded in the spring of 1993 by the Clinton administration to rebuild the country as a nation under a mandate from the U.N. Security Council, against a backdrop of media clamor for a continued U.S. military presence. The mission ended, however, after a disastrous ambush cost eighteen American lives and the United States withdrew in failure. A notable part of this adventure was the role played by CNN. There can be no doubt that the television image of starving Somalis played a large part in getting us in. There can also be no doubt that the image of a Somali mob abusing the corpse of an American soldier played a large part in getting us out.

In true dialectical fashion, one mistake begat another. We recoiled from Somalia and therefore hesitated about Rwanda. There was no CNN effect to get us in, and a genocide took place while U.N. troops watched.

In Haiti the United States intervened with some 20,000 troops and two aircraft carrier groups to restore democracy in the unique form of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The invasion was launched in response to a wave of desperate refugees seeking asylum, many dying from either exposure or unseaworthy boats before they could reach Florida. The results of this effort were disheartening, to say the least. Secretary-General Kofi Annan recently wrote to the Security Council that "a combination of rampant crime, violent street protests, and incidents of violence targeted at the international community could severely limit the ability of the mission to fulfill its mandate."[2] After six years of effort and several billion dollars in aid, the United Nations and the United States gave up. All international observers agree that the May 2000 parliamentary elections giving Aristide's party a huge majority and Aristide's own election in November were blatant frauds. The result of all this effort has been not to rescue the country, but rather to enthrone a leader who is certainly no democrat. I must note that Haiti is by now a familiar target of American humanitarian intervention. We stayed nineteen years the first time (from 1915 to 1934) and six years the second time. The results truly speak for

[2] U.N. Daily Highlights, Nov. 28, 2000 (http://www.un.org/News/dh/20001128.htm).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

themselves in this prolonged experiment to impose democracy through the bayonet.

Finally, we have the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo. In 1990–91 the Bush administration thought Bosnia was Europe's business, not ours, and so did the Europeans. Both seemed more amenable to propping up Gorbachev's Soviet Union, already a political corpse, than to dealing with the real trouble brewing in Yugoslavia. Without U.S. leadership, clashing European interests produced a predictable paralysis. As massacre followed upon massacre, we issued condemnations, but did not intervene to prevent atrocities. Finally, in the summer of 1995, international and domestic pressures, combined with the scenes of the awful Srebrenica slaughter, forced President Clinton to act.

A similar episode followed in Kosovo. Over a million Kosovars were set to flight by the Serbs before NATO went to war. This military action, despite the enthusiastic reviews of our air power, succeeded only when we threatened a ground invasion. It ended on a particularly sour note of strain within NATO's command structure. Many dangerous precedents were set. NATO had attacked a sovereign state to rearrange the politics of one of its provinces, even though the situation did not pose a threat to the alliance itself. Clearly such actions alarmed other countries, which feared that the promotion of our values would become an excuse to intervene in their internal affairs. There was another ugly mishap within the NATO command itself. A British subordinate to U.S. General Wesley Clark, the supreme allied commander, refused his order to intercept the Russians in their dash to the Pristina airport. Oddly enough, the Pentagon sided with the Briton. Clearly, these are not experiences the alliance would wish to repeat. The result is that today the United States and NATO are committed to keeping troops in Bosnia and Kosovo until either they become multiethnic democracies or time comes to an end, whichever occurs first. Old Balkan hands, including FPRI's founder Robert Strausz-Hupé, who knows that area intimately, tell me that the end of time is the more likely event.

This pattern of interventions illustrates the dangers of what I call "electronic populism." By waiting until a humanitarian disaster has occurred, replete with gory coverage by the media, a president may find it easier to rally public support for military action. But by doing so, we put our whole foreign policy at the risk of events that are shaped primarily by others. We lose twice in this approach. First, we forfeit strategic direction, whereby we shape events. Secondly, we also disarm our diplomacy. As Henry Kissinger has often observed, the early stages of a problem, when positions are still fluid and ambiguous, present the best opportunity for creative diplomacy. Once positions are hardened and the massacres committed, there is little left to do except to summon the troops. So we end up making much more effort for much less result. Even worse, we expose the very people we hope to save to even greater risk. In both strategic and humanitarian terms, these have been military interventions to rescue an utterly failed foreign policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Modest Proposal

There is an alternative to humanitarian intervention as we have seen it. The beginning of wisdom is, first, to restore the primacy of strategic planning in our foreign policy and in so doing to put humanitarian intervention in its place, that is, with a lesser but still honorable role. Otherwise we become vulnerable to passing crises and lack any sensible judgment about their importance to our overall goals. Once this is done we will be able to revive our diplomacy of prevention. We must discard the idea that we need the disaster before we can do anything effective. There is no room in a sound American foreign policy for today's electronic populism! I realize that preventing a crisis sometimes requires an earlier threat to use force. But does anyone not believe that a united U.S.-European approach to the Bosnia crisis in 1991 or 1992 would have spared everyone great agony and saved thousands of lives?

Secondly, if diplomacy fails and we contemplate intervention, we should recall that our military forces operate in support of national objectives that include above all the deterrence of major wars, which is really the most important humanitarian role we can play. We and our allies must keep this in mind as we contemplate "minor" interventions. The marines, in their very plainspoken way—only an army general could say that—called their manual on the subject *The Small Wars Manual.* It was published in 1940, and if you can get beyond the fascinating chapters on the care and feeding of mules you will find a fair description of what humanitarian missions are today. "Small wars" are compounded by ambiguity, different rules of engagement, and many other snares and traps. It was Wellington who said that "a great country can have no such thing as a little war." So in the interest of our larger role in deterrence we must be wary of frittering away our strength.

Thirdly, if no alternative is available, when we do intervene militarily we ought to do so with military prudence. These are not exercises that break new ground in military science. The key point is to determine whether and how the use of military force will make a difference for the better. The definition of that difference will automatically allow us to measure whether our objectives are being achieved once we hit the ground. That, in turn, will make it much easier to determine the point of exit. Forget about checklists and artificial exit deadlines. The key is to set reasonable goals and then to measure our progress toward them. Goals cannot be vague (such as building a nation) or superficial (such as holding an election). These are troops trained to fight, kill, and overcome; they are not police or social workers. I do not accept the argument by some that peacekeeping actually sharpens combat skills. Just the opposite is true.

Finally, we ought to use the coalition principle as often as we can. Others share our values. Some partners are better placed to intervene and have a more acute understanding of the situation. But I want to add a caveat

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

here. NATO itself should not necessarily be pressed into this task. Those few NATO members that have the capacity to project military power should act if it is in their interest to do so. The rest of the alliance should be supportive. This was the formula I used successfully while supreme allied commander to deal with so-called out-of-area crises. I am convinced that it remains both workable and far preferable to the cumbersome and restrictive procedures we saw in the Kosovo war. The United States has an essential role to play in forming such coalitions. We need not and should not provide most of the forces. But the essence of any coalition, namely, shared burdens and shared risks, may require significant U.S. participation. We should never forget that leadership comes at a price.

Let me conclude now by reviewing the main points. Humanitarian intervention has a minor but honorable role to play in American foreign policy. It must be judged on the balance of values and interests, ideals and reality, what is right and what is prudent. The American people will not support humanitarian intervention as a formula to impose American values on the rest of the world, nor will they support a realpolitik that does nothing about genocide. Thus far, we have failed to strike the proper balance. Humanitarian intervention as we have known it over the past decade has been neither just nor practical. "Electronic populism" stays our hand until disaster strikes, depriving our foreign policy of strategic sense and our diplomats of their most effective opportunities to act, before blood has been shed.

Humanitarian intervention has a minor but honorable role to play in U.S. foreign policy.

A better policy would restore strategic balance, focus on prevention, and consider engagement in these "small wars" within the context of the more important mission of deterrence so that we do not fritter away our strength. If we must intervene, our objectives must be both attainable and measurable, and we should share burdens and responsibilities with our coalition partners. But above all, we must lead.

Humanitarian intervention, like the rest of foreign policy, is ultimately a test of a nation's character. Are we willing to defend the right, and fight for it, if need be? Americans have answered this call throughout their history. But there is another part to character, and that is humility. Robert Strausz-Hupé wrote that "moral perfection, especially when it uses service to humanity as its vessel, puts me on my guard." We ought to be on guard too, lest the promise of America's values become an excuse for an American crusade. I hope we can avoid the folly of those European empires that sought to impose civilization with their bayonets. Let us do our duty when our forces must be used to rescue humanity from man-made disasters. But we should do so in the understanding that foreign policy and military forces are very imperfect instruments in a very imperfect world.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"For [over] twenty years IS has been influencing scholarship and public discourse. On a wide range of topics, it has become our most interesting and important journal."
–Robert Jervis, Columbia University

"The best journal in the field."
–Kenneth Waltz, University of California, Berkeley

"Absolutely indispensable."
–Samuel P. Huntington, Harvard University

"A forum for the most important scholarship on international security issues."
–Benjamin Frankel, Editor, *Security Studies*

"Excellent"
–The Times Higher Education Supplement

International Security

For over twenty years, *International Security* has published articles that have defined the debate on all aspects of war, peace, and security studies. Its lucid and well-documented essays come from all political and theoretical perspectives. Subscribers receive the most provocative and most frequently cited articles on today's security agenda.

Steven E. Miller, Editor in Chief
Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones
and Owen R. Coté, Editors

http://mitpress.mit.edu/ISEC

Select Recent Contributions
Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James D. Morrow
The Contributions of Rational Choice: A Defense of Pluralism Lisa L. Martin
Return of the Luddites Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook
The Modeling Enterprise and Security Studies Robert Powell

The full text of IS is now available online through The MIT Press.

MIT Press Journals
Five Cambridge Center
Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
617-253-2889 tel
617-577-1545 fax
journals-orders@mit.edu

Published quarterly by The MIT Press for the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University. ISSN 0162-2889

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Humanitarian Intervention

Strategy and Preventive Diplomacy

by Adam Garfinkle

This essay argues two propositions. The first is that the diplomacy of humanitarian intervention is more important than many realists think it is or would like it to be—and that includes realists resident in the upper strata of the George W. Bush administration.[1] The president and his senior national security aides have written and spoken as though they were wedded to a Reaganite approach to this issue: Nancy Reagan, in this case, as in "Just say no." Bush himself expressed this view clearly during the presidential campaign: "We should not send our troops to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide in nations outside our strategic interest."[2]

Appealing though such an approach may be, it just will not work. Humanitarian crises will occur in relative abundance because post–Cold War conditions are busily generating them, and even if the United States avoids entanglement in most of them, that avoidance, no less than any involvement, will affect broader American interests. Responding to such crises therefore requires an overall strategy that takes into account the respective importance of and interplay among various U.S. interests. Put differently, any coherent discussion of the diplomacy of humanitarian intervention demands attention to the strategic context. Unless the United States has a strategy, it will not be able to conduct a successful diplomacy of humanitarian intervention—or of anything else.

The second proposition is that a realistic approach does exist to the problem of humanitarian intervention, but it abides amid the thickets of

[1] By humanitarian intervention I mean the use of military force to stop or affect the course of a violent dispute in which significant numbers of civilians are being victimized. I exclude "interventions" in which outside military resources are used in the aftermath of natural disasters. This essay was prepared for the Foreign Policy Research Institute conference "The Question of Humanitarian Intervention," Philadelphia, Pa., Feb. 12–13, 2001.

[2] George W. Bush to ABC News, Jan. 23, 2000, quoted in Doyle McManus, "Lacking a '90s Doctrine, U.S. Foreign Policy Drifts," *Detroit News*, Apr. 21, 2000. See also Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, Jan./Feb. 2000, pp. 45–62.

Adam Garfinkle is editor of *The National Interest*.

© 2001 Foreign Policy Research Institute. Published by Elsevier Science Limited.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

coalition diplomacy. Concern for sound coalition diplomacy happens to be a key element of any effective national strategy, and so we come back to the conclusion that, in order to have a workable diplomacy of humanitarian intervention, the United States will first have to attend to other tasks.

The first proposition may be established by recounting a short history of humanitarian intervention and the post–Cold War debate over it. The second proposition is conjectural, but the lessons derived from the first suggest that the requirements of effective coalition diplomacy are indeed attainable.

A Short Diplomatic History of Humanitarian Intervention

The diplomacy of humanitarian intervention is hardly new. The form it has taken recently, however, is new, and it is that current form which concerns us most.

As to the antiquity of the matter, this cannot be disputed. Lord Byron's poetry would have turned out far differently had not the thrall of modern Greek nationalism affected British diplomacy in the 1820s. Cuban history might have turned out differently, too, had not William Randolph Hearst agitated to promote war between the United States and Spain in 1898 on behalf of what amounted to damsels in distress. Perhaps the oldest recorded episode of successful humanitarian intervention is found in Genesis 14. A war broke out in the lower Jordan Valley, which led in due course to the seizure of a civilian named Lot, his family, and all their possessions. Lot's uncle Abraham heard about this through a survivor of the ordeal and, with a night-striking commando force of 318, attacked the captors, freed the hostages, and pursued the guilty to the outskirts of Damascus. Thereafter, Abraham's diplomacy with the king of Sodom assured all sides their core interests, and matters returned to normal (for a while—five chapters later the king of Sodom has a nasty go of it).

In more recent times, humanitarian intervention has taken various forms. India severed off East Pakistan and turned it into Bangladesh in 1971 for avowedly humanitarian reasons. In 1978 Vietnam invaded Cambodia, and in 1979 Tanzania did the same in Uganda, ostensibly to oust genocidal regimes. The United States justified the 1983 invasion of Grenada by the need to ensure the safety of U.S. medical students on the island. Humanitarian concerns were more or less real in every case, but they did not drive any of these decisions. The truth is that, since it is no longer fashionable to use military force in the pursuit of national interests, those who do so have to call it something else.[3] They often call it humanitarian intervention.

But why do states feel obliged to employ the rhetoric of humanitar-

[3] There are exceptions, such as the Ethiopian-Eritrean War of 1999–2000, but the exceptions prove the rule. The reaction of the world community was to label that conflict the most recondite and downright stupid in recent memory.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ianism? It is because a major normative change occurred in international politics in the twentieth century, and that change owes its origins in no small part to the growing power and status of the United States. The U.S. rise to superpower status and the subsequent ideological tone of the Cold War enthroned the Wilsonian triad of values on an international scale: democracy and national self-determination; free markets within and free trade among states; collective security and limits on the possession and use of weapons.[4] While the reality of Wilsonianism was limited and uneven during the Cold War, the change in international elite standards of "best practice" was dramatic. Just compare matters in 1960 to those of 1860. Amid that change and unevenness, one should not underestimate the importance of hypocrisy, which, as several observers have noted, can be the advanced wave of a new truth.[5] What is noteworthy in the conduct of the Vietnamese, Tanzanian, and Indian governments from the examples cited above is not that they went to war, but that they felt obliged to invoke humanitarianism as a reason.

The end of the Cold War, and especially the *way* it ended, raised the stature of Wilsonian values higher still. This is the secret of the much-sought-after name of the post–Cold War era, "hiding in plain sight," as Michael Mandelbaum puts it.[6] This is the Wilsonian era, no less real in its normative power for its continuing geographical limits and institutional imperfections. And it is in this era that the diplomacy of humanitarian intervention has been born anew. Indeed, the diplomacy of humanitarian intervention has been redefined by three post–Cold War factors, and the ascendancy of Wilsonian norms plays a role in all three.

First, the diplomacy of humanitarian intervention has attained a high profile by default. It was obvious what the United States should do during the Cold War: win it. Most humanitarian interventions had to be ruled out for fear of major military escalation out of proportion to the stakes involved. With the concerns of the Cold War gone, so are the inhibitions regarding humanitarian interventions. Today, moreover, the backdrop of Wilsonian values encourages thinking about humanitarian crises as challenges to collective security broadly construed. This explains the movement to attenuate the principle of state sovereignty—whether through speeches by U.N. secretary-general Kofi Annan, declarations at "millennium" summits, or "spontaneous" international criminal law.

Secondly, the occasions for a diplomacy of humanitarian intervention are more abundant. This is not just an illusion. While Cold War concerns did deflect attention from many a sad problem in the Third World, there really are more humanitarian crises now that the Cold War is over. The spread of the Wilsonian ethos of self-determination has been interpreted in many places in

[4] See Michael Mandelbaum, "Bad Statesman, Good Prophet," *National Interest*, Summer 2001, pp. 31–41.
[5] See also Alan Ehrenhalt, "Hypocrisy Has Its Virtues," *New York Times*, Feb. 6, 2001.
[6] Mandelbaum, "Bad Statesman," p. 31.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

collective terms rather than in the individualistic terms of the Scottish Enlightenment. This has given rise to instances, as in Nigeria and Indonesia, where the relative democratization of the central government of a heterogeneous state has stimulated ethno-religious conflict instead of ameliorating it. Meanwhile, global economic integration (commonly called "globalization") based on the Wilsonian principle of market systems and free trade has overwhelmed the organizational capacities of many governments, leading to a series of failed and collapsing states. And the great powers no longer impose imperial discipline on their proxies, leaving them freer to make misjudgments and trouble.

The third factor is that the end of the Cold War resurrected a debate in the United States about the purposes of American power in the world. This venerable argument is mostly occluded whenever the country is at war—hot or cold—and returns to strength once the war is over. But as America's relative power has grown with each successive cycle, each successive stage of the debate has adapted accordingly. The debate was wrought into its modern conceptual shape early in the twentieth century by two titans: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt. So it remains today, with the views of Wilson triumphant in ever more of the world thanks to American power and tutelage, but with those of TR recently reinstalled in the White House—a consequential irony to which we return in conclusion. Although it involves some academics, this revived debate is not just academic. What the preeminent global power thinks about such matters is enormously significant. Clearly, Americans in the highest offices of the land are vested in the debate, and when they grasp the great wheels that turn policy, they pull hard—and the ship of state comes about. Reviewing this debate is essential, for disputes over the diplomacy of humanitarian intervention rest at its very center.

Controllers, Abstainers, and Shapers

There are three schools of thought in the contemporary version of the great debate, each with an identifiable liberal and conservative wing. These schools are the controllers, the abstainers, and the shapers.[7]

Controllers believe that the United States should maximize its influence and that American hegemony is a good thing. Conservative controllers believe the United States should do so for its own interests because the world is a dangerous place, though they assert that others will benefit as well. This view accepts hegemony as the best route to international stability and decries balance-of-power approaches as inherently prone to crisis. Conservative controllers are realists in that they believe that the essential nature of the

[7] Charles William Maynes coined these terms in "Contending Schools," *National Interest*, Spring 2001, pp. 49–58. I have adopted them because they conform to my own thinking.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world does not change, or at least is unlikely to. The war of all against all is real, so better to win than to lose it. They are Rooseveltians (of the Theodorian sort), but some of them are realists with a twist, believing that American values are so benign that coalitions are unlikely to rise against the United States. In their view, the world is the same, but Americans are different. Liberal controllers, on the other hand, favor American hegemony not because the world is dangerous, but rather because it is needy. Theirs is the therapeutic metaphor, not the power-political one. Liberal controllers are secular messianists; they believe in transformational possibilities and politics. They are Wilsonians (of the Woodrowian sort). The world can be different, and Americans, because they are different, must make it so.

Three corollaries flow from this basic description of controllers. First, while controllers express a desire to work within coalitions whenever possible, allies are instruments, not partners, of American will. Liberal controllers often make exceptions for international organizations, but only when the United States controls their nature and agenda. The United States can burnish its international image by having allies and working through international organizations. Allies may also share costs and help sell policies to their own citizens. But Americans make the decisions, and if they do not determine to act, it is generally presumed, no one else will. Secondly, credibility is seamless. No problem is too small to affect America's image, and image is part and parcel of a great power's influence. Thirdly, the use of force is not a last resort, and the possibility of force acts both as a reward for those who would be protected by it and as a threat to those who would defy the controller. The more overwhelming the specter of American power, the less the need to assert it. Though conservative controllers are less squeamish about this point than liberal controllers, the conclusion is the same: there can be no such thing as too large and capable a U.S. military force.

What are the implications for humanitarian intervention? For conservative controllers it means, yes, intervene—because American credibility and image are at stake. The United States must do good deeds to maximize its "soft power" so that coalitions need not form against it. The country needs an overwhelming military force for prudential reasons so that it may never fail or be embarrassed in such interventions. If, after the fact, intervention entails nation building, Americans should be prepared to stay the course and pay the price, for it increases U.S. presence and influence in the world.

Liberal controllers believe in intervention for all these reasons, and also because such interventions are the key to the transformation of international politics itself. For the Wilsonians of the Clinton administration and its intellectual supporters, the U.S. attitude toward humanitarian intervention had a distinctively teleological dimension. Many believed that if such interventions became a focus of U.S. efforts, they would change world politics in ways no less significant than British antislavery policy in the nineteenth century. Just as the great liberal power of that era transformed the normative

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

environment with regard to slavery, and just as the major Western powers after World War II delegitimized racial hierarchies as a means for ordering world politics (largely through colonial projects), so the United States could delegitimate mass murder and violent repression as political instruments. This is not to say that the Clinton administration had a strategy that fit clearly in the liberal controller school. No strategy was ever systematically imposed on (or by) the administration, and the Clinton administration chose not to intervene in several humanitarian crises. The Clintonites thus spoke like liberal controllers, but acted erratically.[8]

Whatever its inconsistencies, the desire to transform world politics is presumably what the Clinton Doctrine—the June 22, 1999, avowal to stop mass murder everywhere despite the cost to the principle of sovereignty—was all about.[9] It is also what David Rieff means when he writes that "our choice at the millennium seems to boil down to imperialism or barbarism."[10] Choosing imperialism on this scale might mean that U.S. sovereignty ultimately changes shape as a result of its successes, but the new structure of world politics as a whole would reflect American values. In the view of the liberal controllers, American sovereignty would suffuse the transnational republic.

Abstainers believe that the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet power mean that the world is really not such a dangerous place. Most also credit the benign influence of globalization. Not only have military threats to the United States and its allies diminished considerably, but the role of military force in global affairs is also giving way to economic forces and the pacific balm of consumerism. For liberal abstainers this is fine; let a thousand Bloomingdale's bloom. For conservative abstainers this is not so fine, for free trade runs roughshod over organic community and places an unfair burden on blue-collar workers. But neither sort of abstainer sees a need for military alliances. Both wings believe that such atavisms of the Cold War are more likely to drag the United States into regional wars that are none of its business.

Abstainers of both sorts also share a distaste for the idea of humanitarian intervention. Liberal abstainers do not like it because they fear that such interventions will justify a huge U.S. military establishment that benefits the infamous military-industrial complex. They prefer that such problems be handled by a U.N. force or some other coalition of local parties that the United States might encourage and support financially—perhaps—from afar. They might countenance an exception in the case of literal genocide. Con-

[8] For a vivid description of this erraticism in the administration's early years, see Elizabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).

[9] Addressing Kosovo Force troops in Skopje, Macedonia, Clinton said: "We can then say to the people of the world, whether you live in Africa, or Central Europe, or any other place, if somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background or their religion, and it is within our power to stop it, we will stop it." *New York Times*, June 23, 1999.

[10] David Rieff, "A New Age of Liberal Imperialism?" *World Policy Journal*, Summer 1999, p. 10.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

servative abstainers resist putting American soldiers in harm's way unless there is a concrete national interest for so doing. They despise all forms of moralizing "globaloney," believe that charity begins at home, and would—if they read good books—love the way that Charles Dickens parodies Mrs. Jellyby and her concern for the natives of Borrioboola-Gha in *Bleak House*.

Shapers do not believe that American domination is desirable or sustainable, partly because this is a republic, not an empire, and they want to keep it that way. They believe, further, that attempts at control will generate resentment and opposing coalitions, no matter how appealing American values seem (mostly to Americans). Subservient allies will bandwagon with American power if they have no realistic alternative, but having to do so will reduce the appeal of the bond and expose it to premature breakage. Unlike controllers, shapers credit the balance of power as a way to sustain international stability; it is the hegemonist model, they argue, that is more likely to incite war. But all shapers believe that the world remains a dangerous place, even if the dangers assume different shapes and sources from Cold War days. Abstention is not an option.

Shapers, whether liberal or conservative, believe that the United States needs partners. The United States is a great power with an obligation to itself and to others to preserve and expand the benefits of a more peaceful and prosperous world, but trying to do so unilaterally is counterproductive. Shapers would have the United States approach international norms and institutions in such a way that others, of their own volition, will want to join them. In other words, Americans ought to act neither as Wilson nor as TR, but as Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower. That means, first of all, that American primacy must aim to provide common security goods. Only in that context can liberal political and economic institutions spread, and only then with patience and the foreknowledge that the advent of liberty and market economics is often destabilizing both within and among states. Unlike controllers, shapers do not believe in an "end of history" through a final victory of ideas; unlike abstainers, shapers do not believe in an exit from history through isolationism. They believe in perpetual management.

The differences between liberal and conservative shapers are mostly temperamental. Liberals put more stock in international institutions, conservatives in more traditional alliance relationships. Liberals believe in functional methods to calm political distempers; they consider foreign aid, nation building, and cultural exchanges useful for developing new norms, strengthening coalition politics, and spreading American soft power. Most conservative shapers claim less for such efforts and are less reluctant to show a big stick to keep troublemakers in line. Still, both kinds of shapers believe that the American military can be too large and too activist because it can generate adversarial coalitions. As for the question of sovereignty, shapers recognize that the state represents the only means found thus far at the level of mass societies to guarantee democratic political accountability. Some forms of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nationalism have been admittedly illiberal, but no form of transnationalism has yet shown that it can be anything but illiberal with respect to democratic accountability.

It follows that shapers are not political messianists, but they do concede classical realism's flaw in lacking a theory of change. They have to concede it; no sentient American can look at the world today and deny the reality of qualitative change over the past century. That is why conservative shapers, in particular, are well described as leavened realists. It is from the dual recognition that qualitative change in international politics is real but close control of it impossible that shapers draw their temperament. It is also where their robust belief in the law of unintended consequences originates.

Reference above to the nineteenth-century slave trade is worth recalling in this regard. The British aristocracy's determination to end the slave trade was sincere, but it fostered a world view that led in due course to British imperial domination of large parts of Africa.[11] The "white man's burden" was not a cynical phrase in those days, though within a century the shifting of the world's normative order made colonialism nearly as odious a term as slavery had once been. The merits of ending slavery and sparking colonialism are a topic for other debates and essays. The point is that the humanitarian impulses of the powerful are invariably imperial. As Henry Kissinger has put it, starting from the example of the war in Kosovo, "a glaring gap opened up between the claims of the various allied leaders extolling their new ethical foreign policy and the reaction of most of the rest of the world. The developing countries generally interpret the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as a device by which the industrial democracies reassert a neocolonialist hegemony."[12] This observation is the seed that spawned the realist opposition to the Clinton administration's meliorist approach to national security. As far as temperamental realists are concerned, good intentions are proven dangers, and the loftier the intentions are, the more dangerous they become. That, presumably, is why Orwell said that "saints should always be judged guilty until proved innocent."

The humanitarian impulses of the powerful are invariably imperial.

Shapers, then, are selective engagers when it comes to humanitarian intervention. Liberal shapers believe in soft power, and humanitarian intervention—when it works as advertised—advances U.S. soft power. Intervene, they say, as part of a strategy of employing coalition politics to deepen the peace. Do not intervene when doing so would put useful coalition understandings at risk or when an intervention would alienate a major power better integrated into the international mainstream. Similarly, do not intervene with the ulterior motive of undermining international law. International law rec-

[11] I thank Anatol Lieven for raising this point.

[12] Henry A. Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), p. 264.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ognizes the right of intervention in the sovereign affairs of other countries only under two extraordinary circumstances: in the case of genocide and when the U.N. Security Council determines that a problem within a state poses a threat to international security. As shapers see it, that is how things should stay. It may sometimes be necessary to act outside of international law, but making the law itself too permissive would cause excessive collateral damage to international order.

Conservative shapers also worry about appearances of failure, and here it matters a great deal that not all cases of potential humanitarian intervention are created equal. As noted, some are conducive to coalition building and some are corrosive of coalitions. Some require force, some do not. Some can be effective through air power, others require terrestrial methods. Some require peacekeeping, others peacemaking. Some target organized forces that are at least capable of efficient surrender, while others do not. Some require nation building in the aftermath to be a success, some do not. Some will have a large ripple effect regionally—for good or for ill—and others will not. In some places the existing reputation of the United States will be an advantage (Panama, for example), and in others it will be a disadvantage (any Arab country). All this matters because, for the conservative shaper, the first principle of humanitarian intervention is "Do no harm," which, put differently, means "Do not fail."

This also means being careful not to promise more than any humanitarian intervention can reasonably deliver. Had the United States announced upon intervening in Bosnia that it would guarantee the separation of forces, effect a limited demilitarization, facilitate a coalition of European states to help restore civil normalcy, and then depart after a decent interval of calm, American soldiers would be home, and the operation would have been a success. But by claiming the goal of a "multiethnic democracy" in a place that can barely conceive of such a thing, the United States instead guaranteed itself failure at worst and long years of treading diplomatic water at best.

As conservative shapers see it, humanitarian interventions should be a peripheral concern to a major world power such as the United States because, as emotionally evocative as these cases may be, they pale in importance next to existential issues of national security. Conservative shapers believe that U.S. military deployments to missions other than core concerns should be evaluated with reference first to their impact on readiness and resources devoted to major contingencies. But peripheral does not mean entirely absent. If, for example, participation in a humanitarian intervention can strengthen an important bilateral relationship with strategic implications—as did U.S. intervention in East Timor, with Australia—then it makes sense to do it.

Realist shapers are thus especially concerned that humanitarian interventions not be set adrift from prior strategic concerns. If they enhance America's soft power or solidify important coalition relationships at low cost,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

then it makes sense to pursue them. On the other hand, just because the strategic profile of humanitarian interventions is low does not mean that their political profile will remain low. Large mistakes made in a "small" war can have political consequences out of scale to its objective strategic stake—or have we forgotten the Vietnam War? Just as bad, the complications of such engagements can suck attention and resources away from the more important task of maintaining sound relations with those major powers that form the structure of international security writ large. Fail at that, after all, and one loses the power to shape much of anything.[13]

In sum, controllers believe with Tacitus that if you want peace, prepare for war. Abstainers believe with Hank Williams that if you want peace, mind your own business. Shapers believe that if you want peace, balance the institutionalization of opportunity with the deterrence of danger, for the problem of humanitarian intervention is not an abstract moral problem, but one bound to the problem of strategy. This brings us to our second proposition.

A System of Systems to Deal with Humanitarian Crises

Strategy involves matching ends to means, and to work it requires establishing and maintaining priorities. It requires discrimination among options and methods. Controllers do not need a strategy for humanitarian interventions because choices, and hence setting priorities, are unnecessary; we must address all such crises since security and credibility are indivisible. Abstainers do not need a strategy either, for they would address none of these crises.

In the real world, however, the United States needs a way to discriminate among cases. The Clinton administration showed what comes from not having one. Its decisions on any given humanitarian crisis usually came down to short-term prudential considerations driven by media exposure, opinion polls, or categorical moral considerations: is genocide happening or not? President Clinton turned one way and then the other over Bosnia, after first being dissuaded by reading Robert D. Kaplan's *Balkan Ghosts* and then hurled forward by images on CNN of bombed-out marketplaces.[14] All the while the various elements of U.S. diplomacy operated disjointedly through a shifting amalgam of habit, sentiment, bureaucratic logic, and interest-group cajolery. These claimants on diplomacy are harmful even when there is a strategy, but they invariably wreak havoc when strategy is absent.

[13] There have been several efforts to establish formal realist, or "shaper," criteria for U.S. intervention in humanitarian and other crises. See Adam Garfinkle, "NSC-68 Redux?" *SAIS Review*, Winter–Spring 1999, pp. 41–54; Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* chap. 7; and Joseph S. Nye, "Redefining the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, July/Aug. 1999, pp. 22–35.

[14] *Balkan Ghosts* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Short-term prudential and moral concerns *are* important and hard to parse. But they are inadequate as a basis to decide matters of humanitarian intervention. Such decisions must rest within a broader strategic idiom. It was a great anti–Clinton administration applause line to declare that superpowers should not "do windows."[15] But it begs the question of what they *should* do, and the answer is not obvious. If not transform the world, then what?

The basic strategic instinct of the Bush administration is easy to discern, even before the end of any formal strategic review. The administration wants to maintain U.S. global primacy by focusing on sound alliance relations and drawing other major powers into the international political and economic mainstream over which the United States stands preeminent. In that context, the administration wants to spread freedom and the benefits of globalization. But it realizes, as the Clinton administration evidently did not, that the same forces that can benefit so many also let loose tremendous instability. It was embarrassing that the U.S. government so avidly pushed globalization, only to be surprised by the instabilities it caused, such as the Asian financial crisis and the distortion of political reform by the crony capitalism of the post-Soviet world. That is why, along with spreading the benefits of the global Wilsonian era, the Bush administration will need to work at dampening the instabilities that this selfsame process generates, including especially the phenomenon of the failed state. Thus, if the United States would lead a coalition for a more peaceful and prosperous world, it can tolerate only so much general mayhem. The United States cannot successfully pursue the opportunities before it if it is consumed with managing the Somalias, Haitis, and Bosnias of the world.

The United States does not have to lead every posse.

What, then, to do? If the United States does not wish to lead in dealing with such crises, it must erect a system of systems by which other actors—states and international institutions—deal with them instead. The United States does not have to lead every posse, but it does have to build the decision-making system whereby posses are formed. This requires four sorts of effort.

First, the U.S. government needs to become more capable of engaging in preventive diplomacy, so that it can head off conflict before it reaches the level of incipient mass violence.[16] Even if preventive diplomacy succeeds in only 10 percent of the cases it would be worthwhile, given the unpredictable mayhem that any one humanitarian crisis might generate. The United States used to be more capable of such action, but the resources now at the government's disposal for such purposes are inadequate. Showing the way to

[15] See John Hillen, "Superpowers Don't Do Windows," *Orbis*, Spring 1997, pp. 241–57.

[16] In December 1998, President Clinton initiated a project called the Genocide Early Warning System, an interagency effort housed at the State Department. But no resources were provided for this effort and by the end of the Clinton administration virtually nothing had been done.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

improvement, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century recently offered specific proposals for revamping the State Department and the priorities of the intelligence community with precisely the question of preventive diplomacy in mind.[17]

This is not to say that preventive diplomacy is easy to practice or guaranteed to succeed; even under the best of circumstances, an amateurish effort can be counterproductive. The encouragement the Clinton administration gave to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the summer of 1998, for example, by sending U.S. aircraft over the Kosovo-Albanian border, may have seemed a way to deter Serbian aggression against Albanians in Kosovo. Instead, it led the KLA to try deliberately to enmesh the United States in a war on its behalf against Serbia. Early American efforts therefore had the opposite effect from that intended. More generally, since disaffected groups have the power to make trouble but not to commit genocide—while ethnic groups who hold the powers of the state do—any policy that automatically reacts against government repression in effect aids rebel groups. All else being equal, such a policy is liable to encourage acts of rebellion. That, too, is unwise.[18]

Also unwise is for the United States to lead every effort at prevention and amelioration by itself. In this regard, the establishment of a U.N. constabulary force, under the aegis of the Security Council, is not an outlandish idea. Indeed, it has garnered support not only from liberals, but also from the likes of Edward Luttwak, William F. Buckley, and Ronald Reagan.[19] In 1993, a bipartisan federal commission on improving the effectiveness of the United Nations also recommended a U.N. rapid-reaction "legion" as an element of preventive diplomacy.[20] As a number of studies have pointed out, that notion does have its strict limitations.[21] If any permanent Security Council member opposes its use, the force will not be employed. If it runs into serious combat, its standing capabilities may quickly prove inadequate and even embarrassing. Indeed, the record of such forces to date is poor: they have taken too long to muster and have not fared well once in place. But their performance can improve, and in those instances where the major powers are in agree-

[17] U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change* (Washington, D.C.: USCNS/21, Mar. 15, 2001), esp. section III.

[18] I thank Dr. Alan Kuperman for reminding me of this dynamic.

[19] See Edward Luttwak, "Where Are the Great Powers?" *Foreign Affairs*, July/Aug. 1994, pp. 23–28; William F. Buckley, "On Being Involved with Mankind," *National Review*, Dec. 23, 1996; and Ronald Reagan, "The Work of Freedom . . . An Unending Challenge," *Washington Times*, Dec. 14, 1992.

[20] James A. Leach and Charles M. Lichenstein, co-chairs, *Final Report of the United States Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993). I am indebted to John G. Heidenrich for bringing this commission to my attention, as well as the Buckley and Reagan citations above.

[21] See John Hillen, *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1998); and John Bolton, "'Preventive Diplomacy' and the Role of the United Nations," in *In Harm's Way: Intervention and Prevention* (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of the Presidency, Fall 2000).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment and where local antagonists want external help, such a force can be an economical solution.

Beyond preventive diplomacy, the United States must also try to institutionalize protection against the depredations that conduce to humanitarian disaster. In other words, it should take steps to halt the disintegration that may be wrought by rapid change before it reaches the politico-military level. All too often, preventable conditions give rise to pandemic social ills. Retrograde banking practices encourage corruption and kleptocracy. Legal vacuums hamper effective political and economic reform. Governments tolerate or abet narco-terrorism because they see few short-term alternatives for economic growth. The parochialism of both governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) distorts refugee aid and relief mechanisms. Certifiably insane land-use practices—such as building residential dwellings on flood plains using timber from immediately adjacent hillsides—are widespread and dangerous. All of these problems can contribute to "failed states" and humanitarian disasters.

The United States does not stand helpless in the face of such circumstances. Ameliorating such problems is part of what is meant by providing common security goods. But to provide such goods, the United States needs to work with NGOs and U.N. agencies in a way that takes these institutions seriously. To the extent that they are not adequate to the task, the United States has an interest in seeing that they become so. That means there is little choice but to make common cause with other democratic and administratively competent governments—America's European allies, the Canadians, and the democracies of East Asia. And that means, in turn, that the cost of disagreement with these governments on other issues has to be reckoned as including the diminution of the U.S. ability to solve common global functional problems.

Failing proximate or longer-term efforts at prevention, the third task for the United States is to seek regional partners to take the lead in dealing with humanitarian crises. This is a variation on the Nixon Doctrine, promulgated more than thirty years ago under other circumstances and for other purposes, but the basic spirit remains the same. The European Union, Canada, Japan, and Australia—and potentially countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, and South Korea—have important roles to play in this form of burden sharing. Perhaps no other countries in the world have the administrative and technical capabilities—and the wealth—to do what is necessary. This is a notion, too, that should appeal to the current administration, at least in principle. George W. Bush, as a presidential candidate, asserted that the Clinton administration "made the right decision on training Nigerian troops for situations just such as this in Rwanda." Likewise, Condoleezza Rice has written that humanitarian interventions "might be better carried out by regional actors, as modeled by the Australian-led intervention in East Timor.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The U.S. might be able to lend financial, logistic, and intelligence support."[22] Some analysts have also suggested using "private" armies (i.e., mercenaries) either to patrol or to intervene in humanitarian crises. While such an approach might have a place in some instances, it is difficult to see how national policy could be predicated on such tactics.

Appealing or not, even here there are pitfalls to avoid. A U.S. partnership with Nigeria, for example, may effectively dampen trouble in Sierra Leone, Burundi, or Liberia, but it may also embolden a future Nigerian government to act imperiously with regard to its smaller West African neighbors. The United States may choose partners with their own sins and harvest domestic resentment when they fall. As with preventive diplomacy, there is no risk-free path and no substitute for good diplomatic judgment.

If crisis prevention fails, if getting at the source of instability proves too hard or too distant, and if multilateralism is not possible, the United States may still be right to mount an intervention—but only if it does not oversell the effort. This means not sensationalizing the situation, saying less rather than more, avoiding the snare of taking cues from media images and agendas, and striving post hoc to build international support for the undertaking. No one can pretend that doing any of this is easy.

All four of these efforts, in one way or another, put a premium on working well with others. It is true that American decisiveness is usually necessary to establish a working coalition, but that is a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for success. The Bush administration may find it particularly awkward to address humanitarian crises in concert with U.S. allies in Europe. The Wilsonians among the Europeans will interpret every heartbreaking crisis as a failure of American leadership, and the Rooseveltians in Washington will privately interpret their bleating as woolly-headed hypocrisy.

Clearly, the realists of the Bush administration feel uneasy about the international Wilsonian consensus as it has come to look early in the twenty-first century, especially among the "Third Way" social democrats of Europe. Key players on the Bush team are inclined toward solid military alliances, not collective security arrangements—and the difference between the two is huge. Thus, they want a functional NATO, not a watered-down European security and defense identity halfway in bed with Moscow. They do not see arms possession as a problem, but rather as a symptom of prior political problems, and they do not trust formal arms control as a means to ensure peace. They favor missile defenses and facing down North Korean extortion, while the Europeans tend to see both inclinations as Cold War atavisms. To be sure, administration principals recognize nontraditional security problems—global warming, environmental issues, the AIDS epidemic in Africa,

[22] Bush made this comment in the second presidential debate, Oct. 11, 2000; Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," p. 53.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and so forth. But they do not place them above geopolitical concerns and certainly do not approach them with the energy of a religious zealot.

This means, in sum, that for the Bush administration to deal effectively with the humanitarian crises ahead, it will need the help of precisely those with whom it is having considerable difficulty establishing common ground. It would be a mistake to underestimate the attitudinal divergence between the United States and its closest traditional allies, and unless some way is found to manage this divergence, the U.S. diplomacy of humanitarian intervention may face a very difficult four years.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

International Negotiation
A Journal of Theory and Practice

Editor-in-Chief:
Bertram I. Spector
Center for Negotiation Analysis, Potomac, MD, USA

In an era of dramatic change in international affairs, there are many significant examples of interdependence in the fields of environment, trade, economies, politics and security, which contrast strongly with the increasing number of conflicts caused by nationalistic, ethnic and religious issues. These contradictory trends often seek resolution through the mechanism of international negotiation and mediation.

International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice examines negotiation from many perspectives, to explore its theoretical foundations and to promote its practical application. It addresses the processes of negotiation relating to political, security, environmental, ethnic, economic, business, legal, scientific and cultural issues and conflicts among nations, international and regional organisations, multinational corporations and other non-state parties.

The journal's practical aim is to identify, analyse and explain effective and efficient international negotiation and mediation processes that result in long-lasting, flexible and implementable solutions. The Editors feel that these questions may be more effectively addressed by devoting entire issues of the journal to the study of a particular problem. **International Negotiation** therefore consists primarily of focused, thematic issues that review the state-of-the-art on a selected topic, introduce original research, present new concepts and methods, and identify future directions for study. Each issue offers a coherent, integrated perspective on a specific subject, including such key areas as ethnic bargaining in pluralistic societies, water diplomacy, negotiating within the EU, the Oslo process, non-traditional security negotiation, business and economic negotiation, the place of ethics, the role of NGOs, negotiating cultural identity, internal conflict negotiations, and sustainable development talks.

2001, Volume 6 (3 issues), ISSN 1382-340X
Subscription rate: EUR 166.50 / USD 167.00 / GBP 106.25
Individuals may subscribe at the reduced rate of:
EUR 82.50 / USD 83.00 / GBP 52.75

Visit the journal's websites at: **http://interneg.org/in/** or **www.kluwerlaw.com**

Please contact our office at one of the following addresses or order from your bookseller:

For Europe and Rest of World:
Order Department, Kluwer Law International,
Distribution Centre, PO Box 322,
3300 AH Dordrecht, The Netherlands
Tel: +31 (0)78 654 6454 - Fax: +31 (0)78 654 6474
Freephone in the UK: 0800 963 955
email: sales@kli.wkap.nl

For USA, Canada, Central and South America:
Kluwer Academic Publishers
101 Philip Drive, Norwell, MA 02061 USA
Telephone toll-free in the US: 866 269 WKAP
All other customers: + 1 781 871 6600
Fax: + 1 781 681 9045
E-mail: Kluwer@wkap.com

Visit our website at http://www.kluwerlaw.com

KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL
Incorporating the publishing programmes of Graham & Trotman, Kluwer Law and Taxation and Martinus Nijhoff.
THE HAGUE · LONDON · NEW YORK

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Humanitarian Intervention

Liberals, Neocons, and Realcons

by Michael C. Desch

How should we understand the politics of humanitarian intervention?[1] Do American leaders decide where and when to use military force to prevent or stop humanitarian crises on a case-by-case basis from ad hoc motivations, or do overarching ideological predispositions determine when they act or abstain? While there is no doubt that domestic politics and particular circumstances affect when and how the United States engages in humanitarian intervention, a larger ideological backdrop plays a greater role. This essay explores the two major ideological poles in past and future debates about humanitarian intervention: liberalism and conservative realism.

In his book *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington suggested that the fundamental source of civil-military conflict in the United States was the tension between civilian liberalism and the conservative realist ethic prevalent in the military officer corps. Following Louis Hartz, Huntington maintained that liberalism had such deep roots in American political culture that it dominated civilian political attitudes.[2] Liberalism certainly has a powerful hold on some American civilian elites, but there is ample evidence that realism has also played an important role in the practice, if not always the rhetoric, of American diplomacy.[3] Debates about humanitarian intervention

[1] This article draws on talks on humanitarian intervention and military operations other than war that I gave at the John M. Olin Center for the Investigation Into the Theory and Practice of Democracy, University of Chicago, May 2000, and the Senior Conference, U.S. Military Academy, June 1994. For helpful comments I thank George Herring, Samuel Huntington, John Mearsheimer, and my fellow panelists at the Foreign Policy Research Institute conference "The Question of Humanitarian Intervention," Philadelphia, Pa., Feb. 12–13, 2001: Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Harvey Sicherman, Rick Newman, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, and Steven Kull.

[2] *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1957); and Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Founding* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1955).

[3] John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001).

Michael C. Desch is associate professor and associate director of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, the University of Kentucky.

© 2001 Foreign Policy Research Institute. Published by Elsevier Science Limited.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the 1990s certainly fell on either side of this liberal-realist divide, and evidence already suggests that in the early years of the 2000s these debates will continue to be waged along the same lines. The big difference, however, is that during the Clinton years the liberal interventionists were civilians concentrated in the executive branch and agencies, whereas the conservative realists who opposed intervention were largely in the U.S. military and Congress. Hence, humanitarian intervention was in fact an issue of civil-military relations. Today, those positions have been reversed: the new Bush administration includes many conservative realists (realcons), among them Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, whereas liberal internationalism is losing ground within the executive branch. The remaining proponents of humanitarian intervention are the neoconservatives (neocons), who share many of the liberals' assumptions. Thus, the battles over humanitarian intervention in the Bush administration will be waged along the fault lines dividing post–Cold War conservatives. It remains to be seen which side the public will support, but given that public support for humanitarian intervention has always been shallow and transient, chances are good that the heyday of humanitarian intervention is over.

The Intellectual Foundations of Humanitarian Interventionism

Liberalism and conservative realism have very different philosophical roots. The former draws upon elements of the just-war tradition of such medieval scholastics as St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, and such Enlightenment theories as John Locke's social contract, Immanuel Kant's vision of perpetual peace based on a republican league of states, Baron de Montesquieu's view that trade promotes democracy and peace, and Adam Smith's reconciliation of morality and self-interest. Realists, on the other hand, trace their intellectual lineage back to Thucydides' arguments about the primacy of power in relations among states, Niccólo Machiavelli's claims for the centrality of *raison d'état* in foreign policy, Thomas Hobbes's picture of the bleak life of man (or states) in the anarchic state of nature, and Edmund Burke's critique of utopian revolution.

Elements of both intellectual traditions were evident in the early debates among the Founding Fathers over foreign policy issues such as support for France during the Revolutionary Wars and the Monroe Doctrine, and they continued to define the poles of subsequent foreign policy debates.[4] Major figures in the conservative realist tradition included George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, John Quincy Adams, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Walter Lippman, George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, and Richard Nixon. The liberal American statesmen and thinkers included Thomas Jeffer-

[4] Charles D. Tarlton, "The Styles of American International Thought," *World Politics*, July 1965, pp. 584–614.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

son, William Jennings Bryan, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, Jimmy Carter, and Bill Clinton. Some major figures, such as the Democrat Harry Truman and the Republican Ronald Reagan, had a foot in both camps.

Contemporary adherents of each world view look to different historical events to illustrate the nature of the current problems in world politics. The two most salient historical events defining the current debate about humanitarian intervention are the Holocaust and the Vietnam War. For liberals, the central, damning fact of the Holocaust was that the United States and the international community stood by and did nothing while the Nazis exterminated nearly 6 million Jews and occasioned the deaths of over 16 million other people. The current assertion of the West's moral obligation to intervene in cases of ethnic conflict and genocide derives in great part from the sense, born of rage or guilt, that something (such as easing immigration quotas or bombing death camps) could have been done to combat the Holocaust, but was not. Liberals, therefore, approach humanitarian intervention with a "never again" moral imperative.[5] What is more, the Holocaust has played a major role in undermining the sacrosanct status of state sovereignty in international law and shifting the focus to the obligation of the international community to protect citizens within states, thereby reinforcing liberal enthusiasm for humanitarian intervention.[6]

The most salient events defining the current debate are the Holocaust and the Vietnam War.

Conservative realists also draw lessons from the Second World War—for instance, not to appease dictators (the famous Munich analogy). Moreover, the cry "never again" echoes in their skepticism about humanitarian intervention, although there is a crucial difference: the salient historical reference for realists is not the Holocaust, but rather the Vietnam War. Conservative realists, both military and civilian, regard U.S. involvement in Vietnam as the epitome of the misapplication of military force and the effort to build a democratic nation in South Vietnam as a noble but futile project.[7] The failure of the United States and the international community to build a nation in Somalia twenty years later, at the cost of eighteen U.S. soldiers dead and scores wounded, powerfully reinforced the lessons of

[5] Stephen J. Solarz and Michael O'Hanlon, "Humanitarian Intervention: When Is Force Justified?" *Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1997, pp. 3–26; and David S. Wyman, *The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941–1945*, rev. ed. (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 341–54.

[6] See Richard J. Goldstone, "From the Holocaust: Some Legal and Moral Implications" in *Is the Holocaust Unique? Perspective on Comparative Genocide*, ed. Alan S. Rosenbaum (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2001), pp. 41–47.

[7] For an excellent discussion of the American military's conservative realist ethic during the Cold War, see Richard K. Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). Among prominent realist opponents of the Vietnam War, see Hans Morgenthau, *Vietnam and the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965); and Kenneth Waltz, "The Politics of Peace," *International Studies Quarterly*, Sept. 1967, pp. 199–211.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Vietnam. For conservative realists, the use of military force in pursuit of national interest, the prime example being the Gulf War, is wise, while the use of force to promote liberal conceptions of world order and human rights, whether in Bosnia, Somalia, or Kosovo, is ill advised.

One of the ironies of the Vietnam War was that while it dampened liberal ardor for using military force in some instances (Central America and the Gulf War, for example), many liberals have nevertheless become post–Cold War hawks, advocating the frequent, if nontraditional, employment of force.[8] This in fact meshes well with Huntington's argument that liberals are willing to use force so long as objectives are altruistic. Moreover, many liberals have long envied the mobilizing capacity of military "threats" and the concerted and purposive responses that militaries can marshal. Since traditional, nonmilitary instruments of statecraft such as diplomacy and economic sanctions are not as effective, many liberals have sought to define every international problem since the Cold War as a security "threat" and summon the military, despite their reservations about Vietnam. This has certainly been true of humanitarian interventions.

What does it mean, then, to say that someone is a liberal or a conservative realist with respect to humanitarian intervention? A liberal, according to Huntington, is someone who believes that (1) individual rights hold primacy over national interests and sovereignty; (2) the natural state of man is peaceful; (3) the application of reason can resolve conflicts of interest among individuals and states; (4) human nature is malleable and improvable; (5) human society is progressively improving; (6) norms are more important than power; (7) international institutions are effective means of promoting harmony; and (8) military force should only be used in pursuit of altruistic objectives. A conservative realist, by contrast, maintains that (1) the collective good supersedes individual interests; (2) man is inherently evil and weak; (3) conflict and strife are inherent in human relations; (4) human nature is immutable and the likelihood of progress minimal; (5) power is central to human interaction; (6) national security is precarious and constant vigilance is necessary to protect it; (7) the nation-state is the most important actor in international politics; and (8) war is a useful and legitimate tool to advance the national interest, but should only be used for that purpose.[9] For liberals, nearly all of their beliefs on these matters support humanitarian interventions; for conservative realists, most of their beliefs lead them to be skeptical.

The Old Politics of Humanitarian Intervention under Clinton

Huntington's notion of a realist military clashing with liberal civilians comes closest to describing the debates about humanitarian intervention

[8] See, for example, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., "'Nation Building?' Yes," *New York Times*, Jan. 25, 2001.

[9] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 90–91.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

during the Clinton administration. Clinton took office after the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet military threat. Under the best of circumstances, this was apt to be a difficult period in civil-military relations. Without a clear threat, intense debates were bound to arise over defining the primary mission of the post–Cold War American military. In addition, a period of reduced threat was likely to induce civilians to push for reductions in the size of the military and the defense budget, triggering military opposition and resistance.[10]

There was a fundamental disparity between Clinton's liberalism and the military's conservative realism. In his first major foreign policy statement during the 1992 presidential election campaign, Clinton embraced Kant's classical argument to the effect that democracies never go to war with each other.[11] Given that belief, it was inevitable that he would turn the promotion of democracy into a shibboleth of his administration. The Clinton administration also embraced international institutions as a main vehicle through which states could work to ensure peace and cooperation. Its enthusiasm for NATO expansion, which cynics attributed to electoral imperatives or hidden anti-Russian bias, was couched rhetorically, and no doubt sincerely, in terms of transforming NATO from a traditional alliance into a pan-European collective security institution. Finally, as Huntington anticipated, the administration was not averse to using the military to further liberal objectives. Clinton's ambassador to the United Nations and later secretary of state, Madeleine K. Albright, nicely captured the prevailing sentiment: "What's the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if we can't use it?"[12] So the Clinton administration did use U.S. armed forces eighty-four times (an average of twelve times per year), ranging from military strikes against Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan, to military operations other than war (MOOTW) designed to relieve famine or repress ethnic conflict. In contrast, over the forty-six years of the Cold War, the United States conducted about a hundred military operations (two per year), a much larger percentage of which were traditional war-fighting missions.[13] Pushing for more and more MOOTW at a time of strategic uncertainty, declining force size, and shrinking budgets was a foolproof recipe for intense civil-military conflict.

In addition to the general philosophical principles that led liberals to support humanitarian intervention,[14] the legacy of the Holocaust provided a powerful historical metaphor to justify such action. For example, during the

[10] See my discussion in *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), chap. 2. For recent evidence that high-level Clinton administration officials are now admitting their serious problems with the U.S. military, see Jane Perlez, "For 8 Years, a Strained Relationship with the Military," *New York Times*, Dec. 28, 2000.

[11] "Excerpts from Speech by Clinton on U.S. Role," *New York Times*, Oct. 2, 1992.

[12] Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 576.

[13] See Federation of American Scientists, "United States Military Operations" (http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/index.html#post).

[14] John Rawls, "The Law of Peoples," *Critical Inquiry*, Autumn 1993, pp. 36–68.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weeks leading up to NATO's American-led air campaign against Serbia in the spring of 1999, the Clinton administration and its supporters regularly cited the international community's failure to intervene before the Second World War as providing the moral imperative for doing so today. Clinton made this argument explicitly:

> Sarajevo, the capitol of neighboring Bosnia, is where World War I began. World War II and the Holocaust engulfed this region. In both wars Europe was slow to recognize the dangers, and the United States waited even longer to enter the conflicts. Just imagine if leaders back then had acted wisely and early enough, how many lives could have been saved, how many Americans would not have had to die.
>
> We learned some of the same lessons in Bosnia just a few years ago. The world did not act early enough to stop that war either. And let's not forget what happened—innocent people herded into concentration camps, children gunned down by snipers on their way to school, soccer fields and parks turned into cemeteries; a quarter of a million people killed, not because of anything they have done, but because of who they were. Two million Bosnians became refugees. This was genocide in the heart of Europe—not in 1945, but in 1995. Not in some grainy newsreel from our parents' and grandparents' time, but in our own time, testing our humanity and our resolve.[15]

At the height of NATO's air campaign against the Serbs in Kosovo, the president and the first lady sponsored a seminar titled "The Perils of Indifference," which featured the noted Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel. Peter Novick offers numerous examples of how the rhetoric of the Holocaust found its way into the debates over whether to intervene in the face of egregious violations of human rights in Bosnia, Haiti, and Rwanda.[16] Clearly, the legacy of the Holocaust played an important role in encouraging the Clinton administration to undertake humanitarian intervention.

One of the major consequences of the Clinton administration's posture was to undermine its relationship with the military. In fact, civil-military jousting began even before Clinton was elected. As a candidate he campaigned in 1992 on a platform of assisting the international community in "shooting its way into Sarajevo," while the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, explained in the *New York Times* why such policies made generals nervous.[17] Humanitarian interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo each sparked fairly intense periods of conflict along lines drawn largely, though not exclusively, between liberal civilians and realist military officers.[18]

[15] "Statement by the President to the Nation," Oval Office, Mar. 24, 1999 (available at US Mission to NATO Archive of Policy Statements of Prior Presidents, http://usa.grmbl.com/s19990325h.html).

[16] Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1999), pp. 247–55.

[17] R. W. Apple, "Campaign Shifts to New Turf: Clinton Challenges Bush on His Strong Suit, Foreign Policy," *New York Times*, July 29, 1992; and Colin Powell, "When Generals Get Nervous," *New York Times*, Oct. 8, 1992.

[18] For evidence of civil-military tension over Bosnia, see Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Modern Library, 1999); and Michael R. Gordon, "General in Balkan War Says Pentagon Hampered NATO," *New York Times*, May 21, 2001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Powell epitomized the position that military force should only be used for purposes clearly in the national interest. His famous doctrine, which he first helped Caspar Weinberger formulate during the Reagan administration and later refined in his own name, set the following conditions under which force should be used: (1) the issue at stake must be a "vital national interest"; (2) force is to be used massively or not at all; (3) political and military objectives should be clear; (4) the operation must have overwhelming congressional and public support; and (5) force should only be used when all other instruments of statecraft have been exhausted. Not surprisingly, few cases of humanitarian intervention can meet those criteria, since they rarely affect vital interests, seldom call for unconstrained use of military force, involve political and military objectives that are murky at best, tend to inspire indifference in the public and Congress, and are often resistant to other instruments of statecraft.

As Powell's *My American Journey* and James Kitfield's *Prodigal Soldiers* both make clear, the reticence of the American military is a legacy of the war in Vietnam.[19] Most of the military's senior leadership in the 1990s had been bloodied as company-grade and young field-grade officers in a conflict that they believed had nearly destroyed the armed forces. By the end of the war, the services suffered from rampant drug use, endemic racial conflict, and miserable morale, while the American public's willingness to send their sons and daughters to the colors was so uncertain that the military was forced to lower its recruitment standards radically.

In response, the senior leadership of the military, especially the army, initiated a remarkable rebuilding process in the late 1970s. Central to it was the imperative to make the military's primary mission the fighting and winning of a high-technology conventional war against the Soviet Union and its allies in Central Europe, southwest Asia, or the Korean peninsula. Eschewing "nation building" and low-intensity conflict, the doctrinal reformers of the late 1970s produced the force that won a stunning victory in the Gulf War. But this organizational renaissance also had negative consequences. Along with the lesson that the military should devote itself exclusively to deterring or winning the nation's wars came the conviction that what went wrong in Vietnam was that the senior military leadership had blindly obeyed ultimately disastrous civilian commands. As Powell confirms, he and his generation of military leaders resolved that they would never again "quietly acquiesce in half-hearted warfare for half-baked reasons."[20] A recent book influential among today's younger officers, H. R. McMaster's *Dereliction of Duty*, also concludes that if only senior military leaders had spoken out forcefully in the

[19] James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1995).

[20] Powell, *My American Journey*, p. 149.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1960s, disaster might have been averted.[21] As a result, senior commanders have been far more assertive about injecting military views into political debates.

So the legacy of Vietnam came back to haunt many liberals in the Clinton administration, including the president himself. His avoidance of military service during Vietnam and comments about "loathing" the military did not endear him to the troops once he became commander in chief. Many of his senior foreign policy aides also appeared hypocritical when they advocated using force in Bosnia or Kosovo, since Albright and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke had both opposed the Vietnam War. Military resentment was manifest throughout the Clinton administration, beginning with Powell's role in the debate about Bosnia during the 1992 campaign and continuing through what many regard as an orchestrated pattern of high-level military leaks questioning the wisdom of the administration's air war against Serbia in spring 1999.

The New Politics of Humanitarian Intervention under Bush

If the old politics of humanitarian intervention were marked by civil-military conflict, the new politics during the George W. Bush administration are likely to be characterized by the breakup of the Reagan-era conservative consensus. Already by the early 1990s it was clear that this alliance was falling apart. Realcons such as Samuel Huntington, Charles Krauthammer, Owen Harries, Fareed Zakaria, Edward Luttwak, and George Will began to stake out foreign policy and defense positions markedly different from those of neocons such as William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Norman Podhoretz, Jacob Heilbrunn, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Michael Ledeen, Joshua Muravchik, and Paul Wolfowitz.[22] Realcons advocate a foreign and defense policy designed to defend America's vital interests, and see little at stake for the United States in most of the humanitarian wars of the 1990s. Moreover, they believe that one of the great dangers facing the nation in the early twenty-first century stems precisely from U.S. preponderance. They fear that since the United States is so overwhelmingly powerful, an activist and often arrogant foreign policy risks provoking a counterbalancing coalition. Bush's call for more humility in America's role abroad has resonated sympathetically with the realcons.

Conversely, the neocons advocate vigorous policies to maintain American preponderance in order to manage the new world order. The exemplar of such a policy was the famous 1992 Defense Policy Guidance floated by neocons during the first Bush administration, which sought to

[21] H. R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* (New York: HarperCollins, 1997).

[22] Gideon Rose, "Present Laughter or Utopian Bliss?" *National Interest*, Winter 1999/2000, pp. 41–47.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prevent the rise of any challengers to the United States' global dominance.[23] Neocons also believe that if the United States does not seize the unipolar moment, its credibility as a great power will be undermined. Finally, neocons maintain that ideals are as important as interests, hence their support for spreading democracy and intervening to resolve humanitarian crises. Podhoretz says that neocons "assert that the proper strategic objective of the United States is 'to make the world safe for democracy,'"[24] and Wolfowitz notes that "[n]othing could be less realistic than the version of the 'realist' view of foreign policy that dismisses human rights as an important tool of American foreign policy."[25] Promoting democracy and humanitarian intervention have emerged as two of the key issues dividing realcons from neocons.

To date, the Bush administration seems inclined toward the realcon pole, at least in terms of humanitarian intervention. As a candidate, Bush made this clear in his debates with Vice President Al Gore by echoing the Powell Doctrine and alluding very pointedly to the cautionary lessons of Vietnam:

> MODERATOR: New question. How would you go about as president deciding when it was in the national interest to use U.S. force, generally?
>
> BUSH: Well, if it's in our vital national interest, and that means whether our territory is threatened or people could be harmed, whether or not the alliances are—our defense alliances are threatened, whether or not our friends in the Middle East are threatened. That would be a time to seriously consider the use of force. Secondly, whether or not the mission was clear. Whether or not it was a clear understanding as to what the mission would be. Thirdly, whether or not we were prepared and trained to win. Whether or not our forces were of high morale and high standing and well-equipped. And finally, whether or not there was an exit strategy. I would take the use of force very seriously. I would be guarded in my approach. I don't think we can be all things to all people in the world. I think we've got to be very careful when we commit our troops. The vice president and I have a disagreement about the use of troops. He believes in nation building. I would be very careful about using our troops as nation builders. I believe the role of the military is to fight and win war and therefore prevent war from happening in the first place. So I would take my responsibility seriously.[26]

Bush also intimated that he wanted to withdraw U.S. forces engaged in peacekeeping missions in the Balkans as soon as possible, considered the Clinton administration's intervention in Haiti a mistake, and was relieved that the United States had not intervened in the Rwandan genocide of 1994. These

[23] "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Re-emergence of a New Rival,'" *New York Times*, Mar. 8, 1992.

[24] Norman Podhoretz, "Strange Bedfellows: A Guide to the New Foreign Policy Debates," *Commentary*, Dec. 1999, pp. 19–32.

[25] Quoted in Stan Crock, "Bush's Foreign Policy: Like Father, Like Son?" *Business Week*, Aug. 14, 2000, p. 36.

[26] General Election Presidential Debate, Oct. 3, 2000, University of Massachusetts, Boston (http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2000a.html).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 1 Conservative and Neoconservative Views on Foreign Policy

Respondents who . . .	Conservative	Neoconservative
• view policy of "enlarging" democracy as successful	29.9%	46.9%
• think human rights should be cornerstone of policy	37.9	59.4
• oppose peacekeeping as a central military mission	79.3	43.8
• support Powell Doctrine	43.6	18.8
• oppose open-ended military commitment to Bosnia	74.7	46.9

Source: Michael P. Noonan, "Conservative Opinions on U.S. Foreign Policy," *Orbis*, Fall 1999, pp. 621–32. Survey respondents defined themselves as conservative or neoconservative (among other categories).

sentiments were echoed by his first senior national security appointees, Powell and Rice. The latter suggested that the United States would no longer be "the world's 911."[27] There is some evidence that a bipartisan foreign policy coalition endorsing a policy of "realistic restraint" on the use of force may be emerging as well.[28]

Now that the military's conservative realism has established a beachhead in the executive branch, it seems likely that the sharp civil-military conflict over humanitarian intervention in the 1990s will abate, although civil-military conflict over other issues such as defense spending and resource priorities may continue.[29] The new debate about humanitarian intervention will take place largely within the Republican Party, and Table 1 makes clear that the differences between the two sides are quite striking.

A neocon-liberal alliance is by no means out of the question.

The realcon/neocon schism has already manifested itself in disputes over personnel appointments and the administration's new Iraq policy.[30] So far, it appears that the neocons have been marginalized, as is evident from Wolfowitz's being passed over for secretary of defense (though he and a few other neocons did receive lower appointments at the Pentagon) and no other neocons' receiving cabinet-level foreign policy or national security positions in the Bush administration.[31] If they want to promote humanitarian interventions and other aspects of a more activist foreign policy, the neocons will have to find allies outside the executive branch—indeed, outside the Republican Party. A neo-

[27] Condoleezza Rice, "American Dream for Us All," address to the Republican National Convention, Philadelphia, Pa., Aug. 1, 2000, in *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Aug. 15, 2000, pp. 653–55.

[28] For evidence of this see Senators Pat Roberts (R-Kan.) and Max Cleland (D-Ga.), "Realistic Restraint: Seven Principles for Shaping a New National Strategy," *Armed Forces Journal International*, Jan. 2001, p. 12.

[29] Rowan Scarborough, "Military Expects Bush to Perform," *Washington Times*, Dec. 26, 2000; George C. Wilson, "Rumsfeld Upset by Joint Chiefs' $10B Supplemental Plan," *National Journal's CongressDaily*, Jan. 24, 2001; and Lisa Caruso and Stephen Norton, with Charlie Mitchell, "Appropriators Angered by Joint Chiefs' Supplemental Request," ibid., Jan. 25, 2001.

[30] See Jacob Heilbrunn, "Win Another One for the Gipper," *Wall Street Journal*, Dec. 18, 2000; and Lawrence Kaplan, "Drill Sergeant," *New Republic*, Mar. 26, 2001, pp. 17–21.

[31] For a contrary view, see Lawrence Kaplan, "Containment: Dick Cheney's Plan to Stop Colin Powell," *New Republic*, Feb. 4, 2001, pp. 17–20.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 2 Comparison of Conservative Realists, Liberals, and Neoconservatives

Issue	Realcons	Liberals	Neocons
individual vs. group	group	individual	group
human condition	conflict	cooperation	mixed
human rationality	little	much	mixed
human nature	unchangeable (bad)	changeable	changeable
society improvable	no	yes (from below)	yes (from above)
norms vs. power	power	norms	both
role of international institutions	negligible	central	negligible
role of military	warfighting	promote ideals, human rights	warfighting and idealism

Source: Adapted from Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1957).

con-liberal alliance is by no means out of the question, especially since many neocons started out in the Democratic Party or even well to the left of it. Others aligned themselves with conservative Democrats such as Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson of Washington. And even after many neocons broke with the Democratic Party in the late 1960s and early 1970s over a variety of issues, including the increasingly anti-Israel stance of many in the party, they still identified with Democratic figures such as Woodrow Wilson, Dean Acheson, and Harry Truman. In recent years, some neocons have again found some common ground with liberal Democrats. In 1992, for example, a group of neocons took out an ad in the *New York Times* endorsing Clinton's candidacy for president. In 1999, Norman Podhoretz and other neocons joined liberals such as Anthony Lewis to petition in favor of military action against the Serbs in Kosovo. Thus, there is ample precedent for neocons to ally themselves with liberals in Congress in the future, especially in support of humanitarian intervention.

As Table 2 suggests, enough overlap exists between liberals and neocons on issues relevant to humanitarian intervention to justify an alliance. A big difference between them concerns the role of international institutions, since neocons tend to be far more unilateralist than liberals. But the compatibilities between liberals and neocons go much deeper than mere tactical convenience. Both types are "radicals" in the sense Huntington suggested in his essay "Conservativism as an Ideology."[32] That is, both evince deep dissatisfaction with the state of American society as it is, although their respective remedies differ.[33] Huntington argues that such a dissatisfaction with the status quo is not compatible with conservativism, but rather is the

[32] Samuel P. Huntington, "Conservativism as an Ideology," *American Political Science Review*, June 1957, pp. 454–73. For his application of this discussion to the neocon/realcon debate, see his "Robust Nationalism," *National Interest*, Winter 1999/2000, pp. 31–40.

[33] On this see Robert Devigne, *Recasting Conservativism: Oakshott, Strauss, and the Response to Postmodernism* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 59.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hallmark of a radicalism that can manifest itself not only on the Left, but also the Right.

Another area of common ground is the liberals' and neocons' distaste for realism. Bill Clinton himself dismissed realism on the grounds that "in a world where freedom, not tyranny, is on the march, the cynical calculus of pure power politics simply does not compute. It is ill-suited to a new era."[34] There is a similarly strident anti-realism among neocons. Leon Wieseltier, literary editor of the *New Republic* (a magazine that perfectly embodies the substantial common ground between liberalism and neoconservativism), excoriated realcons who opposed U.S. intervention in Kosovo in the spring of 1999. He was particularly scathing about Fareed Zakaria's argument for accepting the partition of Kosovo:

> And then [Zakaria], too, takes cover behind Winston Churchill. "As Winston Churchill—hardly shy about using military force—once said, there are certain circumstances in which 'jaw, jaw is better than war, war.'" Jaw, jaw. There speaks the gentleman from the Council on Foreign Relations. This is not realism. This is complacence. But it is not the task of the United States to make the world safe for brandy and cigars.[35]

Another neocon stalwart, Robert Kagan, went so far as to claim that realism has never been influential in American political thought and argued that policies animated by realist logic were thus bound to fail.[36]

The neocons' disdain for realism is based on intellectual and practical considerations. The intellectual foundation of the neocons' opposition to realism is their belief that ideas matter as much as or more than the interests (or "prudence") trumpeted by realcons, and they believe it is simply impossible to account for much of American international behavior without reference to ideals. Normatively, neocons worry about the health of a society without any sense of mission abroad or moral compass for its foreign policy. Pragmatically, they fear that if ideals or normative principles do not undergird U.S. policy it will be impossible to sustain an internationalist consensus.[37] Peter Novick and others suggest that another practical reason many neocons reject realism is their concern that a U.S. foreign policy animated solely by realpolitik might undermine America's commitment to the security of Israel.[38] They worry that after the Cold War no compelling strategic rationale for a close U.S.-Israeli alliance exists, so they emphasize the common democratic

[34] "Excerpts from Speech by Clinton."

[35] Leon Wieseltier, "Saving NATO, Losing Kosovo: Force without Force," *New Republic On Line* (http://www.thenewrepublic.com/archive/0499/042699/wieseltier042699.html).

[36] Robert Kagan, "History Repeating Itself: Liberalism and Foreign Policy," *New Criterion*, Apr. 1999, p. 4.

[37] Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrensdorf, *Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999).

[38] Novick, *Holocaust*, p. 183; and Geoffrey Wheatcroft, *The Controversy of Zion: Jewish Nationalism, the Jewish State, and the Unresolved Jewish Dilemma* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1996), p. 308.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

systems of the two states and the American moral obligation to the Holocaust survivors as bases for the relationship. In sum, neocons advocate an activist foreign policy, applaud efforts to spread democracy, and encourage humanitarian intervention to keep faith with American principles and serve specific policy objectives. Given this, neocons would naturally find the Bush administration's realism anathema and are likely to seek allies to counter it among liberals in Congress, the media, and the public.

Where Does the Public Stand?

Since conservatives are deeply divided, both sides will likely appeal to public opinion to buttress their position. Which side is correct about where the public truly stands on humanitarian intervention? Some believe that the so-called CNN effect—public clamoring for decisive action in response to instantaneous news coverage of humanitarian crises—may force the U.S. government into precipitous interventions. But the extensive literature on the CNN effect does not support the proposition that news coverage shapes government policy.[39] Neocons, in contrast, acknowledge some initial public indifference or wariness toward intervention, but argue that skillful political leadership can overcome it. As Kagan and William Kristol wrote:

> Common wisdom holds that Americans do not care about their nation's role in the world. But it has been a long time since any of their leaders asked them to care, or made an appeal to the elevated patriotism that joins interest and justice, and that has characterized the American republic from its beginning.[40]

The overall likelihood is that public support for humanitarian intervention will prove so soft and transitory that it is not likely to provide the neocons with the ballast they seek to float their notion of America's obligation to intervene for humanitarian purposes. That is not to say that the public is averse to humanitarian intervention, especially if the burdens are shared.[41] In the case of Kosovo, public support for the air campaign was only slightly above 40 percent in the weeks before the launch of air operations, but climbed to 61 percent in mid-April 1999. But whether that was the result of inspiring leadership of the sort neocons want or just a "rally 'round the flag" effect is not clear.[42] In any event, public support for the introduction of ground forces (never higher than 52 percent) and the use of those forces in

[39] See Warren P. Strobel, "The CNN Effect," *American Journalism Review*, May 1996, pp. 33–37; and Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus, "Humanitarian Crises and U.S. Foreign Policy: Somalia and the CNN Effect Reconsidered," *Political Communication*, Oct./Dec. 1995, pp. 413–29.

[40] Robert Kagan and William Kristol, "The Present Danger," *National Interest*, Spring 2000, pp. 57–70.

[41] See Steven Kull, "What the Public Knows that Washington Doesn't," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1995/96, pp. 102–16.

[42] John Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (New York: Wiley, 1973).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

combat (never higher than 43 percent) lagged significantly behind support for the air campaign with its minimal danger of casualties. Finally, public support even for the air campaign dropped off as it wore on with little apparent success.[43]

Moreover, the public is generally not very interested in foreign policy issues now that the Cold War is over.[44] According to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, public concern about "foreign problems" is the lowest it has ever been.[45] In addition, overall levels of public support for various uses of force seem to reflect the importance of the issue at stake. Thus, the Persian Gulf War attracted the highest and most sustained level of public support: 65 percent as early as September 1990 and 80 percent in January 1991, shortly before the air war began. There were similarly high levels of support for air strikes against Iraq in December 1998 (74 percent) and Sudan and Afghanistan in August 1998 (66 percent).[46] Public support was much lower, however, for humanitarian interventions in Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo. Significantly, even when these interventions can be undertaken successfully and without casualties, as was the case in Kosovo, public support still erodes over time.[47] All this suggests that the realcons are more in tune with public opinion than the neocons after all, despite the CNN effect and even when interventionists play their Holocaust trump card.[48]

Summation

The most serious objection to the argument above that the politics of humanitarian intervention are largely shaped by contrasting world views is the claim that what really affects these debates are domestic politics and contingent circumstances. In Haiti, for instance, Clinton seemingly intervened because the Congressional Black Caucus pushed for it and Floridians feared that a flotilla of illegal immigrants would land on their beaches. Contingencies obviously do matter. But the role of ideology is indicated by the overall high rate of humanitarian interventions under the Clinton administration and by the very different responses of the first Bush and Clinton administrations to crises both of them faced in Somalia and Bosnia. As for the new Bush

[43] Gallup Organization, "Poll Releases," May 4, 1999 (http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr990504.asp).

[44] Jeremy D. Rosner, "The Know Nothings Know Something," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1995/96, pp. 116–30.

[45] John E. Reilly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), fig. 1-3.

[46] These figures come from the Gallup Organization, "Poll Releases," Mar. 30, 1999 (http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr990330.asp).

[47] John E. Reilly, "Americans and the World: A Survey at Century's End," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1999, pp. 97–114.

[48] On the lack of resonance among the public of the appeal to the Holocaust, see Novick, *Holocaust*, p. 257; and Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War* (New York: Random House, 2000), pp. 99–104.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

administration, its key figures have signaled their ideological sympathy with the realcons' skepticism about humanitarian intervention. So any decrease in the rate of interventions under Bush II will suggest that ideology matters. If on the other hand the rate remains roughly the same as during the Clinton administration, then the case for a domestic-politics model will be strengthened.

In sum, the dichotomy between liberals and conservative realists that Huntington first used to outline the general terms of civil-military conflict in the United States also nicely frames the larger ideological debates in recent years about American foreign and defense policy. During the Clinton administration, debates about particular issues such as humanitarian intervention came closest to Huntington's original conception: they pitted liberal civilians in the administration against conservative realists in uniform and in Congress. That ideological divide will continue to set the terms of debate about humanitarian intervention in the new Bush administration. The big difference is that now the realcons have the upper hand, and advocates of humanitarian intervention inside and outside the administration will have to forge a new coalition, mobilize public support, and push the president into taking on risky missions in which, against his own inclinations, he must invest political capital. The chances of all that occurring are slim.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Alex Lennon, Editor-in-Chief

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY

"With the passing of the Cold War, the intellectual challenge of U.S. foreign policy could hardly be greater. *The Washington Quarterly* has been consistently creative in meeting this challenge."

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former National Security Advisor

"Once you subscribe to *The Washington Quarterly*, you won't want to give it up. For business leaders who need to follow public policy and global events, the *Quarterly* offers some of the best in-depth analysis available today."

William Schreyer, Chairman Emeritus, Merrill Lynch

Published quarterly by The MIT Press for the Center for Strategic and International Studies

A premier international affairs journal, *The Washington Quarterly* is a valuable source of incisive, independent thinking about our changing world and the foreign, defense, and economic policies suited to the times. Renowned intellectuals and policymakers from the United States and overseas contribute diverse political and professional perspectives to each issue.

Recent Articles Include:

■ *Biotechnology: The Next Transatlantic Trade War?* **by Mark A. Pollack and Gregory C. Shaffer** ■ *Exorcising Europe's Demons: A Far-Right Resurgence?* **by Jonathan Marcus** ■ *Unholy Symbiosis: Isolationism and Anti-Americanism* **by Joseph R. Biden, Jr.** ■ *Prospects for Moving Forward* **by His Majesty King Abdullah II** ■ *Energizing the U.S.-Japan Security Partnership* **by Kurt M. Campbell** ■ *Balkan in Dependence* **by Janusz Bugajski**

2001 Subscription Information ISSN 0613-660X

	*Print & Electronic***	*Electronic only*
Individual	$40	$36
Institution	$135	$122
Student*/Retired	$28	$25

*copy of current ID required. *Prices subject to change without notice. Prepayment required.* **Outside U.S.A and Canada, add $20 shipping. Canadians add 7% GST. Send check—drawn against a U.S. bank in U.S. funds, payable to ***The Washington Quarterly***—AMEX, MC, or VISA number to: Circulation Department, **MIT Press Journals,**
Five Cambridge Center, Cambridge, MA, 02142
Tel: (617) 253-2889, Fax: (617) 577-1545,
journals-orders@mit.edu

http://mitpress.mit.edu/TWQ

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Humanitarian Intervention

Legality, Morality, and the Good Samaritan

by Jacques deLisle

In an era when political leaders and policy advocates increasingly invoke humanitarian reasons to intervene around the world, the legality and underlying normative theory of humanitarian intervention spark heated disputes. On every major question, disagreement abounds among practitioners and commentators alike. Is humanitarian intervention ever permissible under international law? If so, within what range of factual circumstances or procedural conditions? Is it ever morally justifiable or even obligatory? If so, do the applicable theories of politics or human rights point to relatively expansive or restrictive views of the propriety of intervention? This essay reviews the disparate answers to these questions that come from several, mostly positivist, arguments about the legality of humanitarian intervention and various consequentialist and rights-based analyses of the morality of humanitarian intervention. An alternative model is derived from the American law and jurisprudence of the Good Samaritan. This Good Samaritan–based paradigm can provide the connections between legal and normative questions and a degree of constraint and determinacy that are lacking amid the current welter of divergent and competing claims.

The reasons for the plethora of conflicting approaches to humanitarian intervention are simple enough. All the elements for unclear law and protracted moral combat are present: tension among core international legal principles (chiefly state sovereignty and human rights), shifts in the international environment (primarily globalization and the end of the Cold War), disagreement about the relevant moral or political theories (principally rights-based and consequentialist approaches), discord over the application of legal rules and moral principles in murky and idiosyncratic real-world cases, and conflicts among states' strategic and security interests (particularly between

Jacques deLisle is professor of law at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

© 2001 Foreign Policy Research Institute. Published by Elsevier Science Limited.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

states with the will and capacity to intervene and states that fear becoming targets of intervention). Under these conditions, the boundary between legal analysis and arguments of moral or political theory is especially porous. Claims about the legality or morality of intervention in any particular case or category of cases often trigger charges that they are either result-oriented and self-serving instances of self-judgment or doctrinally unsustainable and politically unrealistic arguments from first principles.

These features of the law of humanitarian intervention and assertions about its normative underpinnings do not require that we acquiesce in legal nihilism or moral relativism, or that we retreat into irrelevant legal or moral-political idealism. Our options are not limited to, on one hand, accepting humanitarian intervention as a field in which the strong do what they can and the weak do what they must or, on the other hand, clucking about why the strong ought not act in the absence of any clear rule compelling or permitting intervention (or ought *to* act in the absence of any clear rule forbidding intervention). Avoiding these effete extremes requires a concept of humanitarian intervention that recognizes links between law and arguments of moral and political theory, offers a structured account of contemporary humanitarian interventions and widely held intuitions about their propriety, generates principled explanations of why the easy cases seem easy and the hard cases hard, and provides relatively clear means for assessing whether intervention is permissible in a particular case.

A Good Samaritan model of intervention would include justification, constraint, and obligation.

An analogy to the law of the Good Samaritan has these attributes. It suggests a model of humanitarian intervention that includes elements of justification, constraint, and obligation that are sufficiently clear and cogent that they can be endorsed or attacked as either too generous or too stinting. A Good Samaritan–based paradigm is hardly uncontroversial, and it is in some respects ill fitting or indeterminate, but in ways that shed light on some genuinely difficult issues. To judge the appeal of such a model, we must first understand why the legal and moral status of humanitarian intervention is so unsettled.

The Postwar and Post–Cold War Context

A definition of humanitarian intervention that would find little disagreement is the use or threat of force by a state or states in order to alter institutional structures, policies, or practices inside a target state in such a way as to stop or prevent severe human rights violations (including genocide, systematic torture, and some severe persistent violations of some set of core internationally recognized human rights) or a humanitarian catastrophe. Be-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

yond this, however—and even with respect to details of this definition—disagreement and conflict reign. Consider the very phrase *humanitarian intervention.* While the basic idea has deep historical roots, the current controversies are distinctively contemporary and unprecedentedly sharp. Humanitarian intervention lies at the intersection—or the collision—of two fundamental elements of the postwar international legal order: state sovereignty and human rights.

Intervention obviously entails an exception—and a challenge—to the sovereignty and autonomy of the nation-state. Those familiar principles take as their founding myth the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and its endorsement of a system of sovereign, territorial states as a cure for religious or imperial wars waged (rather like today's humanitarian interventions) in the name of universal moral principles. The more relevant formulation of the principle of state sovereignty is of more recent vintage. It was articulated in reaction to the aggressive use of force against the independence and integrity of states by the Axis powers in World War II and is enshrined in the preamble and opening articles of the U.N. Charter. The charter also specifically proscribes one state's intervention in the internal affairs of another. The robust postwar conception of state sovereignty received a further boost when decolonization gave rise to a host of new states that were internally weak, externally vulnerable, and thus predictably attracted to anti-interventionist norms.

Humanitarian grounds for intervention clearly evoke human rights. The idea that moral principle or higher laws permit the use of force across state boundaries is a hoary concept in international law, reflected in the treatises of Hugo Grotius and other seventeenth- and eighteenth-century pioneers of international law and with roots long preceding their work. The law and theory of humanitarian intervention also owe much to the humanitarian law that has developed since the middle of the nineteenth century as a part of the law of war, especially the rules governing the treatment of noncombatants.[1] Still, the contemporary meaning of *humanitarian* is mostly a product of the international law of human rights developed in response to Nazi atrocities, first at the Nuremberg trials, then in the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Since 1945, two U.N. covenants on human rights and a plethora of international agreements and norms and national laws and policies have elaborated the theme. Undeniably, the trend has been toward expanding rights, with the entrenchment of some core human rights (such as freedom from slavery, genocide, and apartheid) as peremptory norms, the elaboration of specific rights (especially positive

[1] The humanitarian law element has received less widespread attention than the other dimensions. Good relevant discussions of its relationship to the law of humanitarian intervention and human rights include Theodor Meron, "The Humanization of Humanitarian Law," *American Journal of International Law,* Apr. 2000, pp. 239–78.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

social, economic, and cultural rights), and the "discovery" of new or candidate rights (such as the right to development or democracy).

While the tension immanent in humanitarian intervention has been evident for some time, two recent developments have made it more immediately relevant and controversial. First, globalization has reinforced the position that peace, prosperity, and minimal respect for human rights are globally as well as conceptually indivisible, since all powerful states now have an economic stake in what used to be considered marginal lands, and since pressures from the media and nongovernmental organizations (the so-called CNN and NGO effects) now routinely push governments to relieve suffering in formerly obscure corners of the world. Secondly, the dissolution of the Soviet bloc removed a powerful deterrent to intervention around the world and nurtured in the one remaining superpower an attitude of moral triumphalism conducive to humanitarian arguments for intervention. The end of the Cold War also ushered in an era of ethnic conflicts that tend to produce the sort of atrocities that invite humanitarian intervention. Further, the demise of a bipolar international structure made multilateral intervention less geopolitically risky and easier to organize, whether through the United Nations or through regional organizations such as NATO and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

In this changed context, the list of humanitarian missions undertaken during the past decade has grown long and gone global: Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, post–Gulf War Iraq, East Timor, and arguably Haiti. If proponents of more expansive—or even morally consistent—intervention had prevailed, the list might have been longer still, including, for example, Sudan, Chechnya, the Kurdish areas of Turkey, or meaningful efforts in Rwanda. The intervening coalitions and states, along with nongovernmental advocates of humanitarian intervention, have suggested various legal and moral arguments to support action in some or all of these cases, while other states and commentators have reacted with predictable alarm. Proponents have mixed traditional legal grounds for intervention with arguments that edged toward and occasionally crossed into calls for humanitarian intervention. While opponents have continued to invoke the inviolability of state sovereignty, those arguments had already gone about as far as was tenable in the post-colonial era. At the same time, an additional line of defense against the new interventionism found support in the concerted cultural-relativist attack from Asian and other non-Western states on the universality of human rights as espoused in the West.

Deep divisions also run intranationally among leaders, officials, and scholarly analysts about the permissibility of humanitarian intervention in particular cases and in general. With the familiar ground rules and guideposts of the old foreign policy debates gone and with their replacements not yet fully in place, such disputes have generated especially strong misgivings that the positions taken on any specific intervention reflect partisan political

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leanings more than principled analysis, and suspicions that general claims about humanitarian intervention are thinly veiled extrapolations from judgments about a particular case (usually the most recent one).

The Law in Disarray

The state of debate over the law of humanitarian intervention suggests that international law is doomed to irrelevance here. International legal rules function best when they command a broad consensus, reflect the positions of the major powers and other actors with serious interests at stake, and do not demand radical changes in most states' behavior. In such cases, international law can legitimate efforts to induce change in the behavior of the few recalcitrant nonconformists. The discourse on humanitarian intervention displays none of these features. Some proffered legal rules demand radical changes of behavior or principles, and none wins general support even from the key participants. The wide range of seemingly plausible arguments offers something for everyone and therefore little for anyone.

While there are as many views as there are proponents, and many commentators adopt or synthesize several conceptually distinct arguments, it is possible to sketch a rough typology of basic positions. Some assert that "humanitarian" intervention is never lawful. On the strictest reading, the U.N. Charter and its underlying customary law so limit the use of force in international relations and so proscribe intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a state that the only permissible exceptions are a handful of explicit ones. These include situations where states use force in self-defense, where the Security Council authorizes an enforcement action after determining that a threat to international peace exists, or where the target state has given valid consent. Few cases of purported humanitarian intervention can unambiguously satisfy these restrictive criteria. In those cases, intervention is lawful because—and only because—it has passed these state security– and state sovereignty–protecting tests, and *not* because it meets some independent standard for humanitarian intervention.[2]

A slightly more expansive view accepts additional substantive grounds for intervention, for example, when coercive measures support national liberation or prevent genocide. While this position would support some actions often classed as humanitarian, such measures still are lawful only because they meet specific, narrow criteria that do not assume any general or distinct doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Moreover, this expanded notion of permissible intervention opens the door to a broad range

[2] For the view that this basically is the law, see Jonathan I. Charney, "Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo," *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, Nov. 1999, pp. 1231–48. See also Louis Henkin, "Humanitarian Intervention," in *Human Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century* (Washington, D.C.: American Society of International Law, 1993), pp. 383–403.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of *anti*-interventionist arguments based on the right of peoples to self-determination or the maintenance of a stable and peaceful international order—either of which can be imperiled by forcible intervention under many plausible factual circumstances.[3]

A third view in the anti-interventionist repertoire looks not to principles of state sovereignty or normative or prudential arguments, but to history. Examination of centuries of doctrine and practice in international law reveals no foundation for a legal principle that allows true humanitarian intervention. What may appear at first to be historical instances of humanitarian intervention turn out to have been acts that were permissible under less controversial legal rules or unlawful acts that were denounced as such at the time. Nor did they generate any legal principle of humanitarian intervention that won widespread acceptance. If this historical analysis is accepted, then anyone claiming that international law authorizes humanitarian intervention bears the burden of showing where and how that norm came into international law in very recent times.[4]

One way to perform that task is straightforwardly—and radically—positivist: humanitarian intervention is permissible under international law if it is authorized by the Security Council pursuant to its powers under the U.N. Charter, period. There is simply no legal review of whether the Security Council has improperly applied the standard of a threat to international peace set forth in the U.N. Charter when the Security Council approves the use of force to address a human rights or humanitarian crisis.[5] In the early years of the post–Cold War period and particularly in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, there was some hope—and fear—that this argument might provide a viable legal basis for widespread intervention by the United States and its allies. The return to more normal politics and more frequent deadlocks in the Security Council—including, for instance, on questions of humanitarian intervention in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia—dimmed such expectations and required proponents of a more expansive law of humanitarian intervention to seek other arguments.

[3] For a subtle and balanced account of many of these concerns, see Stanley Hoffmann, *The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), pp. 38–60.

[4] For an extensive review of and a generally negative conclusion concerning the claim of historical foundations for a right to intervene on humanitarian grounds, see Sean D. Murphy, *Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), pp. 33–144. For a contrary view, see Richard B. Lillich, "Kant and the Current Debate over Humanitarian Intervention," *Journal of Transnational Law and Policy*, Summer 1997, pp. 397–404; and Michael J. Bazyler, "Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention," *Stanford Journal of International Law*, Summer 1987, pp. 547–620.

[5] For discussions of the view that a Security Council determination is unreviewable, see International Court of Justice, *Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie* (Libya v. United States) (1992); and W. Michael Reisman, "The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations," *American Journal of International Law*, Jan. 1993, p. 93. See also David Wippman, "Change and Continuity in Legal Justifications for Military Intervention in Internal Conflict," *Columbia Human Rights Law Review*, Spring 1996, pp. 435–85.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Other scholars and advocates have suggested that an international legal norm permitting intervention can rest on "close enough" positivism, which comes in two varieties. The first holds that humanitarian intervention is (or ought to be) lawful whenever established doctrinal tests for permissible use of force are almost satisfied. If one is sufficiently close to meeting these tests, then humanitarian considerations may make it acceptable to "put a thumb on the scale" in favor of intervention. Such doctrinal near-misses might include situations where the target state's consent to intervention is problematic or includes not-quite-met conditions, where a civil conflict falls just short of the level of foreign state involvement that is ordinarily needed for legitimate counterintervention, or where the threat that a human rights crisis next door will spill over the border is not quite so grave or imminent or quite so clearly attributable to agents of a state that neighboring states would be permitted to use force in self-defense.

The other version of "close enough" positivism endorses humanitarian intervention where action *short* of intervention with force is clearly permissible, as in the case of widespread human rights abuses or humanitarian disaster, but only full-fledged intervention seems likely to be effective. This class of cases might include actions to defend or rescue one's own nationals or third-party nationals or limited peacekeeping missions that expand when circumstances on the ground deteriorate and threaten a more severe humanitarian catastrophe or a threat to participants in the initial humanitarian undertaking (a pattern commonly known as "mission creep"). By some lights, it might also include situations where the Security Council has authorized action, but only measures short of forcible intervention, to protect human rights or to address a humanitarian crisis.[6]

Yet, while these versions of "close enough" positivism expand the potential scope of intervention, they still leave out those cases in which no conventional doctrine "almost" legitimates intervention. In part to address such situations, other lines of analysis take a more openly reformist approach to doctrine and advocate a more free-standing and expansive law of humanitarian intervention. One such view sees the international legal order as constantly evolving as new rules emerge, often quite easily, through state practice and legal-normative argument. The marked expansion of obligations and norms relating to human rights, the erosion of state sovereignty and the impermeable zone of a state's domestic jurisdiction (especially with respect to the human rights of its citizens), and the continuing vitality of humanitarian

[6] Examples of elements of "close enough" positivist approaches can be found in Abraham D. Sofaer, "International Law and Kosovo," *Stanford Journal of International Law*, Winter 2000, pp. 1–21. For a discussion of particular cases of intervention that suggest a "close enough" positivist analysis, see Fernando R. Teson, "Collective Humanitarian Intervention," *Michigan Journal of International Law*, Winter 1996, pp. 336–69; and Richard B. Lillich, "The Role of the UN Security Council in Protecting Human Rights in Crisis Situations: UN Humanitarian Intervention in the Post–Cold War World," *Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law*, Spring 1995, pp. 1–17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

law all support claims that intrastate humanitarian crises and human rights violations are matters that the international community (composed primarily of states) now considers well within the purview of international law. In recent years, states and groups of states have launched interventions purportedly to promote self-determination, protect democracy, contain conflicts lest they spread or escalate, or pursue humanitarian goals in the absence of a Security Council mandate to use force. Such real-world behavior suggests that both state practice and general opinion among states about what the law permits (*opinio juris*, in the terminology of international law) exist or are rapidly forming in support of humanitarian intervention. Under accepted rules for the creation of international law, this suffices to create a new binding norm. To the extent these requisite elements are not yet present, additional acts of humanitarian intervention more frankly labeled as such are the route to establishing new law.[7]

A related line of reasoning is less expansive in terms of "making" international law, but arguably makes more radical claims about the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention. This approach holds that the U.N. Charter and the broader customary international law it sought to codify and develop authorize (and perhaps require, and certainly do not prohibit) humanitarian intervention. The commitments and principles embedded in the U.N. Charter include states' obligations, running to all other states (*erga omnes*, in legal terms), to protect and promote human rights at home and abroad. We misunderstand the charter as well as broader legal principles if we assign state sovereignty, nonintervention, and state autonomy lexical priority over human rights obligations. We are also not required to hold humanitarian intervention hostage to the Security Council process, which the framers of the charter did not foresee would suffer its now-characteristic paralysis. Giving effect to the core aims and substantive legal norms reflected in the charter and international law more generally thus allows (or even demands) greater procedural flexibility under a sort of "living constitution" view of the charter-based system.[8]

[7] Elements of this line of argument are present in controversial remarks by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan. See, for example, his Address Before the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, Switzerland, Apr. 7, 1999 (http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/1990407.sgsm6949.html). See also Teson, "Collective Humanitarian Intervention," pp. 323–71; and Fernando R. Teson, *Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality*, 2nd ed. (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1997), pp. 175–266. For a more positive and less normative argument that a shift toward intervention (including of the humanitarian sort) has occurred, see Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Gregory A. Raymond, and Margaret G. Hermann, "The Rise and Fall of the Nonintervention Norm," *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Winter–Spring 1998, pp. 81–97; and Lori Fisler Damrosch, "Changing Conceptions of Intervention in International Law," in *Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention*, ed. Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993), pp. 91–110. For a contrary argument that there has been little real change toward humanitarian intervention behind apparent moves to expand the definition of what counts as a threat to the peace warranting an unreviewable Security Council authorization, see Wippman, "Change and Continuity in Legal Justifications."

[8] For examples of such views, primarily stressing a "living constitution" approach, see Teson, "Collective Humanitarian Intervention"; and Bartam S. Brown, "Humanitarian Intervention at a Crossroads," *William and*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Still other positions provide rationales for more thoroughgoing refutation of claims that humanitarian intervention is rarely if ever legal. One approach counters positivist and largely textualist arguments from anti-interventionists with a radically different but structurally similar argument. In this view, the prohibition on the use of force, most authoritatively set forth in Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, simply does not cover true humanitarian intervention. It bars only the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state, that is, actions such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Genuine humanitarian interventions do not use force for these proscribed ends and therefore are not prohibited. The Security Council authorization process and many of the established substantive grounds for permitting the use of force speak only to situations in which the use of force would otherwise violate the restrictions embodied in Article 2. They are thus irrelevant to the question of the legality of humanitarian intervention. A more moderate, kindred line of argument offers a rejoinder to anti-interventionist historical analyses and maintains that the U.N. Charter provisions did not eliminate a preexisting legal norm permitting humanitarian intervention.[9]

A final argument for relatively expansive authority to intervene on humanitarian grounds is strongly antipositivist. It simply sets aside the language of the U.N. Charter and positive international law from other sources. If these laws do not permit humanitarian intervention, then they are unjust, indeed unworthy of the name *law*, and in dire need of reform. A higher law—perhaps natural law—allows and perhaps obliges states and other actors to undertake humanitarian intervention and to bring positive law into conformity as a matter of justice. (Such arguments are international law analogs to those that were used to oppose American slavery and eventually amend the Constitution to abolish it.)[10]

None of these many lines of argument can be dismissed lightly, as they all have some grounding in mainstream views about the content, origins,

Mary Law Review, May 2000, pp. 1706–9. For the more textual interpretivist version, see Teson, *Humanitarian Intervention*, pp. 146–74; and Julie Mertus, "Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from Kosovo," *William and Mary Law Review*, May 2000, pp. 1743–87.

[9] On the argument for the survival of a pre-Charter international law permitting humanitarian intervention, see, for example, Lillich, "Kant and the Current Debate over Humanitarian Intervention"; and Malvina Halberstam, "The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention," *Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law*, Spring 1995, pp. 1–8. For a statement of the less historicist and more radically positivist position, see Mertus, "Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention"; and W. Michael Reisman, "Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos," in *Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations*, ed. Richard B. Lillich (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1973), pp. 167–78. For a clear statement and refutation of the textualist position, see also Daniel Wolf, "Humanitarian Intervention," *Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies*, 1988, pp. 339–40.

[10] This approach can be found in Robert L. Phillips, "The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention," in *Humanitarian Intervention: Just War vs. Pacifism*, by Robert L. Phillips and Duane L. Cady (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), pp. 16–28. For a more aggressive and policy-oriented version of this type of view, see Michael J. Glennon, "The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1999, pp. 2–7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

purpose, or modes of making international law. To the legal fragmentation and indeterminacy that they have produced, we also must add the numerous disputes about critical, if secondary, issues such as what type and what level of existing or potential human rights violations justify action and what counts as sufficient proof that intervention is necessary, proportionate, and sufficiently likely to achieve lawful ends. On this tactical terrain, advocates and opponents of interventionism fight and refight their strategic battles over the general legality of intervention.

Where Moral and Political Theory Cross Paths (and Swords)

With the legal questions so extensively contested and the menu of plausible arguments appearing to offer something for every political taste, it is hardly surprising that normative arguments are never far from the surface. Such claims about what morality and political theory permit or demand with respect to humanitarian intervention fall into two basic categories, rights-based and consequentialist, but with several intramural variations that can yield diverse positions.

One strain of rights-based arguments sees individual human beings as the sole bearers of rights including a list of core human rights and freedom from the harms associated with humanitarian disasters. Because these rights are of fundamental importance and universal concern, their violation, at least at some systematic and severe level, can warrant action that otherwise might be normatively indefensible, such as the use of force across national boundaries. Because the state is legitimate as a matter of political theory *only* to the extent that it serves as a means for advancing or securing the individual rights and interests of its citizens, humanitarian intervention against a state that violates human rights is no cause for concern: the targeted state, by definition, has forfeited or at least compromised its legitimacy.[11]

Another rights-based approach looks to a people's or a political community's collective right to self-determination or self-governance, whether such things are valued for their own sakes or as important means to the effective enjoyment of individual rights. Analyses in this vein typically draw on civic-republican, communitarian, or downright radical critiques of an individualistic understanding of rights—even though their basic position also has a solidly liberal pedigree in the work of John Stuart Mill. They stress that members of a political community must win liberty and shape a polity themselves and cannot have these handed to them by outsiders. In the current international order, the exponents of this approach who want to be taken seriously accord existing states some presumption that they constitute

[11] For arguments in this vein, see generally Hoffmann, *The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention*, pp. 22–24; Phillips, "The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention"; and Teson, *Humanitarian Intervention*, pp. 117–26.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political communities. Because intervention may disrupt a presumptively legitimate state and introduce external influences that may displace intrastate political processes, intervention can be justified only when human rights violations are sufficiently serious to indicate that some group has abused state power to prevent valid self-determination by the people as a whole or that the state has ceased to provide a medium for the collective enjoyment of rights (as can be the case in so-called failed states).[12]

A third rights-based analysis regards states as the principal relevant actors and accords them robust rights to autonomy and integrity and hence freedom from intervention. This odd normative cousin to the realist view of international relations resonates with proponents of "strong sovereignty," whose numbers are thick among the ranks of weaker states' ruling elites. Often, this claim is grounded on an assertion—sometimes of questionable sincerity—that only states protected by strong rights can provide a secure environment for citizens to enjoy their rights. Where states bear such rights, it follows that humanitarian intervention is presumptively problematic.

How rarely or commonly humanitarian intervention is morally permitted or required under these rights-based analyses depends on how expansive one makes the list of individual rights, how low one sets the threshold for intolerable violations of rights, how much presumption one attaches to the rights (or rights-promoting qualities) of states and political communities, how instrumentally one conceives of states' rights, or how one assesses the empirical questions that are the foci of consequentialist analyses.

Consequentialist arguments about humanitarian intervention come in several varieties as well. From an act-consequentialist perspective, humanitarian intervention is morally permissible when it can be expected to produce in the individual case a net benefit in terms of humanitarian values and human rights. The expected gains in reducing or preventing human rights violations or humanitarian disaster in the target state must outweigh the expected harm to human rights and the creation or exacerbation of humanitarian costs incurred as a direct result of the intervention.

Other outcome-centered analyses focus on the broader or more indirect effects that permissive or restrictive standards for humanitarian intervention might be expected to have. One concern is that rules designed to produce the "appropriate" level of humanitarian intervention and intervention in the "right" cases would produce excessive or inadequate intervention. Seemingly optimal rules would encourage too much intervention to the extent that good-faith interveners underestimate the costs of intervention or overestimate the likelihood of success, and to the extent that bad-faith interveners use humanitarian pretexts to act in unjustified cases or with

[12] The most influential contemporary articulation of this position is in Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 86–108; and Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Critics," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Spring 1980, pp. 209–29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

disproportionate force. On the other hand, such rules may lead to too little intervention if potential interveners are unduly pessimistic or risk averse or disingenuously construe standards as not authorizing (or requiring) intervention.[13]

Another possible factor in a consequentialist moral calculus is the possibly perverse effects of seemingly good standards for intervention on states' development or possession of the capacity to intervene. So long as the expected efficacy or futility of intervention is a morally relevant consideration, standards for permissible or obligatory intervention that are otherwise well designed could lead to less-than-optimal intervention by creating incentives for risk-averse states to preempt and avoid responsibilities or pressures to act simply by failing to maintain the ability to intervene. That could lead to too little intervention and a downward spiral as initially more responsible states grow weary of carrying too heavy a burden. Although perhaps less likely, the opposite problem is possible as well. Intervention-preferring states could perceive incentives to develop extensive capacity to intervene effectively, and they might then be tempted to act opportunistically in close but ultimately unwarranted cases. This, in turn, could lead to a vicious circle in which states with different agendas build the means to respond to or to deter such actions.

Normative justification of humanitarian intervention under a rule-consequentialist analysis can hinge on still-more-remote forecasted effects as well, including the impact on states and the existing international system. If relatively expansive permission to intervene were to compromise the opacity, integrity, and autonomy of target states (and, in turn, states in general), then an otherwise acceptable regime governing intervention might be morally intolerable on the ground that it would exact excessive human rights and humanitarian costs by undermining what some see as the principal vehicles for the realization of human rights and the prevention of humanitarian crises. (This would be the case even though there might still seem to be good act-consequentialist arguments for intervening in particular cases.) An increase in the number of occasions for ostensibly proper uses of inevitably destructive military force and the removal of barriers to the eruption, escalation, and spread of intrastate violence are but a few of the dangers imagined by this line of analysis.[14] On the other hand, a relatively expansive regime might achieve its immediate goal of ameliorating humanitarian disasters and

[13] Among these concerns, the problem of "bad faith," or at least self-serving self-judgment, has not surprisingly received the most attention. See, for example, Jules Lobel, "Benign Hegemony? Kosovo and Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter," *Chicago Journal of International Law*, Spring 2000, pp. 19–36. The more general problem of states' likely ineptitude in making the necessary judgments has also received extensive treatment. See, for example, Ian Brownlie, "Humanitarian Intervention," in *Law and Civil War in the Modern World*, ed. John N. Moore (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 216–30.

[14] Moderate expressions of some of these worries are set forth in Richard B. Bilder, "Kosovo and the 'New Interventionism': Promise or Peril?" *Journal of Transnational Law and Policy*, Fall 1999, pp. 153–82; Jerome Slater and Terry Nardin, "Nonintervention and Human Rights," *Journal of Politics*, Feb. 1986, pp. 86–95; and Hoffmann, *The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

severe human rights abuses, and also reduce threats to states and the state system by forestalling degeneration in abusive or failed states and the international conflict which that can produce. A highly restrictive set of rules for humanitarian intervention would have the opposite array of potential virtues and vices.

Consequentialist theories can cast the net more broadly still, bringing into the normative equation anticipated costs and benefits that have no apparent or purported impact on human rights, such as the implications of intervention for the intervening states' economic or strategic interests and domestic politics. With such factors in play, consequentialist analysis can range far afield morally and detach the question of humanitarian intervention from its humanitarian moorings. Even without such extensive normative and conceptual drift, different empirical assumptions about what the consequences will be and different normative choices about what consequences count for justification can lead to radically different positions on whether and when intervention is justified.

It is obvious from the foregoing catalog of consequentialist and rights-based analyses that the normative debate over humanitarian intervention is wide ranging and deeply divided. But all of the above positions and perspectives share a striking eschewal of deontological approaches, specifically those that address what potential intervener states, their leaders, and perhaps their citizens "owe."[15] The reasons for this neglect are not hard to fathom. Deontological arguments often impose affirmative duties to intervene (or especially robust obligations not to intervene) and thus create a clear and demanding "ought" from which the "is" and the "will" can diverge embarrassingly. Of course, affirmative duties, strong proscriptions, and concerns about what an actor ought to do, morally if not necessarily legally, are not wholly absent from existing law and related moral arguments. But they are relatively rare. One of these rather exceptional pockets of the law where such elements beloved by the deontologist loom especially large (and where recognition of the gap between legal "musts" and moral "shoulds" is especially prevalent) provides us with a means to bring order out of the chaotic conflict over the law of humanitarian intervention and its relationship to political and practical moral argument.

[15] I am indebted to James Turner Johnson for emphasizing, in his comments responding to an earlier version of this paper, the importance of such deontological analyses in the ethics literature on humanitarian intervention. Examples of writings in that vein that address international legal questions as well include Hoffmann, *The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention*; Stanley Hoffmann, *Duties Beyond Borders* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University, 1981); Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*; and Allen Buchanan, "The Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention," *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 1999, pp. 71–87.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Humanitarian Intervention and the Law of the Good Samaritan

The law of the Good Samaritan points toward a coherent, systematic account of the law, practice, and moral-political terrain of humanitarian intervention. A Good Samaritan–derived paradigm also provides direction for persuasive advocacy in individual cases and in interpreting rules at the margin, an agenda for moderate reformers, and a target for more radical critics. The basis for the model of the Good Samaritan used here is primarily what has emerged in American law and in normative criticisms and defenses of that law. While the American version is somewhat idiosyncratic, it nonetheless provides a focus for an inquiry that is positive as well as normative. Other versions in the Western legal and moral tradition share many of its core elements. Where the American version departs from the norm, it often does so in ways that make it more relevant for an analysis of international law. The American variant is, for example, especially zealous in protecting the autonomy of prospective interveners and, to a degree, other actors (such as the targets of intervention)—a feature that resonates with an international legal order that still takes the sovereign state as a foundational principle. Finally, in our one-superpower world, a focus on the American model makes sense because it can be assumed to reflect the legal, political, and moral culture of the state most likely to influence the practices and rationales of humanitarian intervention.[16]

The Good Samaritan model assumes that humanitarian intervention is regarded as rescue.

The Good Samaritan model assumes, familiarly if somewhat controversially, that we regard humanitarian intervention as rescue. The primary focus is on the prospective intervener, who usually is legally free to forgo intervention. As a matter of law, a potentially intervening state generally can choose to do nothing to save victims of humanitarian catastrophes abroad even if it could do so at little or no cost to itself and with near-certain success. A state and its leaders may lawfully sit idly by and ignore the suffering of the victims.

Likewise, when several opportunities for humanitarian intervention exist, the intervener may choose among them. The law of the Good Samaritan does not require the intervener first to address the most serious perils or the situations with the highest expected gain according to some utilitarian for-

[16] The model developed here of Good Samaritan law, the related law of affirmative duties, and related normative principles draws on a few standard works in the contemporary academic literature on relevant aspects of American law. They include principally Saul Levmore, "Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations," *Virginia Law Review*, Aug. 1986, pp. 879–941; Richard A. Epstein, "A Theory of Strict Liability," *Journal of Legal Studies*, Jan. 1973, pp. 197–204; Ernest J. Weinrib, "The Case for a Duty to Rescue," *Yale Law Journal*, Dec. 1980, pp. 247–93; Richard A. Epstein, *Torts* (New York: Aspen, 1999), pp. 285–306; William Landes and Richard Posner, "Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans and Other Rescuers," *Journal of Legal Studies*, Jan. 1978, pp. 83–100, 119–27.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mula. Rather, when faced with a case of permissible intervention, a state may choose to intervene or not based on such considerations as national interests, the preferences of domestic constituencies, or the whims of rulers. Is the target country in a strategic location? Does it have vital resources or substantial investments or resident expatriates from the intervening state? Will nonintervention lead to massive refugee flows? Do people in the intervening state feel a special ethnic, historical, or political affinity for the victims or antipathy toward the perpetrators? Have they been moved by television news reports? These are all questions whose answers, under a Good Samaritan model, constitute legally acceptable grounds for choosing where and whether to act in circumstances where intervention would be lawful and morally permissible.[17]

These general principles of a Good Samaritan law model fairly closely track the behavior of states and the contours of some widely accepted obligations under international law. They also suggest that a regime that includes such state discretion is not necessarily ungoverned by law, for a Good Samaritan model does impose legal constraints on the decision to undertake or forgo intervention in circumstances where the requisite type and level (however defined) of human rights violations or humanitarian catastrophe exist.

Under a Good Samaritan–derived model, intervention is unlawful where it is clearly likely to fail or to produce significant net costs. (The parallel in domestic Good Samaritan law is a rule that holds rescuers liable for adverse consequences of an attempt that was negligent in terms of the risks imposed on the victim or others.) An intervening state does not, however, run afoul of legal restrictions if it intervenes on the basis of a close but bad call. (In domestic law, this principle underlies the norm of finding an actor not to be liable where he has carelessly but not rashly attempted a rescue, especially in emergencies where life and limb are at stake and there is little space for deliberation.) This partial limitation on the intervener's discretion accommodates some consequentialist arguments that loom large in the general debates over humanitarian intervention, and also accords with the strong sense that, if cast too strictly, such rules would unduly constrain prospective interveners by forbidding or, in some versions, demanding action in marginal cases. In particular, the "emergency" analogy supports what many would regard as an appealing degree of protection for the intervening state from accountability

[17] For examples of attempts to address and guide the exercise of largely unilateral discretion, see the Clinton-era Presidential Decision Directives 25 and 56 (regarding when the United States will participate in U.N. peacekeeping efforts and a broader range of "complex contingency operations" involving the use of military forces) and the series of mock policy memos on humanitarian intervention, collected in Alton Frye, project director, *Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2000). Many accounts of particular cases of humanitarian intervention stress the varied and chaotic political factors that affect decisions about whether and how to intervene. See, for example, John Harriss, ed., *The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention* (London: Pinter, 1995).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for the consequences of decisions that must be made often in great urgency (to stop the killing and suffering) and almost always with ambiguous and conflicting information about the state of affairs in the target country (including whether reports of atrocities and accusations of responsibility are accurate).

Under a regime that follows the paradigm of Good Samaritan law and related doctrines, a state has affirmative legal duties to act in some narrow circumstances. A state may have an obligation to intervene if it has contributed substantially to the humanitarian or human rights peril in the target state, even if the duty-bearing state's actions were not wrongful or unlawful (as in the domestic legal context of having nonnegligently injured another and having then left him helpless and at risk of further injury). Such an affirmative legal duty also exists if the intervener has some other form of special relationship with the victims (the equivalent of domestic law relationships such as those grounded in contract-like or guardianship-like arrangements). A duty to intervene also exists if the intervening state has a special relationship to the author of the human rights violations or humanitarian disaster (often a relationship of a quasi-custodial sort such as those that apply in domestic law to doctors and institutions with some degree of actual or legally presumed control over dangerous actors). These notions help to account for our normative sense concerning whether a candidate for intervention is a more or less easy or compelling case. They suggest, for example, why many of us sense that intervention perhaps should be more common where the intervening state is the former colonial ruler of the target state, where its government has otherwise established or provided vital support to the target state's problematic regime, where the intervening state is somehow responsible through prior actions for the situation that has led to the crisis, or where its people have ethnic, historical, or other strong bonds to either the victims or the perpetrators of the human rights abuses.

An affirmative duty to intervene also attaches where the intervener has promised to act in the event of human rights or humanitarian emergencies in the target country. Paralleling the domestic law of gratuitous undertakings (including agreements under which third parties are intended beneficiaries) or the law of bargained-for contracts, this element offers an explanation for the persuasive force of some of the arguments deployed by proponents of obligatory intervention. These include arguments based on states' obligations as parties to the U.N. Charter's human rights provisions, other human rights accords, or the U.N. Convention on Genocide. Also in this category are the common invocations of the decisions of regional organizations and the principles set forth in their charters as sources of legal authority for intervention within their regions in the absence of a Security Council mandate. A state's unilateral pledges in, say, domestic legislation might count as well.

The Good Samaritan–based paradigm also underscores that the law-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fulness of a decision to undertake or forgo intervention is a matter quite distinct from the morality of the choice. Normative assessments of Good Samaritan law routinely make several points that easily and tellingly project to humanitarian intervention. The fact that a state has no legal obligation to intervene does not mean that it is free from moral fault when it refrains. The moral opprobrium that attaches to inaction is greater where intervention seems likely to be effective and low-cost, or where the prospective intervener has nearly crossed the threshold of incurring an obligation to intervene. On the other hand, the fact that a state has no legal obligation to intervene does not mean that all voluntary interventions are on a moral par. The moral value of a legally permissible intervention depends on a number of case-specific factors, including the severity and imminence of the harms that the intervention addresses, the risks incurred by the intervener, and the selflessness of the intervener's motive. Thus, the moral penumbra of Good Samaritan law suggests an account of humanitarian intervention that includes, in a systematic and coherent way, our sense of why legal equivalence does not mean equal moral footing for interventions that include heroic efforts or stop genocide and those that seem to be motivated primarily by the intervening state's pursuit of its strategic advantage, political agenda or economic interests.

At the same time, by emphasizing that the intervener's aim is only one factor in answering the question of morality and generally is no factor in answering the question of legality, the Good Samaritan model salutarily consigns to secondary status the issue of the intervener's purity of motive. In debates about humanitarian intervention, the extensive focus on that issue has generated more heat than light, fostered a sense that normative and scholarly debates are largely irrelevant to the practical questions of intervention, and offered little hope of advancing a normative understanding and assessment of humanitarian intervention unless and until the discussion wades more deeply into the murky waters of determining the authentic, attributable will or motive of an intervening state—a will or motive that is the product of complex institutional, public, and partisan politics.

Aspects of a Good Samaritan model that focus on the intervener also suggest a framework for addressing and incorporating other normative considerations that have considerable force in moral discourse about humanitarian intervention. Thus, the moral case for intervention seems strongest where one and only one intervener seems to have a near-certain ability to stop a humanitarian or human rights disaster. By the same measure, the moral imperative for an intervener to act is far weaker where several equally well positioned potential interveners have a similar likelihood of success, or where the concerted action of several interveners seems necessary and the legal or institutional means for coordinating their collective response are lacking. Such considerations suggest, for example, why human rights and humanitarian meltdowns in small, remote places tend to excite relatively little

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

moral or practical response, why Security Council paralysis has strengthened the anti-interventionists' hand politically and perhaps morally, and why NATO (and other capable regional organizations whose members abut humanitarian trouble spots) have been primary foci of normative debates about intervention.

The law of the Good Samaritan addresses actors other than the rescuer, too, and in ways that suggest elements of a more rich and complete conception of humanitarian intervention. Under a Good Samaritan model, a state may intervene only if the goal of the intervention is to save those facing a genuine humanitarian or human rights peril. Intervening merely to improve the material or civic welfare of the target group is legally impermissible. If it intervenes in those conditions, the intervening state is the equivalent of what in domestic law is an officious intermeddler. This feature of a Good Samaritan model suggests how state sovereignty norms coexist, without serious contradiction, with the discretion of intervener states that characterizes most mainstream views of humanitarian intervention.

The law of the Good Samaritan also protects the moral autonomy of victims, but only subject to a strong presumption that victims wish to be rescued. Under a legal regime for humanitarian intervention based on the same principles, a state may intervene to prevent or stop sufficiently serious human rights violations or humanitarian disasters unless it is reasonably clear that the victims do not want such intervention. Such situations may well be rare, not only because most victims will not oppose intervention, but also because it will often be impossible to discern authoritatively the views of the prospective beneficiaries on the question of intervention and especially of intervention in the form and under the terms offered. Still, the principle sets a condition that analysts and practitioners of humanitarian intervention generally would accept (and indeed require). Moreover, this element of a Good Samaritan analogy focuses attention on one of the problematic features of humanitarian intervention: that of deciding how one determines the will of the group to be saved. Yet it does so without broadly undermining the permissibility of humanitarian intervention, as could well occur under a contrary rule that made the legality and morality of intervention contingent upon the articulation of a clear and specific wish for rescue. It also provides a rejoinder to radical critics who argue that permissive theories and much practice of humanitarian intervention pay too little heed to principles of autonomous, active self-determination by members of a political community (even a troubled one), free from external interference.

The handling of the victim's "will" in a Good Samaritan line of analysis also addresses the major extralegal issue of moral hazard. As students of the Good Samaritan problem and the law of rescue have noted, legal and moral norms that encourage rescue can induce victims to do too little to prevent or preempt the perils that face them, thereby creating increased need for rescue. If too many rescuers seek glory or reward, a more systemic problem may

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

arise as well: underinvestment in collective or publicly provided means for reducing risks of harm because of the reliance on voluntary rescuers. Such reliance could be tragically misplaced, given that rescuers' selfish interests may lead to selective intervention, to claims that the need for rescue exists where it does not, or even to the creation of perilous situations to justify rescue.

The debates over humanitarian intervention include numerous instances of these types of concerns. Will the recent rise in intervention lead parties to an intrastate conflict to rush to seek outside help by faking or even provoking atrocities that demonstrate their victimhood? Does the behavior of the United States or NATO stunt the growth of more multilateral approaches to situations that might warrant intervention? How much have intervening powers overreached in identifying or even contributing indirectly to situations warranting intervention? The Good Samaritan paradigm suggests a possible answer that is integrally connected to the broader law and norms relevant to humanitarian intervention, and therefore does not require a radical reworking of the otherwise applicable principles: the moral hazard and related concerns are legitimate, but they merely underscore the importance of taking care not to provide excessive incentives—be they legal, moral, or material—to intervene.

The creator of peril and inflicter of harm also figure in Good Samaritan law in ways that bear on questions of humanitarian intervention. Under a Good Samaritan–based paradigm, a state does not have a legal right to intervene if the government or other actor causing the human rights harms or humanitarian losses has a legal privilege to do so. This principle provides a categorical means for incorporating some of the most significant legal and moral limitations on humanitarian intervention in an international order that accords state sovereignty a central place. It addresses and accommodates the fact that internationally recognized wielders of state power retain extensive legal authority to treat their citizens and subjects harshly. Even the principal human rights covenants embody this feature by carving out an exception to a signatory state's international legal obligation to secure most rights where emergencies warrant suspension or limitation. This notion akin to legal privilege also recognizes and accepts the force of arguments by anti-interventionists who accord legal and normative significance to autonomous self-determination for political communities that are presumptively congruent with states.

On the other hand, the law of the Good Samaritan imposes fairly tight limits on privileges to harm or imperil, another constraint that fits with a plausible and coherent model for humanitarian intervention. Under a Good Samaritan–derived analysis, a government or other actor bears a considerable burden of establishing definitively that it enjoys a privilege to commit acts that otherwise might generate a legal right to intervention in the state. This idea helps to organize and integrate several aspects of humanitarian intervention

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rules and intuitions. One is the notion that human rights problems and humanitarian messes remain matters of domestic or only very limited international concern until they cross a threshold that brings the dissolution of the state's near immunity from scrutiny and authorizes intervention, sometimes on a massively disruptive scale. That is, severe human rights abuse and humanitarian catastrophes are not just easier cases by quantitative comparison to less serious misfortunes; legally and perhaps morally, they are qualitatively different. Another example is intervention in failed states. The widely shared sense that failed states present easier cases for intervention reflects the fact that there is no longer a functioning entity in the target country that the international order would recognize as competent to hold a state's privilege to treat its citizens in disconcerting ways. A dilute form of the same analysis would apply to cases in which a civil war has left no organized, effective government to serve as the medium through which a state's legal rights and privileges can be exercised.

Finally, Good Samaritan law provides a way of accounting for matters that go beyond the basic issue of whether an intervention is permitted, prohibited, or required. Under a Good Samaritan model, a state that exercises its legal privilege or fulfills its legal obligation to intervene incurs obligations governing how it conducts the intervention. Once a state undertakes a permissible intervention, it may not lawfully abandon that intervention unless doing so leaves the victims of the human rights violations or the humanitarian crisis no worse off than they would have been if the foreign state had not intervened in the first place. Following an analogy to domestic laws that hold a rescuer liable for harms caused by his own negligent conduct, the intervening state is obliged to take reasonable care that its actions do not risk harms significantly greater than the humanitarian gains they promise to produce.

These rules of the Good Samaritan–based model parallel some strong and commonly held intuitions about the legality and morality of humanitarian intervention and suggest how they fit into a broader, structured framework. At the same time, they help us to understand why some of the issues concerning how an intervention is to be conducted occupy so prominent a place in the debates. If we get in, how deeply are we committing ourselves? What is the risk of "mission creep"? What is the exit strategy? What are the scenarios under which we can declare success, admit defeat, or otherwise decide it is time to get out? Once the immediate human rights abuses have been stopped and the threat of imminent catastrophe has been addressed, how much further do our obligations extend in preventing a relapse into civil violence or building new institutions to provide order and protect human rights? These questions understandably figure prominently in legal and normative (and not just practical political) assessments of whether to intervene once one understands a decision to intervene as a step that creates affirmative

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

legal and perhaps moral obligations along the lines of those which are characteristic of Good Samaritan law.[18]

Conclusion

A Good Samaritan model of the legal and normative aspects of humanitarian intervention is a general one, not bound to particular transient cases. Nonetheless, the principal applications for the foreseeable future will be cases in which the United States is the major player. To be sure, other instances of purported or possible intervention have arisen (as in Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and East Timor) and can and surely will continue to arise, but most cases will likely raise at least the possibility of American involvement. No other country or group of countries is soon likely to match the United States in its combination of global scope of interests, massive military and diplomatic capacity, and political susceptibility to human rights and humanitarian arguments for action.

A Good Samaritan conception of humanitarian intervention suggests that the United States could more frankly and aggressively assert humanitarian grounds for intervention, and that it could enjoy a good deal of discretion in determining whether, how much, and how it intervenes. There would thus appear to be much in the model to alarm and enrage those who see Uncle Sam not as a Good Samaritan, but as an arrogant bully. But such a picture is inaccurate, or at least incomplete, for the Good Samaritan–derived paradigm imposes considerable legal and moral constraints on U.S. intervention (many of them rooted in the target states' and victim-beneficiaries' rights to autonomy), as well as risks of incurring onerous obligations that would give Americans reasons to be cautious in choosing to intervene.[19]

Moreover, a Good Samaritan model does not reliably settle the question of whether intervention is permitted or required in many particular cases. Even well-settled legal rules and normative principles often do not do so, especially in the tough cases. Rather, they suggest how one can argue for the outcomes and interpretations one favors where such results are plausible but not obviously compelling. Under a Good Samaritan model of humanitarian intervention, the precise contours of many of the rules remain uncertain and open to debate among the fractious participants and commentators that shape American policy. The prevalence of complicated or disputed facts and

[18] For a sampling of ethical and policy-oriented analyses focusing on such concerns, see Hoffmann, *The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention*, pp. 38–60; and Frye, *Humanitarian Intervention*.

[19] Even some of those who perceive and favor an expansive and expanding international human rights regime do not expect the post–Cold War environment to produce a significant increase in full-fledged intervention to protect human rights. See Jack Donnelly, "State Sovereignty and International Intervention: The Case of Human Rights," in *Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention*, ed. Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 139–46.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unreliable or biased reports on conditions in target countries means that efforts to apply any agreed-upon rules will leave room for disputes about the bottom line in most cases. And in any event, many of the Good Samaritan–based rules do not require but merely permit intervention, thus giving scope to prudential arguments against intervention in almost every individual case.

For those who would still regard a Good Samaritan model as an apologia for U.S. overreaching or a cloak for the self-interested, malign, or bungling use of American force, there is a last sobering point: there exists no better alternative. The Good Samaritan–based paradigm provides a relatively coherent and systematic picture that accommodates much of the prevailing international law, political practice, and widely shared moral intuitions concerning humanitarian intervention. Because it has these features, it can generate broadly persuasive (if not always conclusive) arguments for or against particular interventions and the responsibilities that come with intervention, and it can provide a stable target and focus for reformist or radically critical arguments. One or more of these crucial qualities is lacking in other approaches—including the mostly positivist arguments that dominate the debate over the legality of humanitarian intervention and the consequentialist and rights-based analyses that characterize a normative discussion of intervention that often disregards legal issues. Collectively, these other approaches therefore leave legal principles so unsettled and the underlying moral arguments so legally indeterminate that participants would remain largely free to select whatever purported legal rule or normative stance best suits their immediate aims. In such circumstances, suspicion and cynicism about allegedly humanitarian intervention and refusals to intervene are most likely to be justified, and the self-proclaimed Good Samaritan is most likely to deserve a bad name.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Humanitarian Intervention

The Price Paid by the Military

by Sam C. Sarkesian

The strategic landscape of the new millennium is enshrouded in the "fog of peace."[1] While there is no immediate threat to the United States and the fear of major wars has diminished, turmoil and conflicts between and within states have increased. Moreover, the ethnic, religious, and nationalistic roots of such conflicts and the changing patterns of state-to-state relationships are difficult to separate from humanitarian issues. International terrorism, drug cartels, and threats created by information-age technology add to the turmoil. The task of defining national interests and issues of national security has thus been complicated not by immediate threats, but by the unpredictable, uncertain, and confusing characteristics of the international arena.

In such an environment, the role of the "lone superpower" is especially challenging. American efforts to promote democracy, freedom, peace, and stability in the world raise a fundamental question: if the United States uses its military power to accomplish these objectives, what are the possible consequences for the U.S. military itself? Based on the evidence of recent history, the clear answer is that the commitment of the U.S. military in humanitarian crises not only diminishes military readiness, but also requires a mind-set and operational doctrine contrary to the military's *raison d'être* and organizational system. Moreover, at the operational level the role of U.S. ground troops in humanitarian intervention is, in the main, contrary to the training, skills, and rules of engagement for ground combat. Also, the support of the American people is contingent upon the military's adherence to the

[1] John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Apr. 1992). This essay was prepared for the Foreign Policy Research Institute conference "The Question of Humanitarian Intervention," Philadelphia, Pa., Feb. 12–13, 2001. I thank Professor John Allen Williams, Loyola University Chicago, for his valuable comments.

Sam C. Sarkesian is professor emeritus of political science at Loyola University Chicago, author of numerous publications on national security, and a retired lieutenant colonel of the U.S. Army.

© 2001 Foreign Policy Research Institute. Published by Elsevier Science Limited.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

principles of the American way of war. Thus, when committed, the military must operate within these principles—following the "just war" tradition, even when there is no war.[2] It follows that the military must remain within the "orbit" of the American political-social system while operating across the whole spectrum of conflict. In such circumstances, "the U.S. military faces a dual dilemma: How to respond to the uncertainties of the domestic and strategic landscapes, nurture a proper relationship with society and yet retain its *raison d'être*."[3]

The focus here is specifically on U.S. ground forces committed directly in the crisis area. This is not intended to detract from the important role of all the military services in humanitarian intervention, such as the role of U.S. air power in Kosovo. Furthermore, "[e]ach of the military services has evolved its own identity, a complex of beliefs, traditions, prejudices, and values deep-seated and setting their institution apart from the others and from society at large."[4] It follows that each service will interpret roles and doctrine in humanitarian crises according to its own perspective.

The Policy Arena

No one disputes that defense of the United States and its allies is the chief purpose of policy and strategy, but beyond that, "there is no escaping the practical difficulty in trying to define precisely what the national interest (much less vital national interest) might be in a particular case."[5] Thus, President Clinton's final national security statement, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, divided American interests into three categories: "vital, important, and . . . humanitarian and other longer term interests."[6] A year earlier, however, humanitarian issues had been in a different category: "These interests do not affect our national survival, but they do affect our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live."[7] In the same statement, the administration declared that intervening in humanitarian crises was a necessary task for the United States.

[2] See *Field Manual No. 100-23, Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Dec. 30, 1994), p. 15; and Tony Pfaff, *Peacekeeping and the Just War Tradition* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Sept. 2000).

[3] Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor Jr., *The US Military Profession into the Twenty-first Century: War, Peace and Politics* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), p. 1.

[4] A. J. Bacevich, "Military Culture and Institutional Change," in *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy*, ed. Antonia Handler Chayes and George T. Raach (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), p. 103.

[5] Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations and World Politics: Security, Economy, Identity*, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 2000), p. 165.

[6] The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, Dec. 2000), p. 4.

[7] The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, Dec. 1999), pp. 1–2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

With the election of George W. Bush, the role of the United States as lone superpower is likely to become more cautious and selective, and national interests will perhaps be more narrowly defined. This reflects not only Bush's view of foreign policy, but that of Vice President Richard Cheney, who served as secretary of defense during the Gulf War. Also presumed to have a substantial effect on U.S. policy is Secretary of State Colin Powell, a retired general and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who has long stressed the need to have clear political objectives, apply adequate force in any military intervention, and use the military to promote vital national interests. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld underscored the Bush administration's approach to defense policy and strategy in his Senate confirmation hearings in January 2001: "U.S. military forces can best be used when the military mission is clear and achievable and when there is a reasonable exit strategy. . . . When the main burden of the U.S. presence shifts to infrastructure and nation building . . . we are into missions that are not appropriate for the U.S. military."[8]

Questions about the meaning of U.S. national interests and national security reflect an uncertain, confusing, and evolving new world order. While the U.S. role internationally is difficult to define in clear terms, there is a widely held view among Americans that their country is the leader (although reluctantly acknowledged by a number of other states) in the quest for world peace and stability. Few clear guidelines exist, however, on the specific means needed to achieve those lofty goals, that is, on how to get there from here.

Questions about the nation's interests and security reflect uncertainty and confusion.

The gap between ends and means obliges the U.S. military to design a workable military strategy based on a combination of serious assessments, intuition, traditional doctrine, and guesswork. "The military is waiting for direction and, in its absence, is filling the void until civilian leaders determine what they want from American global leadership. Our Armed Services are capable but confused from fits-and-starts approaches. We have to decide as a nation what we want to be."[9] It is a difficult proposition for the U.S. military to develop effective responses to all the possible contingencies and conflicts that impinge on someone's—anyone's—definition of the national interest. The difficulty is enhanced by a profusion of labels ranging from "conflicts short of war" to "stability operations" to "operations other than war," "military operations other than war," "low-intensity conflict," "unconventional conflict," and "asymmetric conflict." To add to the confusion, the missions that these labels are meant to describe involve ethnic, religious, and nationalistic conflicts and a number of peace-

[8] Vince Crawley, "Bracing for Change: Rumsfeld Promises Sweeping Reviews," *Army Times*, Jan. 22, 2001.

[9] U.S. Institute of Peace, *Adapting to the New National Security Environment* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, Dec. 1, 2000), p. 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

keeping and humanitarian contingencies, all of which can be intermixed. For example, is the NATO-U.S. operation in Kosovo a humanitarian conflict short of war, an operation other than war, unconventional conflict, or all of the above?

Confusion and disagreement about the role of the United States in the world and the ends-means problem is reflected in the views of the Clinton administration and its critics. In a 1998 report, the *Chicago Tribune* quoted Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on the role of the United States as lone superpower: "If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further into the future."[10] That same year, in an article titled "Globocop," George Szamuely wrote, "With only one superpower left standing, it was incumbent upon the United States, as the repository of the hopes of mankind, to assume the role of global leader, to become a kind of international *gendarme*."[11]

At a 1995 conference, General John M. Shalikashvili, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, raised troubling questions about the role of the United States in humanitarian crises. In trying to determine when and where to get involved, he stated, "The difficulty lies in distinguishing between helping—narrowly defining our interests and our involvement—and on the other hand, getting caught in someone else's hatreds, prejudices, and intrigues." He concluded, "And who knows? If we are selective and only engage when our interests are very clear, when we have agreement on the limits of our involvement and the conditions of our withdrawal, and we go in when we can make a difference and have the support of an informed public, then maybe in time we will view such missions as supportive of our interests and not as damaging to our security."[12]

Donald Kagan and Frederick W. Kagan went so far as to warn that "America is in danger" because

> increasing military weakness and confusion about foreign and defense policy have encouraged development of powerful hostile states and coalitions that challenge the interests and security of the United States, its allies and friends, and all those with an interest in preserving the general peace.[13]

In looking back at the past decade and the transition from the Clinton to the Bush administration, one can only conclude that the U.S. military faces the challenging and troubling task of developing military strategy in a fluid strategic environment with murky national guidelines. As Anthony Zinni, a

[10] Ray Mosley, "What Went Wrong with Pax Americana," *Chicago Tribune*, Feb. 22, 1998.

[11] George Szamuely, "Globocop," *American Outlook*, Spring 1998, p. 9.

[12] "Remarks by General John M. Shalikashvili," *Humanitarian Crises: Meeting the Challenges*, Cantigny Conference Series (Chicago, Ill.: Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, 1995), pp. 52, 58.

[13] Donald Kagan and Frederick W. Kagan, *While America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness, and the Threat to Peace Today* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

retired Marine Corps general, responded when asked about readiness, "Ready for what?"[14]

Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia and Kosovo

Defining humanitarian intervention is a complicated and an often confusing proposition. In broad terms, *humanitarianism* is a concern for the good of all mankind, but the term has philanthropic as well as ethical, moral, and religious connotations. The norms embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ban "all forms of discrimination, slavery, torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment and guarantees every human's right to life, liberty, nationality, freedom of movement, religion, asylum, marriage, assembly, and many other rights and liberties."[15] The question is who will enforce such a universe of rights and how they will do it in light of the competing norms of nation-state sovereignty and self-determination within states.[16]

Although it often leads to peacekeeping or peace enforcement, humanitarian intervention differs from both. Humanitarian intervention takes place in the absence of a preexisting cease-fire and "may not involve the consent of all parties to the conflict and may appear to violate sovereignty."[17] Moreover, since force may be used to harm or kill some people in the name of the rights of other people, "'*armed* humanitarian intervention' borders on being an oxymoron in the sense that it entails the threat or use of violence for what purport to be humanitarian purposes."[18] This dilemma was clearly shown in the NATO-U.S. humanitarian interventions in Somalia and Kosovo.

In retrospect, the grave errors underlying the U.S. and U.N. roles in Somalia in 1992–95, especially the American intervention, were clear. As the Kagans wrote, "It would be hard to think of a place less important in itself. It had no strategic, economic, or political significance for the United States." Even though the U.S. intervention was a "fiasco," they concluded that "it could not overcome the powerful forces that continued to press for intervention in trouble spots when the occasion arose."[19] Problems with the U.S. involvement were compounded by mission creep, questionable rules of

[14] Conrad C. Crane, *Alternative National Military Strategies for the United States*, conference brief (Washington, D.C.: Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University, Sept. 21, 2000), p. 3.

[15] Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Corporation of New York, Dec. 1997), p. 90.

[16] See David Scheffer, "Humanitarian Intervention Versus State Sovereignty," *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: Implications for the United States Military* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1993), pp. 9–16.

[17] William J. Durch and J. Matthew Vaccaro, "The Environment and Tasks of Peace Operations," in *Peace Operations*, ed. Chayes and Raach, pp. 27–28.

[18] Arnold Kanter, "Memorandum to the President," in *Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine*, Alton Frye, project director (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000), p. 4.

[19] Kagan and Kagan, *While America Sleeps*, p. 332. I thank Michelle Johns, research assistant, Loyola University Chicago, for her help in the study of the Somalia intervention.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

engagement, ill-equipped forces, and the CNN effect, among others, resulting in the tragic episode in Mogadishu that left eighteen U.S. Rangers dead and seventy-seven others wounded.[20] One critical analysis of the incident echoed reportage from Vietnam: "When every civilian is a potential enemy, no fighting is easy. When every battleground is filled with hostile civilians—people you thought you were there to help—the fighting becomes . . . nearly impossible."[21] The lesson another analyst drew from the episode was that "[h]umanitarian intervention may be necessary, but it is also clearly insufficient. . . . Gains from humanitarian intervention in the short term cannot hide the stark reality that a commitment to longer-term nation building is also a requirement."[22] Indeed, there is little to suggest that U.S. involvement had any lasting impact on Somalia's problems, and it may have worsened them.

The U.S. involvement in Kosovo in 1999 was highlighted by an air campaign intended to eliminate the need for a ground invasion. For all practical purposes, however, the air campaign against Serbia included targeting the civilian infrastructure, invariably causing civilian casualties that challenged the notion of "just war." In the aftermath, U.S. forces have been deployed on the ground, trying to maintain peace in a place that, according to a French official, has become a quagmire.[23] While Slobodan Milosevic was displaced, peace and stability in the region remain elusive. Ethnic Albanians and Serbs have attacked each other countless times, U.S. and Russian troops have been fired on, and tensions mount along the Macedonian border, all of which lends credence to the view that humanitarian intervention is rarely a short-term commitment. It ultimately involves a role for military police and invites ground combat—usually unconventional.[24]

Armed humanitarian intervention also negates the notions of fairness and neutrality. The foreign presence ipso facto assists the weaker side in the conflict and so makes the other side an adversary, further complicating any pursuit of the presumed political goal and making the commitment open ended. In any case, defining humanitarian intervention as a military operation distinct from armed conflict without considering the long-term aftermath is inadequate and misleading. This is not to suggest that the U.S. military should never be involved in humanitarian operations. But such involvement must be guided by clear objectives, strategic insights, and calculated priorities, and

[20] See Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, Jan. 1995), esp. pp. 58–59.

[21] Kent DeLong and Steven Tuckey, *Mogadishu! Heroism and Tragedy* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), p. xviii. See also Maj. Clifford E. Day, *Critical Analysis on the Defeat of Task Force Ranger* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala: Air Command and Staff College, 1997), pp. 28–29.

[22] Thomas G. Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), pp. 95–96. Weiss provides detailed analysis of Somalia 1992–95, Bosnia 1992–95, and other interventions.

[23] Kagan and Kagan, *While American Sleeps*, p. 423.

[24] See, for example, Stephen R. Bowers and Marion T. Doss Jr., "Low-Intensity Conflict in the Balkans," *Armed Forces Journal International*, May 1999, pp. 28–34.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

must spell out clear directions for the military and provide it with relevant training. So far, these conditions have not been met prior to the commitment of U.S. forces in humanitarian crises.

The Quest for Full-Spectrum Dominance

The challenge facing the U.S. military with regard to humanitarian crises must also be studied in the context of the mission, as stressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to achieve "full-spectrum dominance."[25] According to the Pentagon's *Joint Vision 2020*, the U.S. military should be capable of conducting peacekeeping and humanitarian operations (the low end of the conflict spectrum), full-scale nuclear war (the high end), and everything in between. That document makes clear that dominance across the conflict spectrum means superiority in any military operation, at any time or place, and in more than one theater simultaneously, if necessary.

One is struck by the complexity of the various categories of action that the U.S. military may have to undertake and by the possibility of simultaneous operations. Moreover, since humanitarian issues usually arise in the context of other forms of conflict, it follows that the U.S. military role in humanitarian operations must be studied as part of the overall assessment of full-spectrum dominance and not in isolation. Over the past decade, a number of officers and observers have made plain their view that humanitarian operations take a heavy toll on the American military's war-fighting capabilities. A study of senior U.S. Army leaders concluded that responding to a variety of conflicts short of war will require new skills that may be at odds with traditional leadership concepts. "'There are an increasing number of peripheral missions,' said Lieutenant General James H. Johnson, 'such as nation building, peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian, counter drug, and disaster relief operations at home and abroad. They represent a major distraction from the battle-focused training needed to fulfill the Army's traditional war fighting role.'"[26]

Evidently, not everyone in Washington or in the military shares that point of view. In 1997, the U.S. assistant secretary of defense stated, "Large-scale peace operations allow our forces to practice and refine strategic deployment, integrate reserve and active forces in field operations and

[25] *Joint Vision 2020* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2000), p. 8.

[26] Lt. Gen. James H. Johnson, letter to R. Manning Ancell, Aug. 10, 1993, as quoted in Edward C. Meyer and R. Manning Ancell with Jane Mahaffey, *Who Will Lead? Senior Leadership in the United States Army* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995), p. 224. See also Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan and Lt. Col. James M. Dubik, *Land Warfare in the 21st Century* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, Feb. 1993), p. 8; "Getting the Military out of Humanitarian Relief," *Defense Monitor*, Oct. 1997, p. 2; and David Callahan, *Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997), p. 177.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enhance joint and coalition operations."[27] In other words, as an *Army Times* headline put it, "Army views Balkans as training ground for Combat."[28]

All indications are that the military is less comfortable with and less enthusiastic about its new roles than the press photos of soldiers feeding children would suggest. "Recruits do not enter the military to do humanitarian work; for that they could join the Peace Corps or an NGO [nongovernmental organization]. They sign up to fight wars."[29] Regardless of these differing viewpoints, the U.S. military is likely to be committed to some humanitarian missions even under the Bush administration.

Cases in point include Bosnia and Kosovo. Despite initial expectations to the contrary, deployments of U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard units to both operations have been scheduled through May 2005, giving the lie to the notion that humanitarian peacekeeping missions are short-term affairs. Contingents in both areas are more properly termed armies of occupation, serving as the local constabulary. The trend is clear: as an army spokesman told the *Army Times*, "Since 1989, the number of Army deployments has grown by over 300 percent, yet the Army's active and reserve forces have shrunk by over 40 percent."[30]

An Operational View of the U.S. Military

There are those, including some in the military, who believe that U.S. military intervention in humanitarian crises sharpens combat readiness. Others charge that critics of such intervention overstate the negative impact on the U.S. military and that the army uses flawed and inadequate measures of the impact on readiness. General Carl Vuono, army chief of staff in 1993, disagreed: "Will today or tomorrow's peacetime commitments leave enough [soldiers] for properly tailoring a robust, major contingency power-projection package? As far as I'm concerned, they will not." Another general, the late Maxwell R. Thurman, testified that after completing peacekeeping missions, "soldiers have to go through an extensive training regime to regain the level of operational proficiency which they held at the outset of that duty."[31] And according to a report in the *Army Times*, "Senior military leaders, including Army General Henry H. Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have

[27] Rick Maze, "Defense Officials: U.N. Peace Missions 'Useful' for Military," *Army Times*, May 5, 1997.

[28] *Army Times*, June 19, 2000.

[29] Andrew S. Nastios, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997), p. 111.

[30] Deployment information and quotation in Sean D. Naylor, "Balkan Rotation Schedule Set through 2005," *Army Times*, Dec. 18, 2000.

[31] As quoted in John G. Roos, "The Perils of Peacekeeping: Tallying Costs in Blood, Coin, Prestige, and Readiness," *Armed Forces Journal International*, Dec. 1993, p. 17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

long argued against separate peace-keeping forces. . . . [P]eacekeeping units would be much less able to transition into a combat force if needed."[32]

The late Les Aspin addressed concerns about training for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions in a May 1994 speech delivered after leaving office as secretary of defense. He observed that the end of the Cold War reshaped the strategic landscape by lowering the barrier to U.S. military involvement, creating problems in determining when U.S. military forces should be used, and increasing the costs—not just monetary—of using U.S. military forces.[33] He noted that in so-called peace operations involving the U.S. military, the rule of three applied: one unit was deployed in peacekeeping, one was getting ready for peacekeeping, and one needed retraining after peacekeeping. It is estimated that it takes three to six months of training to prepare active ground combat units for peacekeeping duties. After returning to their home station, they require an equal period of time to refocus on their primary mission.

Some of the most troubling views come from the ranks. A study on army culture based on surveys and interviews of 13,500 soldiers revealed serious misgivings about leadership and operational tempo. The officers interviewed and surveyed saw "Army practices as being out of balance with Army beliefs." According to the report, "The 'undisciplined' pace of operations is heavily criticized. Officers characterize it as too many short-term, back-to-back deployments. . . . Excessive operational pace is a major source of the degradation in the quality of training. . . . It is detrimental to readiness, leader development, and officer job satisfaction; leads to micromanagement; and is a major reason for attrition among all office ranks."[34]

Such grumbling in peacetime is hardly new. After the Civil War, the Union Army became a virtual government as the defeated Confederacy was placed under martial law. "The Army became a political instrument, a role it did not relish." Later in the century the army was deployed mainly to keep Indians and labor unions in check. As a colonel wrote in 1895, "In reality, the Army is now a gendarmery—a national police."[35]

In the period immediately following World War II, proud armored units stationed in Germany were turned into constabulary squadrons and assumed the functions of German national police. Often these squadrons were deployed in small units, some down to the platoon level, in various

[32] Vince Crawley, "Peacekeepers: Bush Wants Police, Not Soldiers," *Army Times*, Dec. 4, 2000. See also Montgomery C. Meigs, "Operational Art in the New Century," *Parameters*, Spring 2001, pp. 4–14.

[33] Author's notes of Aspin's presentation. See also Les Aspin, "Challenges to Value-Based Military Intervention," *Keynote Addresses from the Managing Chaos Conference* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, Feb. 1995), pp. 1–10, especially p. 6.

[34] Sean D. Naylor, "Study Blasts Army Culture," *Army Times*, June 4, 2001, p. 8. See also Sean D. Naylor, "Two New Panels to Study Officer Morale Problems; In leaked comments, CGSC students blast micromanagement, quality of life," *Army Times*, Apr. 24, 2000, p. 9.

[35] Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*, rev. and exp. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1984), pp. 262, 263.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

small German cities. They served as liaisons with local officials, conducted traffic patrols, set speed traps, supervised camps for displaced persons, and organized raids and searches as required. All of these operations were aimed at maintaining peace and stability in the American sector of occupied Germany.

The role of the U.S. ground forces in Bosnia and Kosovo today resembles those earlier experiences. Like the forces of old, they must adjust their training, weaponry, rules of engagement, objectives, and military-civilian-political relationships to the special demands of humanitarian operations. Those adjustments blunt their combat readiness.

> [T]he actions that soldiers are trained to take in warfighting missions may be inappropriate in peacekeeping missions. They have to do the right thing very quickly, without much time for moral-philosophical reflection. This means that training for war and operations other than war may be more difficult than anticipated. . . . It is not enough simply to declare the mission as peacekeeping and then conclude the police ethic applies. . . . There is only a limited analogy between the police officers maintaining the peace at home and the soldier maintaining the peace abroad.[36]

Frustration is growing throughout the ranks.

Evidently, frustration is growing throughout the ranks. A report in the *Chicago Tribune* quoted a paratrooper from the 82nd Airborne Division who said, "We guard the Albanian kids [from Serbian attacks] in the morning, and the Serbian kids in the afternoon."[37] An enlisted man told the *Army Times*: "You are trained for one thing as an infantryman: war. You are a little bit rougher than most people and you have to come down here and be nice to people. That's not what we are trained for."[38]

General Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, accepted the proposition that the U.S. military must be used in conflicts short of war. Nevertheless, he added this qualifying statement: "The events over the past decade, in such places as Southwest Asia, the Balkans, Haiti, Africa, Indonesia, Kashmir and elsewhere, provide a window into the future landscape. . . . I think we all realize it's murky, it's frustrating and it's increasingly dangerous."[39] Charles Krauthammer provided a critical assessment of U.S. involvement in humanitarian operations: "It is a fool's errand: the endless occupation of a murderous neighborhood in pursuit of utopian objectives of the most

[36] Pfaff, *Peacekeeping and the Just War Tradition*, pp. 21, 23.

[37] James Shea, "82nd Airborne, United States Army, 'I wasn't trained to do day care': Why Are We Using Crack Troops on Safety Patrol?" *Chicago Tribune*, Dec. 5, 1999.

[38] Matthew Cox, "You Call This SOLDIERING? Walking the Beat with KFOR's Warrior Cops," *Army Times*, Mar. 27, 2000.

[39] Vince Crawley, "Shelton: Bush Call to Cut Back Missions Naive," *Army Times*, Dec. 25, 2000.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

peripheral strategic interest to the United States. . . . This is what happens in humanitarian war when you *win*."[40]

But others argue that such missions are essential. In an article on U.S. forces in Bosnia, Major General Kevin P. Byrnes, commander of the army's First Cavalry Division in Bosnia, said that "having been over here and seen how military force is being used, what we're able to accomplish sustaining the peace, I think it's worth it."[41] And retired general Wesley Clark, who commanded NATO forces in Kosovo, stressed that those in the military today required "both a war-fighting spirit and a peacekeeping capability."[42]

Regardless of whose testimony one honors, the difficulties of defining national interests and strategy, operational doctrine, rules of engagement, weapons, training, and deployment priorities—while trying to remain dominant across the whole conflict spectrum—are enough to cause even the most gung-ho officer to throw up his (or her) hands and ask, "Ready for what?"

Direction for the Future

It is likely that the U.S. military will remain involved in humanitarian interventions, but there needs to be a serious reassessment of the impact of such involvement on the effectiveness of the military. On the one hand, the military must continue to strive for full-spectrum dominance, even when involved in humanitarian crises. On the other hand, it must ensure that it husbands its legitimacy in the eyes of the American people and its utility in the eyes of the political leadership. The military cannot refuse to participate when ordered, but neither can it silently accept requests that amount to slow-motion suicide. There are no simple or one-time solutions to the dilemmas of humanitarian intervention, but there *are* alternatives to the use of ground troops.

First, units within the military can be designated specifically for humanitarian operations, adding ten to fifteen thousand personnel to the existing force structure if required. Such units should not be included in regular combat formations or cobbled together from the National Guard or Reserve. They would be active-duty units trained in military-police and civil-affairs duties, led by officers trained in the languages and cultures of the relevant countries and the vagaries of multilateral operations in cooperation with allied troops. Critics might argue that such units would be unable to

[40] Charles Krauthammer, "The Short, Unhappy Life of Humanitarian War," *National Interest*, Fall 1999, p. 8. See also John Hillen, "American Military Intervention: A User's Guide," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder*, no. 1079, May 2, 1996.

[41] Tom Philpott, "Bosnia: Proving Ground For Peacekeepers," *Retired Officer Magazine*, Apr. 1999, pp. 56, 64. See also Tom Hundley, "Bosnia Tour Hones GI Readiness, Vets Say," *Chicago Tribune*, July 20, 1997. See also Maze, "Defense Officials: U.N. Peace Missions 'Useful' for Military."

[42] Vince Crawley, "What's Wrong with Keeping the Peace?" *Army Times*, May 22, 2000.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

respond effectively to ground combat should it occur during an intervention, but in that event regular ground combat troops could still be held in reserve to protect those *American* lives.

Secondly, U.S. military participation should be limited to logistical, administrative, and intelligence support of the United Nations or other multinational or regional organizations involved in humanitarian crises. The United States should pursue policies that give the lead role in humanitarian crises to organizations such as NATO. Thus, a reduced U.S. role in such crises could not be denounced as "unilateralism." The proposed European Union military force could be a boon in this regard.

Thirdly, U.S. Special Forces teams should be assigned to train *foreign* forces for humanitarian operations, as they did in exemplary fashion with Nigerian troops preparing for deployment in West Africa.

Fourthly, policymakers should consider the use of private organizations such as Military Professionals Resources Incorporated (MPRI), which is staffed by retired U.S. military officers and enlisted personnel. In Bosnia, the Croats' success in driving Serbian forces (and civilians) out of the region was due in part to MPRI training. Private organizations could be contracted to work with multilateral organizations and perform unilateral functions, if necessary, under U.S. oversight.[43]

Fifthly, political leaders should make more effective use in crisis-prone areas of nonmilitary instruments including intelligence and covert operations, which, if successful, can make military deployments unnecessary.[44]

Finally, if in the end the use of U.S. ground combat forces is seriously considered, then the tenets of the Powell Doctrine should apply: the crisis must involve vital U.S. interests, a realistic assessment must be made of nonmilitary options, and the goals and exit strategy must at least be plausible. Perhaps above all, the president and the national leadership must in all cases devise, explain, and sell a clear strategy to the Congress and American people, and give clear objectives to the military. For only then can the armed forces declare, "I'm ready for *that*."

[43] See, for example, David Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, Adelphi Paper 316 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998).

[44] See Thomas Henriksen, "Covert Operations, Now More Than Ever," *Orbis*, Winter 2000, pp. 145–56.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Humanitarian Intervention

Lessons from the Past Decade

by James Kurth

To call the last ten years a decade of humanitarian intervention requires little imagination. In light of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the status of the United States as the sole superpower, it seemed that international relations had at last entered a new era in which military operations could be dedicated to humanitarian purposes. To some extent, the ensuing years have seen this promise fulfilled. All of the U.S. military interventions after the Gulf War—Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo—have been described as humanitarian ones.[1] Similarly, many of the U.N. peacekeeping operations in the same period have been described as humanitarian interventions (Somalia and Bosnia again, along with East Timor and Sierra Leone). Now, after a decade of experience, it is high time to assess this kind of military operation with an eye to discerning the role it should play in the global relations of the decade to come.

A Century of Humanitarian Intervention

As a phenomenon, humanitarian intervention is hardly new to the 1990s. Plenty of U.S. military actions and U.N. peacekeeping operations in earlier decades were justified by some humanitarian purpose, including the U.S. military interventions in Lebanon, Grenada, and Panama in the 1980s. Indeed, even in the early decades of the twentieth century, the dark ages of international politics, the United States intervened a half dozen or so times in

[1] During the same period, the United States has engaged in many punitive air strikes against Iraq and in one-time punitive air strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998. However, these air operations are not examples of military intervention, which normally is defined as the deployment of ground forces on the territory of another country. This essay was prepared for the Foreign Policy Research Institute conference "The Question of Humanitarian Intervention," Philadelphia, Pa., Feb. 12–13, 2001.

James Kurth is Claude Smith Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, where he is chairman of the Study Group on America and the West.

© 2001 Foreign Policy Research Institute. Published by Elsevier Science Limited.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Latin America, and Europeans intervened on numerous occasions in Africa and Asia ostensibly in pursuit of humanitarian goals.

The fact is that virtually every great power has tended to claim that its military interventions served a humanitarian purpose. This is especially the case with democratic states, in which the government must assemble a political coalition to support and sustain military undertakings and the use of force. Humanitarian purposes provide the rationale for one useful part of that coalition—the well-educated, politically informed, and morally concerned upper-middle class, especially the liberal professionals (and the professional liberals). But other parts of the political coalition have their own reasons, such as strategic or economic interests, for supporting a military operation. When historians now look back at any of the "humanitarian" interventions during the first nine decades of the twentieth century, they often conclude that the most important goal was not the humanitarian one. Is it possible that, when they one day look back at the humanitarian interventions of the final decade of the century, they will arrive at a similarly skeptical assessment?

A Variety of Interventions and Perspectives

One can draw distinctions between different kinds of humanitarian intervention from a variety of perspectives. To begin with, one can focus on the problem and distinguish between the different kinds of humanitarian disaster that the military intervention is supposed to address, perhaps along a continuum consisting of (1) famine (Somalia); (2) murderous but erratic violence (Haiti); (3) organized massacres and ethnic cleansing (Bosnia and Kosovo); and (4) systematic genocide (Rwanda), perhaps as defined by the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[2]

Secondly, one can focus on the cause or agent of the humanitarian disaster and thus on the target of the military intervention. Here, a continuum might include (1) political anarchy resulting from a "failed state" (Somalia); (2) organized criminal gangs or armed tribal groups (Somalia at a later time and Sierra Leone); (3) paramilitary units operating with the approval and support of police or military forces (Bosnia and East Timor); and (4) the full organized forces of the state (Rwanda, Kosovo, and perhaps Haiti).

Thirdly, one can focus on the solution to the humanitarian disaster and thus on the objective of military intervention, along a continuum consisting of (1) abstention, or no military intervention at all (Rwanda); (2) relief of the disaster without addressing its political causes (the policy of the Bush administration in Somalia); (3) relief of the disaster plus imposing a sem-

[2] The text of the U.N. Genocide Convention is given in George J. Andreopoulos, *Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), pp. 229–33.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

blance of political order by securing in power a particular local and friendly political figure (Haiti and Sierra Leone); and (4) reconstruction of the entire political system of the afflicted country (Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and the policy of the Clinton administration in Somalia).

Fourthly, one can focus on the means directed at the humanitarian disaster and thus on the particular armed forces used in the military intervention, perhaps along a continuum consisting of (1) punitive but limited bombing with air forces (Bosnia);[3] (2) coercive and extensive bombing with air forces, including both military and civilian targets (Kosovo, extending into Serbia); (3) enforcement operations, but limited occupation with ground forces (Somalia and Sierra Leone); and (4) enforcement operations and full occupation with ground forces (Haiti and East Timor).[4]

Of greatest concern here are the models defined by the third continuum, concerning the solution to the humanitarian disaster and the four principal categories of objectives: abstention, relief, relief-plus, and reconstruction. It can also be useful, however, to refer on occasion to other ways of distinguishing different kinds of humanitarian intervention.

The Abstention Model

Looking only at what the United States actually did or did not do in response to the human disasters of the 1990s, one might readily conclude that it was actually the decade of humanitarian abstention or isolation rather than intervention. In the past ten years, there have been at least eight cases involving at least 100,000 violent deaths or 1 million refugees that the United States and the United Nations did nothing militarily to stop. The most infamous instance was Rwanda in 1994, but others that fit this description include Sudan, Burundi, Congo, Angola, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Colombia (in each of which the humanitarian disaster continues today). In most of these cases, no one in the U.S. Congress or executive branch argued for military intervention.[5] Even the Congressional Black Caucus, which pressed for military intervention in Haiti in 1994, did not do so in regard to the far greater disasters in Africa. Likewise, the general public issued no calls for military action. More surprisingly, perhaps, not even the so-called human rights

[3] In Bosnia in 1995, the NATO air strikes were combined with a very substantial and successful ground offensive by the Croatian and the Bosnian Muslim armies. See Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Modern Library, 1999), esp. pp. 142–62. A very good case can be made that it was this ground offensive, more than the NATO air strikes, that really drove the Serbs to agree to end the war in Bosnia.

[4] I have discussed some of the issues raised by the fourth continuum, that of military means, in "First War of the Global Era: Kosovo and U.S. Grand Strategy," in *The War for Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age*, ed. Eliot Cohen and Andrew Bacevich (New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming 2001).

[5] The U.S. government, supported by Congress, has prepared Plan Colombia, which sends military assistance and advisers to Colombia. Although not a full-scale military intervention, this program could be a substantial step in that direction.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

organizations within the United States lobbied for intervention with U.S. military forces.

Why, in the face of these massive humanitarian disasters, have all the humanitarians been silent with regard to intervention? First, even humanitarians can be, at a certain level, strategic realists. They realize that military intervention against Russia (because of Chechnya) or China (because of Tibet) is simply impossible. They understand that some countries are so large (e.g., Sudan, Congo, Angola, and Colombia—each of which covers an area greater than France and Spain combined) that military intervention within them is simply impractical.

Secondly, many human rights activists are secular leftists, for whom some humans seem to be less human than others. They avoid calling attention to the plight of Christians in Sudan, for instance, who have been massacred and starved en masse in Sudan. On the other hand, some humans seem to be more human than others, especially the Marxist guerrillas who have engaged in murder, mayhem, and drug trafficking in Colombia. Secular leftists avoid calling attention to the crimes of their fellow secular leftists.

With the important exception of Rwanda, it is telling that virtually no one who is engaged in the current debate over humanitarian intervention now condemns the United States' nonintervention in so many humanitarian disasters during the past decade. No one, of course, is saying that military intervention of some sort would have better served U.S. national interests. No one, of course, is saying that such action would have been feasible or practical. But no one is even saying that U.S. military intervention would have been moral or that U.S. nonintervention was immoral.

In contrast, U.S. nonintervention in Rwanda is widely—and rightly—seen as immoral. However, most advocates of humanitarian intervention have not bothered to specify why Rwanda was different from the other cases. If U.S. nonintervention in Sudan, Congo, Angola, and Burundi was not immoral, then why was U.S. nonintervention in Rwanda immoral? Perhaps the difference was that Rwanda is a small country (Congo, for instance, is about one hundred times larger) and that military intervention there presumably would have been more feasible. However, Burundi is just as small as Rwanda. Perhaps the difference was instead due to the extraordinary behavior toward the Rwandan genocide of the Clinton administration, which talked so much about humanitarian intervention. The administration not only refused to consider any intervention with U.S. military forces in Rwanda, but it actively prevented the United Nations from undertaking an intervention with other military forces.[6]

In summary, then, the default policy in regard to humanitarian disas-

[6] Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998). On what military intervention could have done to stop the genocide, see Alan J. Kuperman, "Rwanda in Retrospect," *Foreign Affairs*, Jan./Feb. 2000, pp. 94–118.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ters has not been humanitarian intervention, but rather humanitarian isolation, i.e., abstention. This is also the safest policy, at least for policymakers. The usual advocates of humanitarian intervention in Washington, the media, and academia are likely to forget or forgive the abstention once the disaster is over or their restless attention moves on to some new emergency elsewhere.

The Relief Model

It might seem that an intervention limited to securing the immediate relief of a famine, for example, would be a modest, sensible, and prudent undertaking. Indeed, this is exactly what the first Bush administration thought it was doing in Somalia in December 1992 and what the British and French governments thought they were doing in Bosnia a few months earlier. Later, the sorry course and shameful failure of the U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1993 and the U.N. intervention in Bosnia in 1993–95 demonstrated, however, that such a narrowly construed form of intervention could easily become a disaster in itself. The relief model, in practice, creates an unstable equilibrium, however limited and moderate it might seem in concept. The presence of conflicting interests and warring parties often mean that intervening actors must use force to enter the afflicted country. In that case, a relief operation must be either expanded, as the Clinton administration tried and failed to do in Somalia, or abandoned in favor of abstention, as the Clinton administration eventually did in Somalia and as the U.N. in effect did in Bosnia.[7]

By now, experience has taught that relief alone is not a practical model for humanitarian intervention if forcible entry into the afflicted country is required. But this was not always so clear. In Somalia, the famine was caused by the disruption of food distribution, which in turn stemmed from fighting between armed tribal groups. Initially, U.S. military forces were powerful enough to ensure that significantly larger numbers of people had access to food. However, it soon became obvious that when the U.S. forces departed (as they eventually would have to do), the fighting, anarchy, and famine would resume. This realization sparked the Clinton administration's "mission creep," its failed attempt to reconstruct the Somali political system. Indeed, when U.S. forces departed after the deaths of two dozen American soldiers, Somalia did relapse into anarchy (although fighting abated somewhat) and hunger, the condition in which it remains today. A recent U.N. survey of hunger around the world found Somalia to have the highest ratio of

[7] Of course, intervention that is limited to relief alone is perfectly feasible when the local government is cooperating and other local groups are not warring or hostile to the intervention. In such a case (e.g., when 7,500 U.S. Marines provided disaster relief in Bangladesh in 1991 following a devastating cyclone that killed more than 130,000 people), the intervening military units are really employing their logistical capabilities, not their enforcement ones.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

undernourished persons of all—73 percent of its population.[8] In Bosnia, the U.N. relief intervention of 1992–95 turned into an even worse debacle. By the end of that period, U.N. military units had become de facto hostages of the greater military forces of the Bosnian Serbs. U.N. soldiers were unable to prevent the massacre of 7,000 Bosnian Muslims at the U.N. "safe haven" of Srebrenica in July 1995. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, during the initial U.N. intervention that sought merely to provide relief, rebel forces took U.N. military units hostage. The hostage taking only ended when the U.N. intervention expanded—with the enforcement power of British soldiers—into a version of relief-plus that entailed more vigorous support of the Sierra Leone government.

There is one important exception to the widespread dismissal of military intervention that seeks only to provide relief, namely, operations that have the limited goal of evacuating a particular group of persons (such as an intervening state's own citizens) from the scene of a humanitarian disaster. Many great powers have done this for decades and will doubtless continue to do so. It is the most traditional and least controversial form of humanitarian intervention, although it only helps a very small part of humanity (one's own). This is of no relevance to contemporary liberal advocates of humanitarian intervention.

The Relief-Plus Model

If sustained relief is not possible without restoring a semblance of political order, then the next stage of humanitarian intervention is for the intervening powers to install a handpicked, friendly political leader in power. This model, relief-plus, describes U.S. activity throughout the Caribbean and Central America over the past century. Examples have been Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua through the 1930s, the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, and Haiti in 1994. The United States has undertaken this kind of intervention so often and so regularly that it could be considered "the American way of intervention." The U.S. Marines, in fact, were designed and trained as an expeditionary force able to succeed in precisely such missions. (However, in the four interventions in the Caribbean and Central America since the Second World War, the U.S. Army insisted on joining or even dominating the military operations, a task for which it was unsuited or unnecessary.) The relief-plus model is thus long familiar to Americans, not least because it has proven feasible. It restores political order relatively quickly and cheaply as it puts an end to the disaster produced by the disorder (or excessively oppressive order). American soldiers, moreover, need not remain involved indefinitely.

[8] Christopher S. Wren, "U.N. Report Maps Hunger 'Hot Spots,'" *New York Times*, Jan. 9, 2001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Unfortunately, a new political regime installed by such a military force may prove to be almost as oppressive as the old one, and fundamental humanitarian problems, such as widespread poverty and disease, may go unchecked. As a result, within a couple of years of the intervention's conclusion, many of its original advocates tend to become discouraged or even embarrassed. They avert their eyes from what is happening in the country and turn their attention elsewhere. The moral meaning of the intervention that once appeared to be clear and compelling becomes confusing and ambiguous. This has certainly been true with regard to Haiti since 1994.

It is no accident that most of the U.S. military interventions of this type have occurred within or around the Caribbean basin, America's "own backyard." The United States has had more than a century of close experience with this region, based upon extensive ties in every dimension of political, economic, and social life. More than any other region in the world, U.S. officials can knowledgeably select and effectively support their own local political allies in the Caribbean basin and Central America. It is these close relations between the United States and the countries of the region that make this kind of military intervention so uncongenial to most contemporary liberal advocates of humanitarian intervention. They tend to view such interventions as promoting U.S. strategic and economic interests, with the aid of compliant local elites and at the expense of most of the local people. Like military intervention that evacuates American citizens, military intervention that installs U.S. allies is not what liberal advocates of humanitarian intervention have in mind.

In most other regions of the world, the conditions that favor U.S. selection of and support for a local political leader or elite do not pertain. In Africa, much of the Middle East (with the exception of the monarchies of the Persian Gulf), and South and Southeast Asia (with the exception of the Philippines), U.S. policymakers lack the knowledge and experience to be effective. For evidence, one need look no further than the failed intervention in Somalia.

In sum, the United States is likely to continue to undertake humanitarian interventions on the model of relief-plus in the Caribbean and Central America from time to time. (One can readily conceive of one in Cuba after the death of Fidel Castro). These interventions are also likely to be relatively effective in ending humanitarian disaster (although not endemic problems such as poverty and disease), even though they may attract cries of protest from those who do not see these interventions as being humanitarian.

The Reconstruction Model

The most ambitious kind of humanitarian intervention aims to organize the entire political system of a country according to liberal-democratic or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

multicultural norms. Such "nation building" is the model of reconstruction. Contemporary examples include the NATO and U.N. missions in Bosnia and Kosovo and the U.N. mission in East Timor. The classic examples are the American occupations of Germany, Austria, Italy, and Japan after the Second World War. The great success of the American occupations in the task of reconstruction has been an inspiration to advocates of nation building for half a century, much as the great success of the Marshall Plan has been an inspiration to advocates of economic development.

Discerning economic historians, however, have noted that the Marshall Plan was aimed at the reconstruction of the European economies after their destruction in the Second World War, not at their development upward to an entirely new economic stage. The Marshall Plan sought to restore the European economies to the structure and level they had attained before the war; it was considered a success when these economies had regained their production levels of 1938. This objective was relatively simple to achieve, since the knowledge, skills, and experience (the software, so to speak) of the earlier era still existed within the European work force, even though the factories, railroads, and harbors (the hardware) had been destroyed or damaged during the war.

What the U.S. is attempting in Bosnia and Kosovo is not reconstruction, but new construction.

Similarly, discerning political historians have noted that the American occupations were aimed at the reconstruction of the liberal-democratic political systems that had existed in Germany, Austria, Italy, and Japan in the interwar period before their destruction by Nazism, fascism, or militarism (in 1922 for Italy, 1931 for Japan, 1933 for Germany, and 1934 for Austria). The occupations did not attempt to bring about development upward to an entirely new political stage. It was relatively easy for the occupation officials to seek out and restore to authority political leaders, elites, and even parties that had been prominent in the 1920s. These included such political leaders as Konrad Adenauer in West Germany, Karl Renner in Austria, Alcide de Gasperi in Italy, and Yoshida Shigeru in Japan, as well as Catholic and Social Democratic political parties in West Germany, Austria, and Italy.

This kind of restoration is not what is happening in Bosnia and Kosovo, nor can it ever happen there. Having never had a liberal-democratic political system in their history, those places lack political leaders, elites, and parties with any experience of liberal-democratic governance. What the United States and its NATO and U.N. allies have been attempting in Bosnia and Kosovo is not reconstruction, but new construction, a different and far more demanding task. It should be no surprise (although it apparently was one to the Clinton administration) that very little political construction has actually occurred in Bosnia and Kosovo, certainly not construction toward a liberal, democratic, and multicultural political system. Virtually everyone with any experience and expertise in regard to Bosnia and Kosovo believes that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

these countries cannot become both liberal-democratic and multicultural-pluralistic. They possibly can become either the former or the latter, but not both.

A sort of liberal-democratic (more accurately, populist-democratic) politics would be possible in Bosnia and Kosovo if each state were dominated by one ethnic group that constituted a substantial majority of the state's population. This would entail the partition of Bosnia into three different ethnic parts; the Serbian part would probably join Serbia, the Croatian part would probably join Croatia, and the Muslim part would probably become a mini-state. It also would mean the definitive separation of Kosovo from Serbia and its establishment as an independent state. Is the United States really prepared to give up its multicultural (and oddly ethnocentric) fantasy that American-style political pluralism can be exported to the Balkans? The Clinton administration never did give up; perhaps the Bush administration will be able to do so. Conversely, a sort of multicultural-pluralistic politics would be possible in Bosnia and Kosovo within a multiethnic state dominated by an authoritarian regime that stood above any particular ethnic group. This was the case with Bosnia under the Habsburg empire and with both Bosnia and Kosovo under the interwar Yugoslav monarchy and Tito's postwar regime.[9] In our own time, the only viable way to ensure that degree of pluralism would involve some sort of permanent international trusteeship backed up by a permanent international military force. This is why NATO and the United States have found it so hard to leave Bosnia or Kosovo. Are the Western allies really prepared to assume the historical role of Emperor Franz Josef or Marshal Josef Tito?[10]

In Bosnia and Kosovo, we see once again how the moral meaning of a humanitarian intervention can quickly change from certainty to ambiguity after the passage of only a couple of years. In each case, the military intervention achieved an unambiguous and indisputable moral good of the highest importance: stopping the large-scale killing. But, in the aftermath, that is about the only moral aspect of the interventions that remains unambiguous. Once again, many of the original advocates of the interventions have become discouraged or even embarrassed (especially by the brutal and criminal behavior of Albanian gangs in Kosovo and now in Macedonia, but also by the intolerant and corrupt behavior of Muslim officials in Bosnia).[11]

The reconstruction model is likely to prove as much or more disappointing if attempted in most of the world. Virtually no country in Africa has the historical experiences or the social conditions that would enable the

[9] James Kurth, "Eastern Question, Western Answer," *National Interest*, Winter 1993/94, pp. 96–101.

[10] See Adam Garfinkle, "Franz Josef Clinton," *National Interest*, Spring 1999, pp. 125–28.

[11] The prevailing attitude toward the Kosovo intervention, which was held by most NATO decision makers only one year after the end of the war, was summed up by "a senior NATO official": "Kosovo was such a resounding success that no one in the alliance wants to repeat it ever again." "The Week in Review," *New York Times*, June 18, 2000.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

establishment of a liberal or democratic political system. The same is true of much of the Middle East; even the Gulf War could not make Kuwait more liberal or democratic. With regard to South and Southeast Asia, India is a notable exception, but the idea of a successful U.S. military intervention there challenges the imagination. For the most part, the only regions that have some of the historical experiences or social conditions that are necessary for successful political reconstruction are Western and Central Europe (where humanitarian disasters are unlikely), East Asia (where the strategic calculations in South Korea or Taiwan, for instance, would dwarf any humanitarian concerns), and perhaps Latin America (where, as we have seen, the more likely model for U.S. military intervention is relief-plus, not reconstruction).

Words versus Deeds

Given the United States' generally unimpressive record of humanitarian intervention, why do some Americans—particularly the humanitarian and human rights lobby and its allies in the media and academia—continue to argue and agitate for it? Other authors in this volume shed light on a number of positive political, ideological, and moral reasons.[12] However, one should also not underestimate the human rights advocates' sheer ignorance. Few proponents of humanitarian intervention have spent more than a few months in the country where they would have the United States intervene—if they have been there at all. Virtually none of them have ever worn the uniform of the U.S. military forces they yearn to send into combat, nor do they have family members or friends who have served. It is frankly difficult to take seriously any calls for military intervention from people so far removed from the real-life implications of the action they prescribe.

In conclusion, the United States' past experiences with the four models give rise to rather modest expectations for humanitarian interventions in the future. There will doubtless be future operations along the lines suggested by the relief model, but they will generally be limited to evacuating citizens of the United States or perhaps other Western countries from the scene of humanitarian disaster. There will be further interventions on the model of relief-plus, but almost all of these will be in the Caribbean or Central America. There may be interventions that aspire to reconstruct a political system, but these will be rare, and the local conditions that promote or hinder reconstruction will make each case unique. Instead, the normal model for humanitarian intervention will be—and should be—abstention, or no U.S. military intervention at all.

[12] Also see the contending arguments presented in Council on Foreign Relations, *Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2000).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Structural Constraints on Russian Diplomacy

by Rajan Menon

Americans' propensity to see politics as an extension of personality is evident in their thinking on Russia, which exalts the importance of leaders, one-to-one relationships, trust, and communication. The erosion of Soviet institutions under Gorbachev and the failure of effective governing structures to take root in Russia under Yeltsin reinforced this perspective by making leaders loom large. Yet the wiser course is to understand and anticipate the foreign policy of a state by focusing on structural conditions—those strategic, economic, and demographic forces that are visible now and can, with reasonable confidence, be expected to frame the context of leaders' decisions in the future.

Putin and the Paucity of Power

Unfortunately, Russian president Vladimir Putin, who (in stark contrast to his predecessor) is young, energetic, and sober, feeds the habit of personalizing politics. Many observers expect him to produce big results, but disagree about the specific changes in the offing. Some fear that he will throttle Russia's fledgling democracy, stoke nationalism, and launch an anti-Western or even neoimperial foreign policy. Others hope that his youth and forcefulness will energize slothful, sclerotic Russia enough to enable the government to impose order, collect taxes, and curb corruption.

Whatever Putin's designs, they are constrained by the structural conditions created by the legacies of the past and the broader features of the present context. Consider, first, his country's economic limitations. Russia's gross national product (GNP) is less than that of the Netherlands ($395 billion vs. $403 billion), and its revenues are smaller than Florida's ($40 billion vs.

Rajan Menon is Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University and director of Eurasia Policy Studies at the National Bureau of Asian Research.

© 2001 Foreign Policy Research Institute. Published by Elsevier Science Limited.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

$41 billion).[1] Moscow's economic resources will surely increase if the impressive growth that Russia has experienced since 1999 persists, but sound reasons exist to doubt that it will. The plummeting in the ruble's value since 1998 has boosted growth by raising the prices of imports and increasing demand for domestically produced goods. However, demand may not suffice to sustain the expansion in a country where a third of all people live below the poverty line. Long-term increases in growth and productivity require robust investment, without which the recent upturn—which has been fueled, in effect, by import substitution—will stall. Yet Russia is attracting very little foreign investment, and most of it goes to greater Moscow and a few other areas. In 1999, inflows amounted to a mere $4 billion; on a per capita basis, Hungary (whose population is less than one-tenth of Russia's) attracted ten times that amount. Per capita foreign investment in Russia between 1992 and 1998 was $108; by contrast Estonia received $1,134, Latvia $705, Azerbaijan $408, and Kazakhstan $325 per capita. Russia's share of global foreign direct investment in 1998 amounted to 0.3 percent, compared to 3.8 percent for Brazil.[2] Portfolio investment, another indicator of investors' confidence, shrank from $681 million in 1997 to $31 million in 1999, although inflows amounting to $59 million during the first nine months of 2000 suggested a limited recovery.[3]

Strong internal investment could not offset the anemic foreign investment, despite the $60 billion trade surplus amassed in 2000 thanks to high oil prices and the devaluation of the ruble.[4] Investment is critical because Russia's infrastructure and capital stock, both civilian and military, need to be modernized or replaced, which will entail enormous expenses.[5] But investment in key sectors such as power generation and telecommunications is sluggish, and the larger view is scarcely more encouraging. Russia's capital investment as a percentage of GNP was 11 percent in 1998, compared to 30 percent for Hungary and 25 percent for Mexico.[6] Partly to blame for the dearth of investment is the excessive flight of capital out of the country, which Russian officials estimate at $18–20 billion a year.[7]

Human capital, the second structural constraint, presents an even bleaker picture. Diseases and social pathologies are pervasive in Russia,

[1] *The New York Times 2000 Almanac* (New York: Penguin, 1999), pp. 219, 524, 657.

[2] Richard Ericson, "The Russian Economy: A Turning Point?" paper presented at conference "U.S.-Russia Relations," sponsored by the Aspen Institute, Prague, Aug. 21–25, 2000; "Investment in Russia Rises for 2000," *Russia Journal* (Moscow), June 1–7, 2001 (http://www.russiajournal.com/weekly/article.shtml?ad=4726).

[3] *Russia Journal*, June 1–7, 2001.

[4] "The Russian Economy: Kremlin Crunch," *Economist*, Jan. 27, 2001.

[5] Ericson, "The Russian Economy."

[6] "Russia's Infrastructure: Crumble, Bumble," *Economist*, Sept. 2, 2000; Yevgeny Gavrilenkov, "Sham Stabilization," in *The New Russia: Transition Gone Awry*, ed. Lawrence Klein and Marshall Pomer (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 193.

[7] "Tax Chief Says Capital Flight Now $1.5 Billion A Month," *Security Watch RFE/RL*, June 4, 2001; "Russia: Reform, Repression, or Both?" *Economist*, Apr. 7, 2001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

signaled by rising rates of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, diphtheria, hepatitis C, substance and alcohol abuse, and poverty and homelessness among children (less than one quarter of whom are born healthy). The demographic consequence is rising mortality and declining fertility rates, an imbalance that reduces Russia's population by 750,000 a year. Should that trend continue unabated, Russia's current population of 145 million could fall to 100 million by 2050, and the proportion of citizens in economically productive age groups will shrink while the number of retirees and others dependent on social services increases.[8] Economic and social problems such as these will hobble Russia in the Darwinian competition of a globalized economy, particularly if its windfall from oil exports and high economic growth rates proves short-lived.

The third structural constraint is military power, which historically was Russia's strong suit, but is now severely atrophied. Simply put, the quality and quantity of force available to support Russia's foreign policy are plummeting. Numbers are again revealing. Russia's armed forces numbered 2.8 million in 1992; by 1999, they were down to 1.2 million; in 2000, officials announced a further reduction to 850,000 within three years. The military budget, which was $100 billion in the last year of the Soviet Union, is now $7.3 billion, or roughly 2 percent of American military spending.[9]

Russia's soldiers are thoroughly demoralized.

It is sensible in light of Russia's economic problems to cut the size and budget of the armed forces and to transform an unwieldy conscript army into a smaller, well-trained, modern force. However, what is occurring is not well-conceived reform, but an economically driven reduction that borders on collapse.[10] Only 7 percent of the 900,000 men released from military service since 1992 were retrained for civilian jobs.[11] Nor has life improved for those remaining in the diminished ranks, particularly since the bulk of spending for military procurement until 2000 went to nuclear forces. Russia's armed forces have been weakened by shopworn material and reduced training exercises and are afflicted as well by a spreading rot. Along with alcoholism and brutal hazing, both of which were rampant in the Soviet army, one now finds poverty, rising

[8] See Mark G. Field and Judyth L. Twigg, *Russia's Torn Safety Nets* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); Murray Feshbach, "Russia's Population Meltdown," *Wilson Quarterly*, Winter 2001, pp. 15–21; and Human Rights Watch, *Abandoned to the State* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998).

[9] Figures taken from Alexander Pikhaev, "Ten Years After: Is The Military Reformed?" presentation at the conference "The Fall of Communism in Europe: Ten Years On," sponsored by the Marjorie Mayrock Center for Russian, Eurasian, and East European Studies, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, May 14–17, 2001.

[10] See the two reports by Alexander Goltz, "Signals of Reforms but under Soviet Principles," *Russia Journal*, May 4–10, 2000; and "Full Circle for Military Reform," ibid., Sept. 16–22, 2000. See also editorial in *Iadernyi Kontrol*, "Military Reforms—There Are Plans, But No Goals," Jan.–Feb. 2001, trans. in *CDI Russia Weekly*, Mar. 1, 2001, pp. 12–13.

[11] Vladimir Mukhin, "Soldiers Worry about Road to Civilian Life," *Russian Journal*, May 11–17, 2001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rates of suicide, drug abuse, AIDS, and tuberculosis.[12] Poorly trained, poorly housed, poorly paid, and poorly equipped, Russia's soldiers are thoroughly demoralized. Skills and morale are at a nadir, and the mismatch between the size of the conventional forces and the defense budget is still too large for a turnaround. In 2000, Moscow announced a policy shift that would cut strategic nuclear forces and redirect some funds to conventional units.[13] But this plan could fizzle if the war in Chechnya continues to swallow resources, oil prices fall, or Russia's growth spurt fizzles. All three are distinct possibilities.

The war in Chechnya, especially, has exposed the plight of the Russian army. Contrary to official bravado, the "bandit formations" (Moscow's dismissive term for Chechen fighters) remain strong. Though few in number, the dispersed, battle-hardened, and motivated rebels continue to kill Russian soldiers and officials of the pro-Russian Chechen government with sniper fire, ambushes, and concealed bombs. The innocuous, weary civilian by day becomes a lethal foe by night.[14] By leveling Grozny and driving some 250,000 Chechens into neighboring Ingushetia, Russia has only assured Chechen forces a steady supply of volunteers.

Those Chechens who work in the administration that Moscow is attempting to install in Chechnya are seen by many of their compatriots as quislings in a doomed regime.[15] But without a settlement to the conflict, Russia could be forced to fight for many years—something it cannot afford without drawing money away from the urgent needs of the civilian economy and social programs. Already, contract soldiers (*kontraktniki*) lured by relatively high salaries are playing a much smaller role because there is no money to pay them. Russia will therefore have to rely more heavily on young, inexperienced, indifferently trained conscripts. Moscow announced in 2000 that it would reduce its troop presence in Chechnya by 50 percent to 50,000, but by May 2001 only 5,000 troops had left. Further reductions were sus-

[12] See Deborah Yarsike Ball, "The Social Crisis of the Russian Military," in *Russia's Torn Safety Nets*, pp. 271–84; "Russia: Armed Forces Crime Figures for 1998 Announced," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 1, 1998, from *Moscow Interfax in English*, 1104 GMT, Dec. 1, 1998; Rita Bolotskaya, "Military Leaders vs. 'Suicides,'" *WPS Agency/Defense and Security*, June 26, 2000, trans. Andrei Rybochkin, from *Podmoskovnye izvestiia*, June 16, 2000; and Itar-Tass, Apr. 20, 1999 (http://www.perso.club-internet.fr/kozlowsk/suicides/html). On the health of conscripts, see "Moscow Struggles to Recruit Healthy Conscripts for Military Service," *CDI Russia Weekly*, Mar. 30, 2001, pp. 10–11, from Ekho Moskvy Radio (in Russian), 1400 GMT, Mar. 29, 2001, monitored and translated by the BBC.

[13] Fred Weir, "Putin Tries Big Shift in Military Policy," *Christian Science Monitor*, Aug. 2, 2000.

[14] Since the beginning of Russia's second campaign in Chechnya in 1998, 2,682 soldiers have been killed. See "Russian Troops Killed in Chechnya," CNN.com (http://www.cnn.com/2001/world/europe/06/02/chechnya/html). See also David Filipov, "Russia's Hope for Swift Win Dims with Time," *Boston Globe*, May 30, 2001; Vladimir Filichkin, "Apes at War," *Delovoi Ural* (Chelyabinsk), June 20, 2000, trans. in *Defense and Security* (Moscow), July 19, 2000 (http://www.wps.ru/digest/defence.html).

[15] The best Russian analyst of the war in Chechnya is Pavel Felgenhauer. See, for example, "Chechnya: A Vicious Circle," *Moscow Times*, Sept. 21, 2000. Also see Anne Nivot, *Chienne de Guerre: A Woman Reporter Behind the Lines In Chechnya* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pended in the face of increased Chechen attacks.[16] Even a smaller contingent will prove taxing if it has to remain for the long haul. Wages, construction, and supplies for the war consumed one-sixth of the total 2000 defense budget.[17]

Neither victory nor a negotiated settlement is in the offing. Withdrawal under these circumstances would bring disaster, and Russia's leaders have staked too much on victory. The anti-Chechen wave that swept Russia after the mysterious bombings in 1999 that preceded and facilitated the renewed war helped Putin's political ascent; a military fiasco in Chechnya could be his undoing. Moreover, it could endanger Russia's hold over the entire North Caucasus, a fragile southern borderland rife with demographic pressures, poverty, unemployment, and conflicts among the bewildering array of historically rival nationalities.[18] The dogged anti-Russian nationalism evident in Chechnya does not exist among others in the North Caucasus (who tend to view the Chechens with more than a little ambivalence), but the region is explosive and strategically and economically too important to abandon. If Russia were to lose access to or control over the North Caucasus, it would stand to lose 70 percent of its Caspian littoral, a crucial oil pipeline route, and its gateway to the South Caucasus. Chechnya's instability could infect Stavropol and Krasnodar to the north and even reshape politics in Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, two republics within Russia that sit astride the communication routes to Siberia and have Turkic Muslim titular nationalities. Although neither republic now has a strong secessionist movement, that could change if chaos in the North Caucasus casts doubt on the Russian Federation's longevity.

To overcome the structural problems that encumber it, Russia needs an effective state that is able to keep order, collect taxes, curb corruption, and implement reforms. But state building is a protracted process, and Russia will need more than another decade to complete the task. Nevertheless, because of its nuclear weapons, it will continue to command attention, sit on the Security Council, attend the G-8 summits, and make diplomatic forays into the Middle East. Bereft of other assets, it still has a great power's trappings, although Putin's proclamations about reviving Russia's greatness will merely highlight the gulf between aspirations and abilities in what is now a virtual power. The discrepancy between self-image and efficacy will in turn encour-

[16] "Moscow Forced to Suspend Troop Withdrawal," *Security Watch RFE/RL*, May 14, 2001.

[17] Vladimir Mukhin, "At What Cost the War in Chechnya?" *Russia Journal*, Mar. 6, 2000; Rajan Menon and Graham D. Fuller, "Russia's Ruinous War in Chechnya," *Foreign Affairs*, Mar./Apr. 2000, pp. 32–44.

[18] Menon and Fuller, "Russia's Ruinous War"; Anna Matveeva, *The North Caucasus: Russia's Fragile Borderland* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999); Yoav Karny, *The Highlanders: A Journey to the Caucasus in Quest of Memory* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000); Sebastian Smith, *Allah's Mountains: Politics and War in the Russian Caucasus* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998); "Krivoe zerkalo Ingushetii" (Ingushetia's crooked mirror), *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, Sept. 5, 2000; "Dagestan: zhizn' vzaimy" (Dagestan: a borrowed life), ibid., Mar. 13, 2001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

age an embittered nationalism marked by finger pointing, victimhood, conspiracy theories, and resentment. Traces of these reactions are already visible in Russians' disillusionment and their government's drive to bolster patriotism and reverence for the military and its "information security doctrine."[19]

In Defense of State Interests

The intellectual fashion of stripping the state of purpose and analyzing it as though it were merely a farrago of contending cliques and cabals has won followers among experts on Russia who, thanks to the country's democratization, can now dwell on the domestic sources of Russian foreign policy. Whether the results of that approach have been helpful is another matter, since it reduces statecraft to a directionless war among special interests. But however weak the Russian state, it is more than a mere arena for personal competition. Its interests are neither transitory nor manifestations of deeper power struggles. An obsession with the rivalries among institutions and groups must not obscure the strategic considerations that flow from history, geography, and the nature and extent of national power, which create the context for means and ends. The following will be Russia's most important strategic goals over the next ten years.

First, Russia will maintain a strategic nuclear arsenal (including land-, air-, and sea-based components) that, while reduced drastically (to fewer than a thousand warheads by 2020) due to the economic burden, will suffice to allow retaliation against nuclear attacks (a very unlikely eventuality) and thus to deter them. Moreover, if Russia's conventional military forces remain weak because of its economic problems, it may also rely on nuclear weapons to thwart nonnuclear threats. Moscow's renunciation of "no first use" and its explorations within the Russian strategic community of ways in which nuclear weapons can, through selective, limited use, compensate for weak conventional forces is a worrisome bellwether, especially given how old and poorly maintained the nuclear arsenal is. Beyond such operational tasks, nuclear weapons will be Russia's ticket to conclaves of the major powers, thus serving a symbolic political function.

Secondly, Russia will continue resisting American plans to deploy national missile defenses (NMD) based on the assumption that such a system would degrade the deterrent value and political leverage of Russia's already-diminishing nuclear forces. Moreover, deploying an equivalent system to protect Russia would entail an unsustainable economic burden, and the costs would mount if American technological leaps render inexpensive Russian countermeasures infeasible or unreliable. Preoccupied by their country's

[19] Fred Weir, "Moscow Pitches Patriot Games," *Christian Science Monitor*, Mar. 22, 2001; "Lesin's Demarche Underscores State's Renewed Propaganda Efforts," *Jamestown Foundation Monitor*, Mar. 1, 2001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economic and technological decline, Russian leaders will resist what they see as an American gambit to start a military competition on a threatening new front. Moscow's opposition to NMD will also stem from the calculation that the United States will intervene more freely in civil conflicts, including those in areas of historic interest to Russia, if it worries less about nuclear escalation. Moscow will wage the struggle against both NMD and modifications to the Antiballistic Missile Treaty in concert with China and will also appeal to European and Japanese anxieties about "decoupling." But Russia's weakness and the continuing centrality of NATO for European security will frustrate its efforts to use the NMD controversy to separate America from Europe. In any case, the fate of NMD will be decided by its technological and economic feasibility and the composition of Congress, not by resistance from a coalition orchestrated by Russia.

Thirdly, Russia will reduce its conventional forces below 1 million troops in order to ease economic pressures and restructure its military for post–Cold War missions. The military's main function will obviously be to deter or, failing that, to repel attacks on Russian territory, but forces will become smaller and lighter. They will also be trained and equipped for broader missions, such as countering internal secessionist movements, peacekeeping, and coercive diplomacy and deployment abroad, particularly in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Russia will make a virtue of necessity by reorienting itself as a regional power, which will entail scrapping the doctrines and force structure that emphasized the projection of power afar. Creating a new force to replace this pared-down version of the Red Army, which was trained and equipped for armored and aerial war in Europe, will require a reallocation of resources from nuclear to conventional forces. Even if that happens, Russia's economic constraints will ensure that a revamped military will be slow to emerge. In short, the gap between the planned and the possible will be dramatic.

As a fourth goal, Russia will try to ensure, at a minimum, that it remains a major power in its own "near abroad."[20] This will involve efforts to prevent Turkey, Iran, China, or Western organizations such as NATO from displacing it or taking action in other former Soviet republics despite its opposition. Russia will also seek to dissuade states in the near abroad from joining what it considers unfriendly alignments or alliances. It will sign more bilateral security treaties along the lines of the one with Armenia, and it will provide assistance to neighboring regimes confronting radical religious movements, which are a growing concern for the Central Asian states. Russia will maintain a limited number of military installations in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, principally to demonstrate to other states (Turkey, for instance) its interests and commitments. Russia will also forge multifaceted,

[20] I use this term purely for convenience to refer to the non-Russian republics of the former USSR and not to suggest, as do some Russian writers, that Russia has natural entitlements with respect to its neighbors.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

though not multilateral, ties with other states of the former Soviet Union because it wants to increase the cost to them of strategic choices that challenge its interests. For leverage, Moscow will use their debts to Russia, their dependence on Russian energy, and their reliance on remittances from citizens working in Russia.

Russia's fifth goal will be gradually to abandon its multilateral strategy based on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in favor of nuanced bilateralism. Instead of a Russian-led forum for interdependence in economic and security affairs, the CIS has become a mere talk shop—long on summits, banquets, and proclamations, but short on implementation. The division between those members who oppose economic integration and collective defense (Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan) and those who favor it (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) will only grow. Rivalries and disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan will also doom efforts to move the CIS from cacophony to cohesion. Russia's grand but hollow multilateralism will give way to a bilateral strategy tailored to the circumstances of particular countries. Agreements with smaller groups of states may become feasible only as supplements to bilateralism, because less-sweeping accords would be more manageable and less alarming to Russia's neighbors.

Russia will also pursue a selective foreign policy beyond the near abroad to align means and ends, focusing on the United States, Western Europe (and within it Britain and France, but particularly Germany), Iran, India, China, Japan, Vietnam, and South Korea. Some countries (the United States and Germany) will receive attention by virtue of their strategic weight, others (Iran, India, China, and Vietnam) because Russia's interests converge with their own and because they are major markets for Russian arms, and still others (Western Europe and South Korea) because they offer economic opportunities and assistance.

Lastly, Russian policy toward the great powers (the United States, Europe, China, and Japan) will be shaped by diverse, sometimes incommensurable motives. Those, rather than domestic institutional rivalries, will be the main source of ambiguities, inconsistencies, and contradictions in Russian foreign policy. It will not be immune to domestic pressures, but its cardinal features will be determined by the extent and nature of Russian state power and the wider strategic environment—in short, by structural conditions.

History, Geography, and the Near Abroad

Russia will consistently oppose the "intrusion" into the former Soviet Union of Western security organizations or those it views as Western dominated. Large countries regard contiguous zones in a near-proprietary manner and seek empire or hegemony, and Russia will be no different. Although it

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will lack the intent, will, and means to resurrect an empire—which is historically passé anyway—it will quite naturally resist what it sees as harmful trends in neighboring areas with which it shares geographical, historical, and cultural links. The character of Russia's state will not alter this disposition. Russian elites, regardless of political inclination, believe that their country should be *primus inter pares* in the near abroad.[21] This consensus will mean continued opposition to NATO's expansion, particularly into Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic states. The approach to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which is not an alliance, will be different. As a full-fledged member, Russia can limit what the body does and where it does it. Moscow will not welcome OSCE ventures in the post-Soviet space, but it will assent to them when it can shape the terms of engagement by withholding consent or directly participating in the operation.

NATO will not admit Georgia and Ukraine (despite enthusiasm for admission in the former), so controversies over the alliance's enlargement will center on the Baltic republics. Russia will intermittently raise the political temperature to hinder the incorporation of all or some of the Baltic states. Should they nevertheless gain admission, the effects will prove more atmospheric than substantive; there may be angry words, but no serious damage to Russia's relations with the West. The first round of NATO expansion did not have the political consequences within Russia that many feared. Russians overwhelmingly opposed NATO enlargement, but the event had little traction in Russian politics. That pattern will hold in the second round. Russia needs economic assistance from the West and continuing progress in arms control. It will not jeopardize these important goals, though it will strive to make the decisions on expansion as divisive within the alliance as possible.

The status of ethnic Russians in the near abroad will remain part of Russia's political discourse, given the allure of nationalism and its utility to demagogues. Russian grievances will always arise when Moscow's leaders meet their counterparts from the other former Soviet states, but their relations will not reach a boiling point as a result. Ukraine and Kazakhstan have long borders with Russia and the largest Russian populations outside the Russian Federation. They have handled what could have been an explosive problem with wisdom and finesse precisely because of these geographical and demographic realities. There has been no civil strife in either country, and Russia has not fostered separatist and irredentist movements. Nor are such dangers likely. The position of ethnic Russians has not even been a dominant, let alone incendiary element in Ukraine's or Kazakhstan's dealings with Russia. Part of the explanation lies in the cultural similarities between Russians and Ukrainians, the Russification of Kazakh elites, and the mellow nationalism that prevails in both Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The power of pragmatism

[21] Rajan Menon, "After Empire: Russia and the Southern 'Near Abroad,'" in *The New Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. Michael Mandelbaum (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), pp. 100–166.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accounts for the rest. From the outset, both countries understood that clashes with Russia over the treatment of their ethnic Russian populations would spell disaster. Russians also realize that they would pay a high price in the West for brazen intervention, which, given the size of Ukraine and Kazakhstan, would be a recipe for strategic indigestion in any event. These conditions will constrain choices over the long term.

Controversies centering on the Russian diaspora have created more friction between Russia and the Baltic states (principally Latvia and Estonia) and will continue to do so. Nevertheless, the problem has been confined to the political sphere and has not involved the military for several reasons. Russia's leaders know that attempts to intimidate the Baltics would mobilize anti-Russian sentiments in the West and strengthen support for bringing them into NATO. Conversely, the leaders of Estonia and Latvia realize the need to reconcile their projects for nation building with Russia's interests. Russians in the Baltic countries have adjusted to irksome circumstances even when, as in the case of language and citizenship laws, they resent them. They know that they live better than their ethnic kin inside the Russian Federation, and that realization—to use Albert O. Hirschman's formulation—inclines them to "voice" and possibly "loyalty," but certainly not "exit."[22]

The framework governing interactions between Russia and individual states in the near abroad is already in place and will not change over the next decade. Ukraine's desultory economic reforms, limited economic ties with the West, fruitless quest for NATO membership, energy debt to Moscow (estimated at $1.4–2 billion), and location will assure its continued and considerable dependence on Russia. Indeed, Russia will increase its economic presence in Ukraine by exchanging Ukraine's energy debt for shares in its industries.[23] Moscow's planned natural gas pipeline from the Yamal peninsula to Germany via Belarus will diminish Ukraine's bargaining power further by reducing both its significance as a corridor for Russian gas exports and the transit fees it receives. Ukraine's failure to enter NATO will have a similar effect. These asymmetries ensure that Russia will hold the upper hand on other issues, such as the terms of Ukraine's lease of Sevastopol to Russia's Black Sea fleet.

Georgia, too, will find that Russia is not a spent force, particularly because Tbilisi's hopes for major economic and security ties with the West, let alone admission to NATO, will come to naught. Russia will continue to exert leverage over Georgia by fostering a no-war, no-peace environment in Abkhazia and North Ossetia, regions with which it has what amounts to a direct relationship. Moreover, although Russia agreed at the November 1999 OSCE summit to relinquish the military bases at Vaziani and Gudauta, it

[22] Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

[23] Anatol Lieven and Celeste Wallander, "Make Russia a Better Neighbor," *New York Times*, Mar. 14, 2001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

retains two others in Akhalkalaki and Batumi.[24] These are areas whose loyalty concerns Georgian leaders, and Russian officers have established independent ties with local elites. Georgian concerns that a wholesale Russian departure from these regions would aggravate tensions between those areas and Tbilisi are a major reason why Russia did not face pressure to vacate all bases. The economic cards favor Russia as well. Georgia depends on Russia for natural gas and owes it $179 million for unpaid deliveries. To illustrate the political significance of this dependence, Russia stopped supplies several times in late 1999 after imposing temporary restrictions on Georgians (but not Abkhazians and North Ossetians) who had hitherto traveled to work in Russia without visas under a CIS agreement.[25]

Oil revenues will provide Azerbaijan greater leeway, although it still must deal with Russia's alliance with Armenia (shored up by a defense treaty, arms sales, and military bases). That alliance gives Moscow a decisive role in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. As in Abkhazia and North Ossetia, the current stalemate affords Russia leverage over both Azerbaijan and Armenia.[26] Furthermore, Azerbaijan remains economically dependent on Russia despite its energy wealth. Half a million Azerbaijanis work in Russia, and their remittances are critical to a country plagued by high unemployment and poverty. Thus, the significance of Russian warnings in 2000 that it would no longer automatically apply the visa-free regime to all states within the CIS was not lost on Baku.[27] Whether or not it follows through, Moscow made its point.

Russia's record in the South Caucasus and Central Asia is often portrayed as a failure. In fact, however, Russia has done rather well despite a weak hand. Its alliance with Armenia defines and limits Azerbaijan's strategic choices. No Georgian official takes seriously the proposition, which appears frequently in Western analyses, that Russia is a bumbling behemoth. Russian companies were included in the Caspian production sharing agreements not because of their technical expertise or wealth, but because Western oil executives appreciated Russia's capacity to act as a spoiler. The government that rules Tajikistan survives because of Russian aid and military backing, and Moscow (along with Iran) was also the moving force behind the precarious peace accord of 1997. Fear of Afghanistan's Taliban and of radical Islam in general makes Central Asian states, especially Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, look to Russia as a necessary counterweight.[28] Even Uzbekistan, the Central Asian state that to date has been most eager to reduce

[24] Michael R. Gordon, "Russia to Cut Its Military Forces in Georgia," *New York Times*, Nov. 24, 1999.

[25] Lieven and Wallander, "Make Russia a Better Neighbor"; Patrick Tyler, "Putin Takes up Debt and Defense with German Chief," *New York Times*, Jan. 6, 2001.

[26] "The Caucasus: Is a Settlement Possible?" *Economist*, June 24, 2000.

[27] Ibid.; and "Heidar Aliev, Maestro of the Caucasus," ibid., Sept. 2, 2000.

[28] "Putin, Central Asia Leaders Agree to Boost Military Cooperation," CNN.com (http://www.cnn.com/2000/ASIA_al/10/ii/centralasia.russia.ap/index/html).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russia's influence, may be rethinking its stance and may have to consider further revisions if Islamist movements supported by Afghanistan become stronger and Washington proves unwilling and Turkey unable to offer tangible support. In the spring of 2001 Uzbekistan agreed to trade natural gas for Russian weapons. Uzbek president Islam Karimov described Russia as "not only the guarantor of our security, but also a reliable strategic partner."[29] While Karimov has responded to the Islamist challenge by forging military ties with Turkey, these are revealing words from a leader prone to warn about the danger of Russian domination.[30] In June, Uzbekistan also joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a new organization that grew out of the grouping informally called the "Shanghai Five," created in 1997 by Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan for arms control and confidence-building measures. The SCO has proclaimed that one of its priorities will be to fight "terrorism, extremism, and separatism."[31]

Russia will remain influential in Central Asia and the South Caucasus despite its weakness. It no longer has an empire in these areas, but neither do competitors overshadow its opportunities and abilities. The United States cannot guarantee the security of states in those regions that face insurgencies or lavish them with foreign aid, for it lacks compelling reasons to assume such burdens. Neither Turkey (whose potential in these regions has been heralded) nor Iran has displaced Russia, and there is no sign yet that China has made improved ties there a priority.

The danger for Russia is thus not expulsion from Central Asia or the South Caucasus, but entanglement. Over time, Russia's fear of instability on its borders may sap its strength by drawing it into conflicts whose roots will prove long and deep. Intervention would be a fool's errand that Russian citizens would come to resent because of its cost in blood and treasure. But propinquity will challenge prudence. Unlike the maritime empires that departed either voluntarily or under duress from their overseas empires, Russia is heir to the Romanov and Soviet continental empires and cannot disengage easily. The lack of money and public support for a forward policy may ultimately force Russia to confine itself within a defense perimeter that extends only to its border with Kazakhstan and to either its current borders with the South Caucasus nations, if it retains its North Caucasus territory, or Stavropol and Krasnodar, if it does not. But that retrenchment is not at hand.

Russia will find it progressively harder to bear the cost of defending its interests in its southern environs. China, which has willingly let Russia act as a stabilizer, will then reassess its strategy and may assume commitments to

[29] Michael Lelyveld, "Uzbekistan: Gas for Russian Arms May Be Dangerous Precedent," *RFE/RL Magazine*, May 9, 2001 (http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/05/09052001123432.asp).

[30] "A Turkish Move into Central Asia," *Economist*, Nov. 25, 2000.

[31] Robert Marquand, "Central Asians Group to Counterweigh US: Russia, China, and Four Republics Meet to Expand Solidarity and Oppose Separatism," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 15, 2001; "Central Asian Trade Bloc Formed," *New York Times*, June 15, 2001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

maintain stability in Central Asia. Its economic stake there is growing, particularly in the energy sector, and it is increasingly concerned that Turkic nationalism emanating from Central Asia could strengthen Uighur separatism in Xinjiang. A Chinese advance will thus follow a Russian retreat from Central Asia. That, in turn, will elicit countermoves by India, which now sees Central Asia as belonging to its extended economic and strategic sphere, and heighten competition between Iran and Turkey. Central Asia, weighed down by poverty, demographic pressures, and radical nationalist and religious movements, will see no benefit from the competition. The South Caucasus faces a similar future, although its mix of maladies and rivalries will be different. Although the new countries there blame Russia for many of their problems, its retreat will not improve their lot.

New Alignments, New Vulnerabilities in Asia

Over the long term, Russia will be on the wrong side of a major shift in the Eurasian balance of power, namely, the accelerating decline of its standing vis-à-vis China. This conclusion may appear incongruous given the much-vaunted "strategic partnership" that now binds Beijing and Moscow.[32] Yet the hyperbole of Russia-China summits and their joint denunciations of a unipolar (i.e., U.S.-dominated) world cannot camouflage what is a marriage of convenience in which one partner increasingly holds the upper hand.[33] Russia needs hard currency, and arms and energy account for most of its exports. China seeks modern weapons, and no state will match the quantity, lethality, firepower, and range that Russia offers. Both Russia and China are multiethnic states battling separatism (Russia in Chechnya, China—to a far lesser degree—in Xinjiang). Both oppose freewheeling humanitarian intervention, especially if under American auspices and undertaken in the name of self-determination. Both worry about the strategic and economic consequences of national missile defense, and both are ambivalent about globalization, which, despite its many attractions, they also see as a species of Americanization.

Nonetheless, these shared tactical interests will not produce a durable strategic concord. As a rising power, China already operates from a position of advantage against Russia, and the margin will increase if its rate of economic growth proceeds apace. Modernization will increase the amount and versatility of China's power and enhance its capacity to make modern weapons. Its sense of vulnerability will diminish, and its confidence and ambitions will grow. Russia will have little of value to offer Beijing apart from oil and gas from Siberia and the Russian Far East—not capital, not technology,

[32] A ten-year treaty of friendship is to be signed when President Jiang Zemin visits Russia in July 2001. "Moscow Readies For Strategic 'Friendship' Treaty." *Security Watch RFE/RL*, Apr. 9, 2001, p. 1.

[33] Rajan Menon, "The Strategic Convergence between Russia and China," *Survival*, Summer 1997, pp. 101–25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not strategic heft. Russia's vast Far East, which is rich in resources, poor in people, thinly defended, and remote from the centers of Russian power, will slowly become part of an extended Chinese economic system—or even metamorphose into a gaggle of statelets under Chinese suzerainty. The direction and speed of China's transformation and the demographic imbalance between its populous northeastern provinces (Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Liaoning, and Heilongjiang have a combined population of 129 million) and the Russian Far East (7 million inhabitants) will inexorably work in favor of a multifaceted, "velvet" Chinese hegemony. In addition, parts of Russia's Far East were in fact Chinese territory until they were annexed in the mid-nineteenth century—relatively recently, in Chinese conceptions of history. Eurasia's balance of power will feature a Russia under China's shadow, not a Russia in alignment with China.[34] Significantly, although the future of Russo-Chinese relations is a matter of much debate, several prominent Russian strategists take seriously the proposition that China could become a threat to Russia.[35]

Fortunately for Russia, India and Japan are both perturbed by China's rise.[36] Even more fortunately, both states—one a major technological power with the capacity to muster far greater military force than it does at present, the other potentially a great power—are located on Russia's flanks. A coalition with them (an outright alliance would be unnecessary and provocative) would force China to spread its resources over three widely separated fronts to avoid encirclement, particularly if Vietnam were to join them. The corollary of this prognosis is that Russia will maintain its Soviet-era alignment with India. Many common interests established during Soviet times shore up that relationship, and no disputes currently threaten it.[37] India is already the largest destination for Russian arms after China.

Moscow will, however, alter its approach to Japan, although the change will be slow in coming due to the territorial dispute over the Northern Territories/South Kurils and a long history of rivalry, conflict, suspicion, and contempt. The unlikely prerequisite for a détente is that governments in Moscow and Tokyo would have to emerge at the same time with the strength and legitimacy to forge a solution based on major compromises. That said, larger strategic variables, not the territorial dispute, will shape the countries' relationship. These variables include the extent of China's power, its intention

[34] Rajan Menon and Charles E. Ziegler, "The Balance of Power and US Foreign Policy Interests in the Russian Far East," *NBR Analysis*, Dec. 2000.

[35] On a possible Chinese threat to Russia, see Dmitri Trenin, "The China Factor: Challenge and Chance for Russia," in *Rapprochement or Rivalry?* ed. Sherman W. Garnett (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), pp. 39–70. For an overview of the Russian debate, see Alexei D. Voskressenski, "Russia's Evolving Grand Strategy toward China," ibid., pp. 117–45.

[36] Rajan Menon and S. Enders Wimbush, "Asia in the 21st Century," *National Interest*, Spring 2000, pp. 78–86.

[37] F. N. Iurlov, *Rossiia i Indiia v meniaiushchemsia mire* (Russia and India in a changing world) (Moscow: Insitut vostokovedeniia RAN, 1998).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

either to revise or to work within the existing order, the U.S. role in the Asian balance of power, and the prospect of Korean unification.

A coalition encompassing Russia, India, Japan, and Vietnam (which is also a major purchaser of Russian arms) could indeed gel if China becomes both stronger and more alienated from the status quo and if the United States reduces its presence in the North Pacific by choice or necessity. As for the division of labor, Japan and India would increase their naval forces, while Russia and Vietnam would maintain ground forces on their borders sufficient to require a Chinese counterdeployment that disperses its power. Military cooperation would be supplemented by a geoeconomic arrangement through which Russia would supply energy to India and Japan in return for their investment in Russia (and Vietnam). China and the quadripartite coalition would both vie for the allegiance of a united Korea. The latter's troubled history with Japan, coupled with the fact that Korea's border with China is longer than its border with Russia, would dispose it to lean toward China.

Russia's Ambivalent Attraction to the West

Russia's future in the near abroad is one of eroding hegemony, and in Asia it will face unfavorable balances of power. In its dealings with the West the most likely prospect is unevenness and ambivalence. The unevenness will stem from converging and conflicting interests. Russia's need for trade, investment, and arms control will necessitate cooperation, and the West will have economic and strategic reasons to reciprocate. But disputes over the size and actions of NATO, humanitarian intervention, globalization, "unipolarity," and "rogue states" will sometimes limit or even imperil cooperation. Moreover, a Russian failure to meet the West's expectations and Western unwillingness to offer the degree of help Russians seek would be a recipe for disappointment and resentment on both sides.

The ambivalence arises from the pull of the Russian past. In the United States, enthusiasm abounds for a Russia that embraces democracy and free markets and joins the Western community, and more than a few Russians share this vision. But only by distorting Russia's past and present can one assume Russia has already chosen the West and that the only remaining step is to work out the details of its path to success. In fact, Russia has always been ambivalent about the values that typify the West. Consider some towering figures of its history (Pavel Miliukov, Pyotr Chaadaev, Nikolai Trubetskoi, Lev Gumilev, the later Alexander Herzen, Nikolai Karamzin, Alexander Solzhenitsyn), and it is clear that there have been dramatically different visions of what Russia is and should become. Westernizers have been part of the Russian drama since Peter the Great. But others—Slavophiles, Eurasianists, and Marxists of various hues—have offered a different plot entirely, rejecting the Western model in favor of a distinctively Russian path. Russians remain

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

divided about their future and even about the nature of the present. Some segments of Russian society will always reject the view that Russia's only viable path is to accept the end of history and don Western garb. So the view, common among Americans, that Russia will necessarily cast its lot with the West is desire masquerading as thought.

Given its problems at home and abroad, it would be unrealistic to expect Russia to spurn the West completely. Contention between Russians who want the West's freedom and prosperity and those who regard the West as shallow, individualistic, and materialistic will continue. Which tendency will prevail depends on the success or failure of Russia's quest for democracy, civil society, and capitalism. Success in that quest will favor Westernizers. If Russia simply fails and becomes a dysfunctional society of marginal significance in the world, then those Russians who oppose Westernization and globalization will gain for themselves the dubious privilege of leadership.

No one should count on Russia's becoming a partner—not because it is somehow untrustworthy, but because of its historical predicament. The Soviet empire collapsed, leaving behind an economic and social wasteland in most of its remnants. In Russia, too many protracted and profound changes must take place before something good rises from the rubble. In the West, the consolidation of territorial states, national identities, markets, and democracy took place more or less sequentially over generations, and the process was still wrenching and often violent. Russia is trying to accomplish these complex transformations rapidly, simultaneously, and with little experience with capitalism or democracy. By expecting rapid progress without setbacks, the West only guarantees that its attitude toward Russia will oscillate between euphoria and despair, neither of which is conducive to sound policymaking.

Russia cannot afford to spurn the West completely.

The West can help Russia create a market economy, but it can offer little beyond financial assistance. Ultimately, the outcome depends overwhelmingly on what happens within Russia, because Westerners have amply demonstrated how little they really know about how to bring about a unique, revolutionary transformation. The combination of grand advice (be it shock therapy, a third way, or the magic of the marketplace) and limited material help can only breed disillusionment and resentment, both of which are now much in evidence in Russia. Assistance must specifically target the educational system, cultural and scientific exchanges, and other programs that help to build up Russia's human capital. It must be coordinated with key American allies to make the burden bearable, and it must focus on areas of mutual interest (such as safe nuclear installations) to garner the political support of domestic constituencies in the United States and other donor nations. A steady, pragmatic approach must replace chiliastic notions of immediate state building and transformation to capitalism.

Yet even a Russia that fails to create democracy and a market econ-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

omy need not turn hostile and join the West's adversaries. A failed Russia will be a weak Russia, and its shifting balance of power with China will mitigate its antagonism toward the West. Scenarios that depict Russia at the forefront of a civilizational revolt against the West by mobilizing Slavic identity and Orthodox Christianity are creative but fanciful. Ukraine, without which any such civilizational coalition would prove hollow, will resist integration with Russia, and most of East Central Europe will gravitate toward the West, and toward Germany in particular. That leaves the Balkans, which Russia could lead, but to what end? The end of the Cold War has not ended Europe's division, but only changed the nature of it. The fall of the Iron Curtain and the expansion of the European Union will make for a continent of haves and have nots. Russia's predicament, as its interest in the Balkans indicates, will be that its flock will consist of the have nots and that the most important state spurned by the EU—namely, Turkey—will remain linked to the United States.

The conclusion that Russia will not become an enemy of the West is but a segue to discussing a fundamental change in the nature of the Russian problem. During the Cold War, Russia affected the West by virtue of its ideological clarity and military strength. Now, Russia's ambivalence and weakness are the problem. This change entails a number of new concerns about, for example, the safety of Russia's nuclear facilities, its inability to maintain order in its immediate neighborhood or balance China, and its eagerness to sell arms and civilian nuclear technology indiscriminately. But the era of globalization is sure to spawn other shocks to the international order, which could involve balance-of-payments crises, capital flight, surging energy prices, and political instability in crucial countries. Russia's periodic calls for help will compete for the ear of Western-dominated financial institutions and stretch their capacities to the limit.

What Is to Be Done?

Several policy-relevant conclusions follow from the preceding discussion. The West should communicate clearly to Russia what specific aspects of its relationship with China are troublesome and why, but to portray these countries' ties as a far-reaching realignment is sensationalistic. The West should neither be surprised by Russia's efforts to retain influence in its immediate neighborhood nor consider them a prelude to domination, for which Russia is too weak. On decisions concerning NATO expansion or diplomacy in the Caspian, the West should take account of Russia's interests, think of ways to relieve its anxieties, and offer it incentives to cooperate—without offering it a veto. NATO should add members not just because the Russians will grudgingly swallow it, but only for compelling strategic reasons. So far, those adduced by the champions of enlargement are unpersuasive, not least because the putative gains—security and prosperity for Central Euro-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pean and Baltic states—can be made in other ways. The United States should not base its policy toward the other former Soviet republics on Russia's preferences, but neither should it move forward as if Russia did not exist or matter. Decisions on missile defense systems should be taken in a similar spirit. Given the size and capabilities of the American nuclear arsenal, it is not clear why rogue states would risk suicide by launching missiles against the United States. Hostile states or groups can use weapons of mass destruction in many—and more surreptitious—ways that bypass NMD. As the attack on the USS *Cole* showed, American personnel and installations remain vulnerable to purely conventional weapons. If the deployment of NMD were essential, it would be tenable to argue that the system's wholly negative effect on Russia is an unfortunate but unavoidable tradeoff. In fact, the necessity is questionable, and the tradeoff certain and sizeable.

Russia's challenge will be to remain whole and to retain the capacity to shape events in its rim lands. Its failure in even these basic endeavors should be no cause for celebration. Russia sprawls across Eurasia, and the effects of its reconfiguration or weakness will be felt far away and engulf key countries—Ukraine, China, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan most directly. Russia's economic or political meltdown could generate refugee flows and illegal migration, lead to the failure of nuclear reactors, and increase the chances that fissile material or even nuclear weapons could be stolen. Rivalries among states seeking primacy in the South Caucasus and Central Asia in the wake of a Russian exit could create new and long-lasting disruptions.

Above all, the Western media, diplomats, and public must cease to see individual Russian leaders as the embodiment of their hopes and fears. That approach has only created the false impression of short-term problems and simple solutions. Studying instead the enduring parameters within which any Russian leader must act reveals the structural forces at work, the problems to which they may give rise, and the preparations required to solve them.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Euro-Atlantic Ostpolitik

by Simon Serfaty

Any assessment of current and future relations between Russia and the West must begin not with short-term conditions in Russia, but rather with a broad appraisal of Europe, the future of its union, and European relations with the United States. Moreover, any analysis of Russia's relations with Europe and the United States must also take into account the relations of all three with China. This is not to suggest that Russia's internal conditions are of no significance, for they clearly do matter. The difficulty is that, broadly speaking, the only consensus among Russia scholars across the political spectrum is that post-communist Russia is just beginning an uncertain transformation, the tremors of which will rattle the country for years to come. The guiding assumption, therefore, is that a mere decade will not halt or reverse four centuries of imperial history. Meanwhile, suffice it to say that Russia "is a mess."[1]

With the ongoing transformation of the European and the Euro-Atlantic space considerably ahead of the incipient changes in Russia, assumptions about Europe can significantly delimit conclusions about the future of Russia vis-à-vis Europe and the United States. For example, a weak and fragmenting Europe pulled slowly forward by an underpowered Franco-German locomotive would create different opportunities and risks than a strong and uniting Europe firmly grounded in reformed and renewed institutions.

For the next ten to fifteen years, the states of Europe will be engaged in the concluding phase of integration that began shortly after World War II. That process started as a result of a shared vision of a failed past, but its

[1] Graham Allison, "Russia's Domestic Political Future," in *America and Russia*, ed. Robert Zoellick and Philip Zelikow (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), p. 19. See also Richard Pipes, "Is Russia Still an Enemy?" *Foreign Affairs*, Sept.–Oct. 1997, pp. 65–78; Anatol Lieven, "Against Russophobia," *World Policy Journal*, Winter 2000–2001, pp. 25–32; and Eric Hobsbawm, *The New Century* (London: Little, Brown and Company, 2000), p. 74.

Simon Serfaty is professor of U.S. foreign policy with the Graduate Program in International Studies at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia. He also serves as director of European studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

© 2001 Foreign Policy Research Institute. Published by Elsevier Science Limited.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

completion does not yet offer a common vision of the future—Europe's so-called *finalité*. Rather, most important to the future of Europe will be a series of pending decisions about the European Union's money, force, governance, and membership that are likely to leave little room for choice once they have been made. As nation-states are being transformed into member states, the union to which they belong (or hope to join) emerges as the main driver in Europe. Accordingly, Russia's relations with the European Union will matter more than its relations with any single European country.

The EU is an increasingly important U.S. interest, if for no other reason than that it is a vital interest for the states of Europe themselves. The only conceivable justification for any qualification of U.S. support for the "completion" of Europe is the need to attach a transatlantic dimension to it. Fundamentally, that dimension already exists, since the United States and the states of Europe continue to acknowledge NATO as their principal security institution. It remains the best means to guarantee the continued U.S. military presence in Europe, contain any revival (however unlikely) of Russian expansionism, balance Germany's influence, and deter or contain small conflicts within and even beyond Europe. To satisfy these goals, the alliance reform and enlargement that began in the late 1990s will need to continue. Thus, the EU's evolving relationship with Russia is also influenced by its evolving relationship with the United States within and beyond NATO.

Only after assessing intra-European and Euro-Atlantic relations can we raise the many daunting questions that surround Russia and its future. Since the European space has historically excluded Russia, and the modern Euro-Atlantic security architecture was erected to defend against Russia, it is difficult to foresee Russia's integration into either of them. The question, then, is what Europe can do to alleviate the risks to the Euro-Atlantic community posed by a defeated and "homeless" Russia. Are Europe's and America's interests in Russia sufficiently common, or at least compatible, to permit complementary policies? Would a significant Russia-EU economic partnership, encouraged by Europe's need for Russian gas and oil, pose an obstacle to a close U.S.-Russia strategic partnership, driven in turn by unstated fears of an outburst of Russian geopolitical revisionism? Are European, American, and Russian goals in the former Soviet space—regarding, for example, institutional enlargement to the Baltic countries or Russia's reintegration with Belarus and even Ukraine—mutually exclusive? To what extent are their respective security interests in southeastern Europe, the greater Middle East, and East Asia conflicting, complementary, or parallel?

A View of Europe and Its Union

The condition of post–Cold War Europe is, in historical perspective, simply astounding. For some, it is a cause for apprehension and exasperation,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for others a source of satisfaction and eager anticipation. Sound reasons support both views. As a new century opens, Europe is more united and peaceful, more democratic and stable, more affluent and dynamic than at any time in its history. And while the ghosts of fear, hatred, and war continue to haunt the periphery (and even to some extent the core) of the continent, they are just that—specters—and no longer the flesh and bones that define Europe.

That fact is cause for great satisfaction. The idea of Europe that the European states endorsed and the United States adopted after 1945 was bold and ahistorical. Bringing defeated Germany into a cage within which it would develop habits of cooperation with other nation-states under the benevolent guard of a distant America marked a sharp departure from national instincts and traditional state behavior. After the failures of the grand projects of the early 1950s, including the European Defense Community, diminished expectations characterized the six-nation Common Market, which only gradually expanded and had little prospect of coordinated monetary and foreign policies. But the European idea was revived in the 1980s, and its achievements soon exceeded anything even the most visionary leaders dared to imagine.[2] As European expectations grew with each accomplishment, however, American apprehensions increased, whether due to predictions of failure or the unpredictable consequences of success.

Now, the states of Europe are nearing the end of their ill-defined journey—an autobahn without a destination more than a destination without an autobahn.[3] The *déjà vu* of their agenda should not distract from the *jamais dit* of their goals. On the table are issues that have been familiar since the signing of the 1956 Rome Treaties: deepen in order to widen, widen in order to deepen, and reform in order to do both. What is truly novel, however, is the magnitude of these issues and the consequences of each decision. Thus, deepening now addresses the pillars of national sovereignty—money and force. Moreover, the calendar for economic and monetary union leaves little room for delay, and the plan for a common security and foreign policy reduces the room for abstention. A euro zone of fifteen states (including Britain, Denmark, and Sweden) will be emerging between 2002 and 2005, and a common security and foreign policy should be emerging visibly between 2003 and 2007. Similarly, widening no longer entails, as in the past, the addition to the union of just a few countries at a time. Instead, at least ten countries are poised to gain membership between 2004 and 2010, including all seven applicants from Central Europe and the Baltic region, as well as Malta, Cyprus, and Slovenia. Finally, institutional reform, beginning with the intergovernmental conference of 2004, will involve negotiating the funda-

[2] See, for example, Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*, trans. Richard Mayne (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978), pp. 403, 524.

[3] Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Germans on Their Future," *Orbis*, Winter 1999, p. 129.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mental rules of governance that would erode much of what is left of each member's sovereignty, challenging the primacy of national legislatures and altering the form of democratic representation within each country.

Such an agenda, once fulfilled, would mark the completion of a revolution as significant as the rise of Renaissance Italy's city-states or the Westphalian system of nation-states. Admittedly, doubts and apprehensions are understandable. On their way to *finalité*, the European nation-states still view the enormity of what awaits them with ambivalence, which may stall their decisions and derail their choices. The metaphorical bicycle rider has difficulty standing still or going backward, but neither feat is impossible. The idea of Europe could still turn sour, most likely because of a public unwillingness to accept the self-denial it would demand in the face of adversity. If economic conditions worsen or political leaders prove timid, Britain may choose to look west to the United States (and away from Europe), Germany east toward Russia (and away from France), and France south (and back to its extra-European temptations).

Should that occur, the consequences would patently affect not just Europe, but also the United States and Russia. Moscow and Berlin might "rediscover" a special relationship, and the United States, exasperated at the collapse of its postwar vision, might allow Europe to drift off on its own. With Britain unable by itself to meet all of America's security needs in Europe, however, Washington would have to seek support from newer allies: given their size, two of the most likely could be Poland and Romania. NATO would turn into a large but largely impotent League of (Euro-Atlantic) Nations, left standing as one of these historic monuments that no one dares to demolish and no one can afford to refurbish.

The idea of Europe could still turn sour.

But that evocation is a challenge to the imagination: disintegration is not an option. In this historic end game, few alternatives remain, even if the next phase still eludes precise description. For EU governments, the age of permanent ambiguities and so-called constructive fuzziness is ending. As the EU gradually gains the credibility of a superpower, if not the reality of a superstate, the emotional burdens of the past are giving way in the face of a unique political construct that may fall short of the union it claims to be, but exceeds the notion of the community to which, once, it could only aspire.

The Transatlantic Dimension of Europe

My assumptions about Europe's relations with the United States can be readily stated.[4] In the United States, the adoption of the idea of Europe

[4] See also my *Stay the Course: European Unity and Atlantic Solidarity* (Washington, D.C.: Praeger/Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 1997); *Memories of Europe's Future: Farewell to Yesteryear* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1999); and *Europe 2007: From Nation-States to Member States*, CSIS Report, Jan. 2000.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was never absolute—but it never needed to be. Predictably, the hope for unity and strength extended to a specific vision of Europe: either a limited, Cold War version or, later, a continent whole and free. The American wish for Europe entailed political, economic, and institutional convergence that would help "them" act more like "us," even if Europeans would always remain distinct from Americans.

During the formative phase of Europe's construction, U.S. apprehensions were significant, but comprehensible. Keeping the communists out of coalition governments in NATO countries was a matter of common sense. With hindsight, the passions aroused over U.S. opposition to Eurocommunism, in Italy and elsewhere, are baffling: what else would anyone expect? Clearly, communist participation in allied governments would have affected NATO cohesion during the Cold War. Sustaining the U.S. dollar as the currency of choice was equally compelling. As the financial storms of the 1970s proved, an erratic dollar caused trouble far beyond the U.S. economy. Preserving U.S. control of the nuclear deterrent should not have been a matter for serious debate: who else should have exerted such control? Certainly not Gaullist France: even assuming that Charles de Gaulle had a keen sense of the future (which he did not), being right twenty-five years too early would still mean that he was wrong for twenty-five years too many. In any event, no transatlantic discord ever led any country in Europe to want to withdraw from the alliance or led the United States to seek to derail the process unfolding in Europe.

Now, during the concluding phase of European construction, U.S. concerns are of a different sort. Centrist republics in Europe can hardly generate fears comparable to those sparked by political changes during the Cold War. The "foreign national parties" of yesteryear have become "European national parties" as they enter into coalitions that shift only slightly from center-left to center-right. As Europe expands eastward, criteria of EU membership are comparable to the criteria that were implicitly outlined for the Euro-Atlantic community, including democratic structures and a competitive, market-oriented economy. For fifty years, the United States sought to remodel the countries of Western Europe in its own image, and now it is their turn to refashion Eastern Europe in that same image.

Still, the United States remains ambivalent. A united Europe whose strength would eventually rest on the joint pillars of a single currency and common security, foreign, and defense policies could emerge as either a counterweight or a counterpart to American power. A counterweight suggests, of course, a fundamentally adversarial relationship, and it could spell trouble for the United States.[5] In this scenario, the euro could compete with

[5] On this view see, for example, Peter W. Rodman, "Drifting Apart? Trends in US-European Relations," *Program Brief*, Nixon Center, vol. 5, no. 21 (1999). See also House Committee on International Relations, *European Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policies—Implications for the United States and the Atlantic Alliance*, testimonies of Peter W. Rodman and John R. Bolton, 106th Cong., 1st sess., Nov. 10, 1999, pp. 33–36, 28–30.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the dollar as a global reserve currency, giving it the political leverage to become, in effect, Europe's *force de frappe* and to deflate U.S. influence internationally.[6] A common security and defense policy would in turn give Europe the military muscle to act independently of the United States or NATO. To be sure, the notion of a European force standing in opposition to American troops remains, for the foreseeable future, implausible. However, the greatest risk to the United States would be that it could get drawn into an engagement it would not otherwise have considered because the "autonomous" European force required assistance. The counterweight, in other words, might prove to be a counterfeit.

Far less gloomy is a vision of a wider, stronger, and more cohesive Europe acting as a counterpart of the United States.[7] The driving assumption behind this view is that what has been happening in Europe over the past fifty years has generally benefited America, and that more integration should be just as good—and certainly better than any plausible alternative. Admittedly, a strong euro could weaken the dollar that has provided well for Europe's (and America's) affluence, and an independent-minded Europe could distract a U.S. leadership that has served well Europe's (and America's) security. While geopolitical, economic, and cultural differences between the two sides remain, they have been narrowing significantly. In sum, American support for more integration in Europe need not mean a diminished American presence there.

History and common sense suggest that Europe is far more likely to emerge as a counterpart than a counterweight to the United States. No state that signed the North Atlantic Treaty has ever left the alliance that it created, and many countries that were once unable to join now eagerly seek membership. On a parallel institutional path, the EU has hardly been an obstacle to a progressively integrated Euro-Atlantic economic area whose scope and strength are unprecedented. The value of American foreign direct investment in Europe, which was negligible before 1957, now exceeds the size of all but the five largest national economies in the world. The share of EU-U.S. trade relative to gross domestic product has fallen over the years mainly because direct investments across the Atlantic have turned formerly international trade into domestic transactions. The "over there" mentality of yesteryear has given way to "over here."

[6] See, for example, David Gowan, *How the EU Can Help Russia* (London: Centre for European Reform, 2000), p. 7; and C. Fred Bergsten, *Weak Dollar, Strong Euro? The International Impact of EMU* (London: Centre for European Reform, 1998).

[7] See Charles Kupchan, "In Defense of Europe's Defense," *Survival*, Summer 2000, pp. 16–32. See also my own testimonies in *European Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policies*, pp. 94–104; and in the hearing before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Europe, *The U.S.-European Relationship: Opportunities and Challenges*, 107th Cong., 1st sess., Apr. 25, 2001, pp. 5–16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Views of Russia in Europe

Throughout the Cold War, the Kremlin never viewed Europe on its own terms. Rather, it misunderstood the emerging European Community as a sort of NATO without America—too important for Moscow to ignore, but hardly strong enough to fear. Accordingly, Soviet policies toward the then-EC reduced to periodic and abortive attempts to exploit transatlantic tensions, in hopes of cracking the Atlantic alliance.

In recent years, however, conditions have been changing. In the late 1990s, a sense of neglect and even harassment by the United States has reinforced Moscow's interest in Europe. As Stephen Cohen observes, "By 2000, some 81 percent [of Russians] believed that U.S. policy in general was anti-Russian and even pro-Western Russians thought a 'reverse iron curtain' was being imposed on the country's borders."[8] In July 2000, Russian president Vladimir Putin readily approved a "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation" that identified the EU as Russia's second highest priority—after the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but before any other part of the world, including the United States and China. This new Russian vision, affirmed in Putin's state-of-Russia message in April 2001, was offered as a direct response to the EU's Common Strategy on Russia, which it approved in 1999.[9] With Russia's primary interest thus moving toward the EU, privileged ties with individual European countries—especially France and Germany—acquired significance on their own merits, as well as for their influence on European integration.

The consequences of Russia's belated discovery of the EU should not be exaggerated. Whether during or after the Cold War, EU members have never found a substantive bilateral dialogue with Russia easy. Ambitious exchanges have occasionally reflected shared aspirations, but not managed to overcome reciprocal irritations. While Putin (a former KGB agent in Germany) and German prime minister Gerhard Schröder (who used to shout his denial of the Cold War in the streets) seem to get along well, they also appear to be more comfortable with a global agenda of "soft power" issues rather than with traditional security issues. Conversely, while Putin and French president Jacques Chirac have come to agreement on substantive security issues, their frequent quarrels suggest the limits of any lasting entente between their countries. More broadly, *la grande Russie* has never sat easily alongside its European neighbors. Even shorn of nearly one-fourth of the Soviet Union's post-1945 territory, Russia remains a power in Europe, but is no closer to being a true European country.

[8] Stephen Cohen, *Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), p. 33.

[9] On shifting EU-Russian relations, see Hiski Haukkala and Sergei Medvedev eds., *EU Common Strategy on Russia: Learning the Grammar of the CFSP* (Helsinki: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti; Bonn: Institut für Europäische Politik, 2000).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Making room for Russia in Europe is complicated by a tenacious Russian self-image that has defied the realities of geography, withstood the trials of history, endured repeated waves of authoritarian governance, and rejected various notions that its rulers occasionally sought to import from other countries. Tim McDaniel has described this idea as the certainty that Russia's distinctive cultural and historical tradition sets it apart from the West and guarantees its future as a great power.[10] The obvious problem with this idea is that the Russian state can no longer support it, the Russian people can no longer endure it, Europe can no longer afford it, and America can no longer tolerate it.

The vexing question, then, is how to deal with an unstable, nuclear-armed behemoth on the edge of Europe.[11] This is a matter of more than regional concern, for the risks of Russian disintegration would spill far beyond its own frontier. At the same time, the gap between the realities and grand illusions of Russia's self-image has become less important, because Russia has had to forfeit the global ambitions that it entertained right up until the demise of the Soviet Union. Even Russia's regional aspirations will fail as its neighbors stand poised to exact geopolitical revenge for decades and even centuries of antagonism and harassment.[12] Under these circumstances, the best available choice for Russia is a closer relationship with its former adversaries in the West. Putin, at least, appears to understand that and seems to want to bring Russia deeper into what Mikhail Gorbachev called a "common European home."

As the expansion of EU and NATO carries those institutions closer to the very border of Russia, Moscow's leaders will have to adjust to their geographical intimacy with Europe. Russian objections played a role in debates about NATO enlargement from the start, but now that Russia is also emerging as a factor in EU enlargement, it is up to Europe's leaders to demonstrate sensitivity about the impact of their decisions on Moscow. So far, they have managed reasonably well.[13] But Russia in turn must somehow forge cooperative relations with both institutions. A Janus-like face that smiles at one and scowls at the other will not work, because a scowling Russia will alarm both.

In any case, Russia's alternatives to closer cooperation with the West are limited. Many Westerners tend to assume that Russia has a broader range

[10] Tim McDaniel, *The Agony of the Russian Idea* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). See also Tom Call, *Russia and Post–Cold War US Policy: The Collision of History and Idealism* (unpublished paper, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Va., Dec. 2000).

[11] Christoph Bertram, "How to Deal with Russia?" in *The Russian Transition*, conference report (Washington, D.C.: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, May 1999), p. 34.

[12] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Geostrategic Triad: Living with China, Europe, and Russia* (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001), pp. 55–57.

[13] A European Commission report about Kaliningrad may be an example of such sensitivity. See Stefan Wagstyl, "Intense Suspicion Gives Way to Support," *Financial Times Survey*, Apr. 9, 2001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of options than it does. For example, if the United States abrogates the Antiballistic Missile Treaty and deploys a missile defense system, Moscow could theoretically retaliate by expanding its strategic defenses and restructuring its offensive arsenal. But Russia has neither the will nor the means to do so. Mention of "Russia" is generally a mask for preconceived positions on missile defense, NATO enlargement, or export controls. Equally fictitious is Putin's putative "China card": history, geography, and China's rapid growth are all likely to push Moscow closer to, not further from, the West.

Features of a New Ostpolitik

"The near impossibility of predicting Russia's future," writes Robert Legvold, "coupled with the ongoing ambiguity of its evolving relationship with the other great powers . . . [and] the new neighboring states creates an immensely broad spectrum of possibilities."[14] Entering the twenty-first century, no one knows what will become of Russia. Nevertheless, neglecting its needs, offending its pride, ignoring its interests, or challenging its power could imperil nations on both sides of the Atlantic.

Europe and America have thus far avoided the pitfalls of dismissing Russia as a marginal power. For its part, Russia has generally remained resistant to Western ideas and enticements, even as it perceives no alternative to the West. As Isaiah Berlin pointed out forty-five years ago, Russian intellectuals have often sought to portray their country as "destined to obey unique laws of its own—so that the experience of other countries has little or nothing to teach it."[15] If that is the case, then Americans and Europeans should stop attempting to cure all of Russia's economic ailments and political deficiencies. Better to think small and cater to the needs of the Russian people than to think big and confront the enormity of the Russian state. Pursuing the latter has done little to alleviate the ills of a failing economy, an angry public, an alienated army, a fragile democracy, and a corrupt elite. In addition, the West should treat the other post-Soviet states with the differentiation they deserve and recognize the individual challenges they face. Engaging them separately could help to ensure that they do not, like Belarus and Moldova, drift back toward Russia.[16]

[14] Robert Legvold, "The Three Russias," in *A Century's Journey: How the Great Powers Shape the World*, ed. Robert A. Pastor (New York: Basic Books, 1999), p. 187.

[15] Isaiah Berlin, "The Silence in Russian Culture," *Foreign Affairs*, Oct. 1957, p. 2.

[16] For other observations of Russia's condition and the principles and expectations that should guide the West's response to it, see among others: Brzezinski, *The Geostrategic Triad*, pp. 63, 68; Bertram, "How to Deal with Russia?"; Cohen, *Failed Crusade*; Zoellick and Zelikow, *America and Russia*; Wayne Allensworth, *The Russian Question: Nationalism, Modernism, and Post-Communist Russia* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); Robert Cottrell, "Founding Father," *New York Review of Books*, Apr. 26, 2001; Michael Dobbs, "It's a Shame to Blame Communism," *Washington Post*, Aug. 13, 2000; Dimitri Simes, *After the Collapse: Russia Seeks Its Place as a Great Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999); and Richard Speir et al., "Iran-Russian Missile

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The agenda of issues now facing Russia and the West is enormous, ranging from aid, trade, investment, and relations with the CIS countries to global concerns about the environment, corruption, and terrorism. If the EU countries and the United States hope to address them successfully, they should do so in tandem. Coordinated policies would meet the individual interests of the states of Europe and the United States, reinforce U.S.-EU relations, and improve Western ties with Russia. One should bear in mind, however, that interests need not be shared evenly to be common, and policies can diverge yet remain compatible. Thus, for example, the comprehensive Joint Statement that concluded the EU-Russia summit of May 2001 need not be a source of concern in the United States, although American participation would surely strengthen the ambitious initiatives outlined in that statement.[17]

Everywhere it can, Russia will continue to view an opening on one side of the Atlantic as an opportunity for widening the rift between America and Europe. During the Cold War, Moscow repeatedly failed to exacerbate internal discord in the West, and Europe and the United States need to make sure such tactics fail now. Relations among the United States, the EU, and Russia should not include any issue over which differences between Europeans and Americans are greater than either side's differences with Russia. The EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the U.S. plan for missile defense, and NATO enlargement are cases in point. Moscow encourages CSDP for the same reason that it used to encourage France's *force de frappe*, namely, as an alternative to NATO. It raises the specter of missile defense, as it did the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative, in order to erode the credibility of the U.S. security presence in Europe. Russia has openly objected to the pace of NATO enlargement and has hoped that EU ambivalence toward it reveals comparable concerns about American strategic preponderance. Keeping transatlantic differences concerning these issues to a minimum will require serious and frank negotiations, but will reduce Russia's ability to create mischief.

Admittedly, there will always be some in Russia who will feel threatened and object to anything the United States and Europe do. That being the case, the states of Europe and the United States need to forge an agreement among themselves and then present it to Moscow "without illusions, without sentimentality, [and] without denying our considerable respective interests," as Schröder recently urged.[18] Doing otherwise—by allowing Russian objections to obstruct a European-U.S. accord—would lead Moscow to misinter-

Cooperation," in *Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Mass Destruction*, ed. Joseph Cirincione (New York: Routledge, 2000).

[17] Joint Statement, EU-Russia Summit, May 17, 2001 (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/summit17_05_01/statement.htm).

[18] Roger Cohen, "Germany and Its Leader Achieving New Stature," *New York Times*, Apr. 17, 2001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pret a desire for consultation with Russia as a Russian veto over Western strategic interests. Ultimately, starting with a European-U.S. agreement is the best way to achieve the most pressing goal, which is finding a resolution to the problem of Russia in Europe, because without it there can be no *finalité* for the European Union, no security for the Euro-Atlantic community, and no stability for Russia.

In recent years, a number of issues have introduced ambiguities into the otherwise firm relations between the United States and its European partners. Russia has eyed that change with the hope of drawing closer to Europe, but it would benefit far more from tapping into the combined strength of all the Western states. Now is the time to sweep ambiguities aside and move beyond the crises and missteps that punctuated the past decade in Russia and Europe as a whole. The architects now charged with reshaping Western Eurasian geopolitical space must agree from the start that the strongest foundation upon which to build is the Euro-Atlantic partnership.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Journal of Chinese Studies and International Affairs

Issues & Studies

Published under the auspices of the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, ISSUES & STUDIES is an interdisciplinary journal devoted to the discussion and analysis of problems related to contemporary China (including mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao) and East Asian international relations. The editors welcome manuscripts dealing with East Asian international affairs in general and contemporary China in particular.

Volume 37, Number 2 (March/April 2001):

The Role of Zhou Enlai in the Cultural Revolution: A Contradictory Image from Diverse Sources, ***Yongyi SONG,*** Dickinson College, Pennsylvania

Student Attacks Against Teachers: The Revolution of 1966, ***Youqin WANG,*** University of Chicago

Economic Ties Across the Taiwan Strait: Buying Time for Compromise, ***Paul J. BOLT,*** U.S. Air Force Academy

Adversarial Engagement and Alliance Relations: Triangular Politics on the Korean Peninsula, 1988-94, ***Seongji WOO,*** Indiana University

Forty Years of the Sino-North Korean Alliance: Beijing's Declining Credibility and Pyongyang's Bandwagoning with Washington, ***Yongho KIM,*** Yonsei University, South Korea

The Problem of Sluggish Enrollment in Ethnic Schools: The Case of One Dong Village in Shaoyang, Hunan, ***Chih-yu SHIH,*** National Taiwan University

Annual subscription rates: US$56.00 (surface mail); US$68.00 (air mail).

Address for subscription: Editing & Publishing Section, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 64 Wanshou Road, Wenshan District 116, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China.

Tel.: 886-2-2938-6763 **FAX:** 886-2-2234-4919
E-mail: <scchang@nccu.edu.tw>

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Better Ways to Fix U.S. Intelligence

by Bruce Berkowitz

Many experts, both inside and outside government, are beginning to agree on the necessary features of a modern, effective intelligence organization. Unfortunately, practice is lagging theory. Despite the apparent consensus on the need for change, recent intelligence failures suggest that U.S. intelligence has yet to leave its Cold War–era methods and structure behind. All of this raises the questions of why it has been so hard to modernize American intelligence and what practical steps could ensure that needed reforms finally take hold.

The Basics of Better Intelligence

Anyone who reads government reports and scholarly studies about intelligence will find a consensus emerging about how to produce effective intelligence in the post–Cold War, information-age environment. It is generally agreed that, first, an intelligence service needs to have a wide field of vision, because threats today can arise suddenly and from many sources. Intelligence organizations must be able to detect threats as diverse as terrorism in the Middle East, organized crime in Russia, and a financial crisis in Latin America. Because organizations, like human beings, have trouble focusing on several issues at once, intelligence officials have to create rules and incentives that lead intelligence personnel to monitor multiple information sources and make sure that information reaches the people who need it.

Secondly, modern intelligence organizations must have agility and flexibility. Because today's threats can take so many forms, U.S. intelligence must be able to assemble whatever expertise it requires for a mission into an effective, integrated team. One problem may require engineers who understand ballistic missile systems developed in North Korea; another could call

Bruce Berkowitz is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a contributing editor to *Orbis*.

© 2001 Foreign Policy Research Institute. Published by Elsevier Science Limited.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for medical and social science experts who understand Africa's AIDS epidemic and its potential effects on the stability of South Africa and Botswana.

The third capability needed is efficiency and focus. Intelligence spending fell in the early 1990s and has remained essentially flat even as the demand for intelligence has grown. This has made finding the most efficient solution to an intelligence problem more important than ever. The private sector, which has more capital, more people, and greater flexibility than government, is a vital partner. The intelligence community must use unclassified information and expertise from commercial and other nongovernmental sources whenever it can. Intelligence managers must then concentrate scarce government funds on those tasks that the private sector cannot (or should not) perform.

To make sure that information does not get lost in the system or slip between the cracks, the fourth requirement is for multiple lines of communication connecting people who have information with people who need it. Intelligence organizations must have as few choke points as possible. Dependence on the success of a particular organization, system, program, or official can lead to what an engineer would call a "single-point failure"—the breakdown of the entire intelligence process because one key link did not perform correctly.

The fifth and final requirement, according to the consensus view, is for direct interaction and transparency. Intelligence consumers (like most people today) expect greater insight into the information they receive. They are unwilling to accept judgments at face value, even from recognized authorities, and want to know where uncertainty in an analysis lies. To gain this sort of insight, they want more interaction with intelligence producers. They also want products that are tailored to their specific needs. If intelligence organizations do not meet these expectations, their products will be ineffective or ignored.

In the business world and think tanks, organization theorists had long talked about networked organizations. It was a simple matter to apply the same principles to intelligence, and articles describing this kind of intelligence community began to appear in the mid-1990s.[1] Several efforts to develop this approach also arose within the intelligence community itself, with some significant results. In the early 1990s, for example, the CIA introduced electronic mail and Lotus Notes into its operations. The latter did not, like true network technology, enable groups of people to communicate directly with each other, but it did allow several people to work on a single document simultaneously. In 1995, the intelligence community began operating Intelink, a Mosaic-based intranet enabling any organization that was a member of the network to deliver electronic documents (including images)

[1] See, for example, Bruce Berkowitz, "Information Age Intelligence," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1996, pp. 35–50; and Berkowitz, "Technology and Intelligence Reform," *Orbis*, Winter 1997, pp. 107–19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

directly to any other member. The following year, the CIA's deputy director for intelligence issued a strategic plan with the ambitious goal of improving the communications and data processing systems available to the typical analyst. The plan envisioned ad hoc, virtual teams of analysts that could draw on whatever expertise was required to address problems as they appeared.[2] In 1997, the CIA's deputy director for science and technology circulated a monograph describing an "agile intelligence enterprise" that would be able to divide itself along functional, geographic, and technological lines and would use new network technologies to assemble teams tailored to particular problems.[3] The emphasis on technology-assisted networks has been echoed more recently in a vision statement from the director of central intelligence, as well as in the statements and writings of other public officials and scholars of intelligence policy.[4]

Recent Failures

Unfortunately, although a common vision for U.S. intelligence may be emerging, the intelligence community is having difficulty bringing it to fruition—as recent intelligence failures demonstrate. American intelligence failed to anticipate the March 1995 sarin gas attack by the Aum Shinrikyo cult on the Tokyo subway system, the 1997–98 economic crises in Asia and Russia, India's May 1998 nuclear weapons tests, and North Korea's 1999 ballistic missile test. It provided no warning prior to terrorist strikes on U.S. embassies and military personnel in Africa and Saudi Arabia, mistakenly targeted the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during Operation Allied Force in 1999, and apparently misidentified the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan in August 1998. To be fair, failures are inevitable in the intelligence business. What is especially troubling, however, is the *nature* of these failures, which clearly reveal organizational rigidity, poor planning, insufficient use of outside resources, and isolation of intelligence providers and consumers.

The most recent failure, the bombing of the destroyer USS *Cole* in Yemen in October 2000, provides some of the most vivid evidence of the problems. Many signs suggested that hostility toward the United States was growing throughout the Arab world during the summer and fall of 2000. At

[2] Directorate of Intelligence, *Analysis: Directorate of Intelligence in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1996).

[3] Ruth A. David, "The Agile Intelligence Enterprise: Enhancing Speed, Flexibility, and Capacity through Collaborative Operations," draft memo, Directorate of Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency, Summer 1997.

[4] See, for example, "DCI's Strategic Intent," cited in *Director of Central Intelligence Annual Report for the United States Intelligence Community* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, May 1999); Robert David Steele, *On Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World* (Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Press, 2000); and Gregory W. Treverton, *Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

least one intelligence report issued in the month preceding the bombing had apparently raised the possibility that terrorists would attack a U.S. warship somewhere in the Middle East.[5] Indeed, the director of central intelligence was sufficiently concerned about the potential threat that he warned President Clinton against vetoing a U.N. resolution condemning Israel, lest this trigger an attack on the United States.[6]

Despite these developments, the *Cole* was sent to Aden harbor for refueling while en route to the Persian Gulf. Although Yemen had been a center of terrorist activity for many years, the Yemeni government and the United States had recently tried to improve relations. Port calls by U.S. warships were part of this effort. On the morning of October 19, a small boat loaded with explosives pulled alongside the destroyer, which had been at a relatively low state of alert, and detonated, killing seventeen sailors and wounding thirty-nine. After the attack, U.S. Navy and Defense Department investigators concluded that, despite the various warning signs, no single piece of advance information had been specific enough to lead the commander of the *Cole* to take extraordinary precautions.[7]

The problem in this incident was in the effective flow and use of information—the essential feature of a modern intelligence organization. Indeed, the intelligence community failed in each of the dimensions experts agree are critical to effective intelligence today. Specifically, intelligence organizations were so focused on the threat of violence in the immediate vicinity of Israel that they missed indicators in more distant, less obvious regions such as Yemen. They failed to integrate classified information that warned of danger to U.S. personnel with unclassified information (such as the television broadcasts by lieutenants of Osama bin Laden) that might have provided a broader picture of the potential threat. Choke points prevented information that was available to some organizations (embassies) from reaching others (U.S. military commands and the destroyer itself). The warning system on which the *Cole* depended appears to have lacked redundancy, as it was critically dependent on Central Command. Lastly, the captain of the *Cole* had only limited interaction with intelligence producers and thus lacked a full appreciation of the context. Had he been aware of the low-level hostility in Yemen, the increasing tension throughout the Arab world, and other,

[5] Mark Hosenball and Greg Vistica, "The Search for Clues: Did Officials Miss Hints of an Impending Attack?" *Newsweek*, Nov. 6, 2000.

[6] See Steven Lee Myers, "U.S. Officials Tell of Getting Warning Last Month, But Say It Was Too Vague," *New York Times*, Oct. 14, 2000; and Bill Gertz, "NSA's Warning Arrived Too Late to Save the *Cole*," *Washington Times*, Oct. 25, 2000.

[7] See U.S. Department of Defense, "Navy Announces Results of Its Investigation on *USS Cole*," press release, Jan. 19, 2001; Department of Defense, *DoD USS Cole Commission Report* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Jan. 9, 2001); and Steven Lee Myers, "After Cole's Bombing, Pentagon Finds Ongoing Lapses in Gulf Security," *New York Times*, Jan. 1, 2001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

almost subliminal factors, he might have put his crew on a higher level of alert.

Perhaps, as the investigators found, no single warning sign was sufficient to cause a responsible official to trigger a general alert. But that is exactly the point. Systems should not depend on whether a precisely defined piece of information reaches a specifically designated gatekeeper. One would refer to the kind of amorphous warning signs that existed prior to the attack on the *Cole* as "buzz," that is, subtle and not-so-subtle indicators that rattle around in a network. In the everyday world, buzz raises the average person's overall level of awareness. People talk to each other and share news, insights, and impressions. This is how networks work. Instead of centralized control of some sort, individual connections and decisions determine the flow of information.

In the future, the United States will likely face the kinds of threats that generate such buzz, as opposed to those involving a single "tripwire" event that by itself sends a clear signal of danger. This is one reason why networks are better suited to addressing diffuse threats. Because networked organizations do not depend on the omniscience of a single director, they are often better able to look in many directions at once. Networked organizations are less likely to suffer a single-point failure caused by a faulty decision or a lapse of judgment by one official at a critical position in a chain of command. Intelligence organizations need this kind of resilience in order to function effectively.

Networked organizations are better able to look in many directions at once.

Some of the other failures of the past several years might also have been avoided if U.S. intelligence had been more agile and better networked. For example, U.S. intelligence might have anticipated the Indian nuclear test if it had been able to cast for a wider range of expert opinion. Many India watchers outside the U.S. government were sure that the governing Bharatiya Janata Party would fulfill its promise to resume testing. Moreover, if intelligence producers had been able to circumvent top officials in the Clinton administration (who were preoccupied with domestic affairs and scandal in early 1999) and deal directly with members of Congress concerned with proliferation, they might have raised the visibility of the Indian situation. Similarly, a process that was open to outside sources of information might have avoided the apparently mistaken targeting of the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan.

Impediments to Change

These recent failures raise a troubling question. If experts understand the kind of intelligence organization that is required to cover today's diffuse, highly varied threats, what is preventing U.S. intelligence from reforming

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accordingly? One problem is that, even as reformers try to bring in the new model of intelligence through the front door, they reintroduce the old model through the back door. The new model of intelligence, namely, networks and adaptable organizations, is incompatible with traditional notions about how intelligence organizations are supposed to operate. Modern organizational concepts are especially at odds with long-held beliefs about intelligence production, security, and planning. This dogma has repeatedly thwarted reform, often without reformers' being aware of what they were challenging.

The traditional model of intelligence is actually a variant of the classic model of a bureaucratic organization. A bureaucracy has three defining features: a division of labor, a hierarchical structure and chain of command, and standard operating procedures that are often (but not always) formally codified. Although bureaucracies have a checkered reputation (after all, the phrase "Washington bureaucrat" is almost always intended as an epithet), they are not necessarily bad. Indeed, bureaucracy may be one of the great management inventions of all time. Compared to some earlier forms of organization (e.g., hordes and mobs), bureaucracies are more efficient and have better accountability. Bureaucracies allow specialization and clear lines of communication and control.[8] A bureaucratic intelligence organization was perfect for monitoring the Soviet threat largely because the Soviet Union was itself an incorrigibly bureaucratic system. It was possible to assign an analyst, department, or agency to monitor some aspect of the Soviet threat for years. The Soviets changed incrementally, and so did the intelligence community.

A traditional bureaucracy is ill suited for today's more numerous and less predictable threats, however. For example, consider how a bureaucracy assigns responsibilities. Lower-level officials get their assignments from higher-level officials; lower-level departments get their assignments from higher-level departments. If no one is explicitly assigned responsibility for monitoring a particular threat, it is likely to be ignored. Effective bureaucrats shun responsibilities that do not fit into their formally defined assignment. They also draw criticism if they do not focus on their own duties or, even worse, divert their attention to someone else's turf.

This kind of specialization is one of the features that make bureaucracies so efficient,[9] but it also reduces the base from which a bureaucracy can draw new ideas and information. Even worse, these traits make traditional intelligence organizations critically dependent on whether supervisory officials correctly anticipate threats. The result is a chicken-and-egg problem. Intelligence agencies will not monitor a threat until higher-level officials tell

[8] For an insightful analysis of alternative forms of organization and their evolution in a military context, see the recent study by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Swarming and the Future of Conflict* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000).

[9] See Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947). Also see Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

them to do so, but higher-level officials cannot tell them to monitor a threat until they are aware of its importance. This is an oversimplification, of course. Most intelligence managers do not merely follow their noses like a horse with blinders. Nevertheless, the essential truth is that intelligence officials justify their programs according to established priorities. Those programs that cannot show how they address a high-priority requirement are the first to face the budget ax. The same is true in the allocation of existing assets. Any operation that is not, in official policy, a high priority will be last in line for access to collection systems and analytic support.

It is in precisely such circumstances that intelligence fails. Investigation of the failure to detect India's nuclear test showed, for example, that some assets that might have detected Indian preparations were unavailable because they were covering other targets—Iraq and North Korea, for example—that had a higher priority under the planning policies of the time. By the time a bureaucratic organization can perceive a threat and develop plans and policies to address it, it may be too late.

Similarly, a traditional bureaucracy is ill suited for using modern information technology, especially networked communications. In an open-architecture, networked organization, the number of opportunities for providing, supplying, or sharing information—and, thus, the power of the network—increases exponentially as each new member joins.[10] Yet a bureaucracy's traditional chain of command, lines of authority, and mission responsibilities are all aimed at channeling and limiting the opportunities of organization members to interact with each other and with outsiders. A bureaucratic intelligence agency, in other words, erects its own barriers to the information revolution.

Breaking the Traditional Model

The challenge of intelligence reform is therefore not how to make the intelligence bureaucracy work better, but rather how to make the intelligence community operate less like a bureaucracy. The measures required to achieve this bear little resemblance to traditional intelligence reforms, but could have a much greater effect on how the intelligence community operates. Most fit into the three broad categories listed below.

1. *Measures that break down hierarchies and stovepipes.* Such organizational barriers restrict the flow of information, impede interaction among intelligence specialists, and inhibit exchanges between the intelligence community and the outside world. In practice, changing the structure entails, first, reducing the separation between analysts and consumers. The traditional

[10] This phenomenon is often referred to as "Metcalfe's Law," after Robert Metcalfe, the inventor of Ethernet, one of the early networking protocols that made the internet possible.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

intelligence model kept analysts apart from consumers to ensure objectivity and avoid politicization. (It also reflected an ivory-tower mentality.) Modern information consumers want direct contact with producers and assume that analysts will maintain their objectivity. The intelligence community has in fact tried recently to bridge the gap by holding briefings for intelligence users and sending analysts to work directly with their consumers. Even so, most analysts still remain separated from intelligence users both organizationally and geographically. Analysts need to be encouraged to get out of their offices, know their customers, and "sell" their products. To promote the new approach, intelligence officials could make serving a stint among consumers a prerequisite for promotion, or agencies could offer bonuses to those analysts who take on such assignments.

Intelligence organizations must also allow analysts to speak for themselves. The traditional intelligence model assumes that internal coordination improves the product and protects an agency's "brand name." Unfortunately, coordination also creates choke points that prevent analysts and consumers from speaking with each other. In this regard, intelligence agencies could learn from the private sector. Investment banks do not make their economists coordinate forecasts or their equity analysts coordinate company assessments. Law firms do not require partners to get approval for arguments they make in court. In each case, the assumption is that, having reached a certain level of seniority, professionals have proved their ability. Quality assurance focuses on hiring and promotion, not on products. Intelligence organizations can do the same. Instead of trying to guarantee that each product is perfect, they should ensure that any analyst in the intelligence community has met certain standards and can speak as an authority. Peer review, especially on matters that depend on judgment more than fact, is much overrated.[11]

Removing structural barriers also requires developing alternative approaches to security. Traditionally, protecting secrets has demanded rigid, hierarchical bureaucracies. Organizations identify classes of information that are supposed to be secret, classes of people who are supposed to have access to the information, and standard operating procedures that define how the people are to handle the information. Such an approach lacks the flexibility required to adapt to rapid changes in user requirements and modern technology. Intelligence personnel certified as responsible and loyal should be given greater personal responsibility for protecting secrets. Professional standards of conduct should be at least as important as formal regulations. Developing one's own secure "information space" should become a part of the intelligence tradecraft. Security officials should act less like police who enforce rules (often in an adversarial manner) and more like specialized support staff who assist intelligence personnel in doing their jobs in a secure

[11] This article was not peer reviewed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fashion. Technology could play a role here, too, by enabling intelligence personnel to detect when they are being monitored, to encrypt digital data more easily, and to take other security precautions.

2. *Measures that make the intelligence community perform more like a market.* The intelligence community must become more efficient, and spending decisions should more closely reflect actual demand. In addition, the measures proposed here would also promote competition among producers by encouraging intelligence users to find alternative sources of information.

An important part of this shift is to calculate the true costs of intelligence products. Incredible as it may seem, it would be hard for any official at the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to tell you how much a specific satellite image cost, or for a CIA official to quote a cost estimate for an intelligence assessment. You could, however, probably learn the cost of an entire satellite *program* or the annual budget of the Directorate of Intelligence. Knowing true costs of products and services and allowing supply and demand to set prices are fundamental components of efficient markets. Officials often explain that it is too hard to estimate the cost of an intelligence product because U.S. intelligence programs are too large and complex. But private sector organizations do this all the time—even large, complex organizations. General Motors knows the unit cost of its automobiles to the dollar. DRI, Accenture, and other consulting firms can tell you the exact cost of one of their analytic reports. Johnnie Cochran can give you a breakdown, hour by hour, lawyer by lawyer, of how much it cost to defend O. J. Simpson (as could, of course, Simpson himself, who presumably got an itemized bill). Instead of pricing goods and services, intelligence officials put all their resources into a big pot and try to allocate them using a complex system of requirements and priorities, much like the process the Soviet Union used to plan its economy. The results, in both cases, speak for themselves.

Once costs have been determined, the intelligence community should also charge for its products. If intelligence products and services have specific prices, intelligence consumers can make purchasing decisions according to their own priorities. This would have the added benefit of forcing political leaders to make explicit decisions about which agencies would receive funding for intelligence support and which would do without. Currently, a politician can point to press reports citing the NRO's budget and ask why, if the United States spends approximately $6 billion per year on intelligence satellites, a particular user did not receive an image he needed. That question will seem reasonable as long as costs, prices, and allowances are unknown, because intelligence will always be perceived as an endless resource—when nothing could be further from the truth. Top intelligence officials should keep a funding reserve for long-range requirements that are so detached from the day-to-day needs of intelligence users that market-based management would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be unable to guarantee their funding. But most programs would likely benefit from such an approach.

Another market-oriented measure would be to lower barriers to lateral entry of personnel. In the current system, most senior and middle-level intelligence analysts and case officers begin their careers at a junior level and rise through their respective organizations. The recruitment process, especially the difficulty of obtaining a security clearance, discourages people with established careers in other fields from considering working in intelligence. Streamlining this process requires spending more money and changing attitudes about how one becomes an intelligence officer, or even what being a "real" intelligence officer is. This suggestion may seem incidental to the substance of intelligence, but imagine the impact on the intelligence community if the process of getting a job at the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, or National Security Agency (NSA) required no more time, uncertainty, or hassle than getting a job at IBM, General Electric, or Oracle. Barriers to lateral entry insulate intelligence agencies from outside expertise and ideas. Lowering these barriers will inject new thinking into intelligence organizations.

3. *Measures that exploit new technology.* Technology is not a cure-all, but certain key investments in technology could further reduce organizational barriers and make intelligence organizations more agile. For example, user-friendly tools could assist all-source analysts in using specialized information. The information revolution is increasing not only the volume, but also the complexity of data. Analysts need to be able to use this information effectively and present it to intelligence consumers in an understandable form. Moreover, analysts need tools so that even generalists without in-depth scientific training can use technical data easily (e.g., software that can scan a digital image to seek out the particular electronic signature of a truck or missile launcher and superimpose its location on a conventional map). More importantly, by making it possible for the average analyst to use these kinds of data, analysts will likely find new and unexpected applications for data and new ways to solve long-standing intelligence problems.

One of the greatest needs, with regard to technology, is for communications and software standards. Incompatibilities between information systems are as effective as rules and culture in reinforcing organizational barriers. Until interoperability improves, individuals within the intelligence community will continue to find it difficult to communicate and collaborate, defeating any attempt to take advantage of networks.

Improving communications capacity, or bandwidth, is also crucial to countering the data glut intelligence analysts face. The situation is only likely to get worse in the face of increasing interaction among producers and users of intelligence, the sharing of ever-larger data sets, and an expanding base of users and information sources. Communication links will themselves become a major constraint on change within the intelligence community. Investments in communications capacity may seem more like a logistical detail than a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

major policy reform, but they are utterly essential to improving intelligence operations.

Effective intelligence reform in the contemporary context will likely be less dramatic than the creation of the intelligence community fifty years ago. No major new organization will suddenly spring to life, as the CIA and NSA did in the late 1940s. Yet measures such as those proposed here could be just as challenging to implement. Most will pose major changes in the intelligence community's organizational culture. Experience suggests that such changes are the most difficult of all—but also the most effective and most significant.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL & PUBLIC AFFAIRS

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The unique single-topic journal with multiple perspectives

Announcing the Spring 2000 Issue

SHADOW ECONOMIES:
PROMOTING PROSPERITY OR UNDERMINING STABILITY?

This issue explores an array of social, cultural, political and economic issues inherent in informal and illicit economic activities across the globe. Featuring **Graham Farrell** on the distinctions between illicit and informal activity; a perspective on the dynamics of clandestine war economies in Africa by **William Reno**; **Alba Zaluar** on urban poverty and the informal sector in Brazil; **Francisco Rivera-Batiz** on illegal immigration and migrant labor in the U.S.; and **Sarah Bachman** on child labor.

Forthcoming Fall 2000 Issue

TURKEY:
STRUGGLE BETWEEN NATION AND STATE

This issue addresses both the complexities of modern Turkish identity and its influence on the country's political and economic policies. Featuring **Metin Heper** on the legacy of the Ottoman Empire; **Henri Barkey** illuminates Turkey's shifting political structure; **Ziya Önis** on the strains of globalization; and the role of religion and its implications on identity politics by **Hakan Yavuz.**

SEEKING INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS *Spring 1999 Issue*

FUELING THE 21ST CENTURY: THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENERGY *Fall 1999 Issue*

Within the United States, subscribe by check, money order or credit card
$23 (one year) $42 (two years) - postage included
Please contact us for institutional and international rates

Payable to: *Journal of International Affairs*, Columbia University
Box 4, International Affairs Building, New York, NY 10027 U.S.A.
Phone: (212) 854-4775 Fax: (212) 662-0398

http://www.columbia.edu/cu/sipa/PUBS/JOURNAL

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Indonesia's Grim Outlook

by Paul Dibb and Peter Prince

Indonesia is not getting the attention it deserves in Washington," warned Singapore's trade and industry minister, George Yeo, in an address at Washington's Institute for International Economics earlier this year.[1] Yeo is a likely future prime minister of Singapore, and he is right to implore the new Bush administration to make Indonesia a high priority. Indeed, the very survival of Singapore—the economic hub of Southeast Asia and a short ferry ride from the nearest Indonesian territory—is threatened by the upheavals currently rocking its massive neighbor.

With the pressing international issues facing President Bush—China and Taiwan, the Middle East, Russia, the Balkans, the Korean peninsula, Iraq—it is no surprise that Indonesia is still a faint blip on the edge of Washington's radar screen. In an article on America's national interests published early in the presidential campaign, Condoleezza Rice, later to become Bush's national security adviser, failed even to mention Indonesia.[2] Yet the United States will ignore the largest Muslim nation in the world and fourth most populous overall at its peril. Indonesia controls critical maritime straits—Malacca, Sunda, Lombok—through which pass almost half of the world's seaborne trade. These are vital gateways on the strategic oil route between the Persian Gulf and North Asia. Their closure would have a disastrous impact on the economy of Japan, a major U.S. trading partner, and seriously affect key U.S. markets in China, South Korea, and Southeast Asia.

Donald K. Emmerson, a prominent American academic expert on

[1] "Asia without the U.S. Would Be A 'Nightmare': Singapore Minister," *China Times Interactive*, Mar. 17, 2001 (http://www.chinatimes.com.tw//english/politic/90031414.htm). See also, "Keeping America in the Asian Dream" (http://theglobalist.com/nor/richter/2001/04-05-01.shtml).

[2] Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, Jan./Feb. 2000, pp. 45–62.

Paul Dibb is a professor and head of the Strategic and Defense Studies Center in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the Australian National University. Previously, he served as Australia's deputy secretary of defense for strategic policy and intelligence, and director of the Defense Intelligence Organization. **Peter Prince** is a Canberra-based lawyer and a former head of the ASEAN section in Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

© 2001 Foreign Policy Research Institute. Published by Elsevier Science Limited.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Indonesia, believes that although the growing political violence in Indonesia "is tragic, it is not enough to destabilize a country of some 216 million people."[3] As Yeo's comments make clear, the hard-headed realists in the Singapore establishment do not agree. Australia, America's closest ally in the Asia-Pacific region, shares this deep concern about the future of Indonesia, whose stability is central to Australia's security. The proximity of such a large, densely populated Asian country is a matter of abiding concern to security planners in Canberra. Credible military threats to Australia can only come from or through the archipelago that stretches from Sumatra across Java and Timor to West Papua and Papua New Guinea.

This article analyzes the grim security outlook for Indonesia and its critical importance for the United States and its allies and friends in the region. The Bush administration should make Indonesia the linchpin of U.S. security planning in Southeast Asia not only because it is strategically important in its own right, but also because its violent disintegration would threaten Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, East Timor, Papua New Guinea, and Australia.

The Threat to Indonesia's Unity

In October 1999, a time of serious friction between Australia and Indonesia over the violence in East Timor and Australia's subsequent intervention at the head of a U.N. peacekeeping force, Indonesia's ambassador to Australia pleaded for understanding:

> It is important for Australians to appreciate that Indonesia is going through a traumatic period. The smoothly functioning democratic process that is taken for granted in Australia has yet to be established in Indonesia. . . . The recent tragic events in East Timor have been played out against a background of this great national effort to form a new government to bring Indonesia into the family of democratic nations. It is important that Australians understand that the institutions they have built up over 100 years of nationhood—a democratic electoral process; a strong and independent judiciary; a free and reasonably responsible press; a largely non-corrupt and highly competent civil service; and a decentralised system of government in which strong States counterbalance the strength of the national government—are things we Indonesians aspire to and are just beginning to enjoy.[4]

The turmoil wracking their vast neighbor has made many Australians appreciate their own institutions more keenly, not least the oft-maligned federal system that imposes eight provincial administrations along with the national government on a country of barely 20 million people. Above all else, it is the

[3] Donald K. Emmerson, "Will Indonesia Survive?" *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2000, p. 95.
[4] S. Wiryono, "Goodwill Should Be Our Mission," *Australian*, Oct. 1, 1999.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lack of an effective federal system that will ultimately be to blame should Indonesia disintegrate.

Australia and other former British colonies such as India, Malaysia, and Singapore inherited robust forms of national government. Moreover, the British colonialists largely worked through local power structures and adapted them for their own purposes, which had the effect of ensuring sufficient local expertise to take over after independence. In contrast, the Netherlands "ruled" its colonies in the strictest sense, refusing to encourage and develop a local capacity to govern. As D. G. E. Hall, one of the foremost scholars of Southeast Asia, has observed:

> One of Indonesia's worst disabilities in her early days of independence sprang from the fact that under Dutch rule few Indonesians had served in positions of responsibility in the civil service or business. The dismissal or resignation of the great bulk of Dutch and Eurasian civil servants in, or soon after, 1950 meant that most of the Indonesians who were promoted into the middle or upper ranks of the civil service had had no training for the posts they came to occupy, while the lower grades came to be grossly overstaffed owing to various forms of political pressure. . . . Indonesia . . . had the weakest civil service of any contemporary major state.[5]

For a short time after independence Indonesia was in fact a decentralized congeries of sixteen far-flung, autonomous, and diverse provinces loosely bound together in what the Dutch insisted must be a "federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia." But the federal experiment lasted barely a year. Having done nothing to promote Indonesian institutions during 300 years of colonial rule, the Netherlands—when it was finally forced to the negotiating table in 1949 after four years of armed struggle—could hardly expect its colonial subjects to pay more than lip service to its federal concept, no matter how benevolent the intentions behind it. "It was a measure of the intense dislike for colonial-inspired schemes that led to the rapid demise of the federal state."[6]

Nevertheless, as Ben Anderson, director of the Modern Indonesia project at Cornell University, has pointed out, the most crucial mistake of Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, was to support the destruction of the Federal Republic of Indonesia.[7] By the end of 1950, each of the self-governing provinces had elected to join a unitary Republic of Indonesia, but over time the dominance of the republic by the Javanese and the latter's failure to address the welfare of other ethnic groups strengthened centrifugal tendencies. Between 1956 and 1958, a series of rebellions broke out in three separate regions of Sumatra, as well as in eastern Indonesia and Kalimantan.

[5] D. G. E. Hall, *A History of South-East Asia* (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), p. 936.

[6] Yong Mun Cheong, "The Political Structures of the Independent States," in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, ed. Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992), vol. 2, p. 422.

[7] Ben Anderson, "Indonesia's Struggle: Conquering a Legacy of Avarice and Vice," *The Age* (Melbourne), May 12, 2001. See also Cheong, "Political Structures," p. 422; and Hall, *A History of South-East Asia*, p. 934.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To suppress them, the central government surrendered much of its power to the armed forces and regional commanders. That in turn elevated the Indonesian military to a place of prominence in national affairs that is only now being seriously questioned. Beginning in 1947, the military began setting up its own national administration "so that each civilian official, from provincial governors down to district supervisors, would be matched with a corresponding figure from the military. Although the two systems were parallel in structure, at each level of the bureaucracy the military counterpart wielded more power. . . ."[8]

When Sukarno ended Indonesia's parliamentary democracy in 1959, installing "guided democracy" with himself as prime minister as well as head of state, military support became crucial. Sukarno restored the original 1945 constitution, which is "short, vague and provides for a powerful presidency."[9] Sukarno gave the military substantial representation in the cabinet, civil service, and parliament. The armed forces chief, General Abdul Haris Nasution, justified this under a new doctrine called the "Middle Way" and described the military as a sociopolitical as well as defense force. By deposing Sukarno in 1966, General Suharto removed any effective civilian counterbalance to the military's dominant role in Indonesian society. The "Middle Way" expanded further, becoming known as *dwi fungsi* (dual function).[10]

Suharto removed any effective civilian counterbalance to the military.

Indonesia's survival as a unitary state into the twenty-first century owes much to the spread of military control across the archipelago. Under Suharto in particular, the military was the key instrument of state and was used ruthlessly to suppress opposition. It gave Suharto the means for imposing stability and the basis for pursuing economic development and growth. Few people were brave enough to speak out against the Suharto regime, and any motivation to do so was muted by Indonesia's strong economic growth under the "New Order" government. As a World Bank expert on Indonesia stated in 1997:

> Nearly 30 years of first rate economic management has produced: average annual growth in excess of 7 percent, inflation below 6 percent, per capita income . . . five times Bangladesh's, four times Nigeria's and three and a half times India's. . . . Most importantly, it remains an indisputable fact that the vast majority of Indonesians shared in Indonesia's economic success.[11]

[8] Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting—Indonesia in the 1990s* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994), p. 15.
[9] Ibid., p. 7.
[10] Ibid., p. 16.
[11] Dennis de Tray (World Bank country director for Indonesia), opening statement to the Consultative Group of Indonesia meeting, Tokyo, July 16, 1997, cited in Peter McCawley, "Human Dimensions of Indonesia's Economic Crisis and Foreign Assistance," paper presented at a conference organized by the Department of Economics, University of Queensland, Oct. 14, 1998, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Military control was a key factor in the country's long-term stability, although, as Suharto's removal after the Asian economic crash attests, it obviously did not suffice on its own. For some thirty-three years, military control preserved stability at the cost of arresting the country's long-term political development. Ultimately it became clear that the apparently stable political surface had obscured serious schisms in the makeup of the Indonesian nation.

With the dead weight of the Suharto regime lifted, Indonesia has now returned to the stage of political evolution it had reached in the late 1950s: a tumultuous liberal democracy searching for basic ground rules to sustain its own existence. Reliance on the military merely postponed for over a generation the essential steps Indonesia must take if it is to make its way in the world as a modern democratic nation. It must learn to manage its own affairs without depending on the military to hold the nation together. Unfortunately, the military's role has permeated national life for so long that any new administration seeking to nurture democratic roots at the different levels of government is likely to face substantial opposition for the foreseeable future from at least some key elements of the armed forces.

A Failed State on the Horizon?

The regional base for ethnic and economic jealousies in Indonesia lends substance to fears of a national breakdown along the lines of Yugoslavia or the former Soviet Union. While the religious aspect of Indonesia's domestic turmoil attracts considerable publicity, it is the ethnic and regional nature of conflict that is truly destructive. The specter of Dayaks from Borneo beheading "immigrant" Madurese and the long-standing armed campaigns in Aceh and West Papua against Jakarta are strong evidence of the serious fault lines in the Indonesian state.

Unfortunately for the central government, economic resentment reinforces ethnic and regional jealousy. Aceh, for example, has substantial oil and gas reserves, and West Papua has some of the world's most extensive gold and copper resources, but Jakarta has long controlled the revenue from foreign exploitation of these natural resources.

Political strife has spread more generally across the archipelago, and Jakarta cannot rein it in. At the height of the Suharto era, the armed forces would have dealt quickly and brutally with mob violence (unless they had instigated it themselves, as was occasionally the case). But with the glare of international scrutiny now firmly on the Indonesian military, brutal suppression is not an option, short of a general breakdown in law and order. Thus, the Indonesian armed forces (now known as Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI) showed little willingness or ability to deal with the massacres in Kalimantan earlier this year or the ongoing violence since the fall of Suharto in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moluccas, Ambon, and elsewhere. The armed forces do not see a political interest in keeping a lid on such violence. In fact, widespread turmoil makes it more likely that the country will support a return to the relative stability of a military regime, or at least one in which the military enjoys a central and respected role. Meanwhile, the central government finds its authority increasingly undermined as provincial administrations question the value of remaining linked to Jakarta at all. If the TNI hopes to achieve its fundamental aim of maintaining the unity of the Indonesian state, therefore, it may find that it will have to reconquer it.

Few outward signs of disunity exist within the TNI, which makes its own decisions about whether to follow government policies and orders. At the time of writing,[12] there was essentially a standoff between President Abdurrahman Wahid and the armed forces, even though Wahid is in theory the commander in chief. In April 2001, the TNI prevented hundreds of thousands of Wahid's supporters from marching on the national parliament. A month earlier, the Indonesian police and the military together suppressed pro-Wahid demonstrations with a heavy hand, but left anti-Wahid demonstrators alone.

A Dearth of Leadership

After promising so much as Indonesia's first democratically elected president, Wahid has been a dismal disappointment. After the triple blows of the 1997 economic crash, the fall of Suharto, and the loss of East Timor, Indonesia desperately needed a new beginning, but Wahid failed to deliver because he proved unwilling to tackle the old, entrenched interests. Moreover, even though Indonesia faces overwhelming internal problems, Wahid has persisted in making extravagant overseas trips that have neither increased foreign investment nor furthered Indonesia's national interests in any evident way. The ultimate folly was Wahid's refusal to interrupt his tour of African nations in early 2001 despite a series of horrific massacres in Kalimantan[13] The violence there was doubly damaging to Indonesia, not simply for its own sake, but also because of the high profile it received in the world's media.

Strangely, one of the last of some fifty overseas countries Wahid has visited is Australia. The relationship between the two neighbors remains seriously damaged in the aftermath of East Timor's vote for independence and the U.N. intervention led by Australian military forces. A Wahid visit early

[12] On July 23, 2001, as this article was going to press, Indonesia's parliament removed Wahid and replaced him with Megawati Sukarnoputri, his vice president. Early signs were not promising for Indonesia under President Megawati. The initial days of her presidency were marred by the assassination of the chairing judge of Indonesia's new human rights court (set up to prosecute atrocities in East Timor) and a protracted struggle for cabinet positions.

[13] See "Wahid Wanders While Borneo Burns," *Economist*, Mar. 1, 2001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in his presidency would have meant a great deal, but on five occasions he cancelled plans for a trip to Australia under pressure from the anti-Australian lobby in Indonesia. When a visit finally came off in June 2001, any chance it had to improve bilateral relations had been substantially undermined by Wahid's impending impeachment in his own nation's legislature.

Compounding Indonesia's difficulties is the lack of any capable alternative to Wahid, even though his days in office are clearly numbered and in all likelihood will have ended by the time this article appears. Indonesia's parliamentarians, on the whole, do not appear to be working for the greater good of the nation. As the *Jakarta Post* declared in April 2001: "The lack of effective government in Indonesia these past few months—caused largely because leaders have been too busy feuding with each other—has pushed Indonesia further to the brink of destruction."[14]

One of the most respected analysts of Indonesian politics, Jusuf Wanandi of Jakarta's Centre for Strategic and International Studies, believes that "nobody among [the political leaders and members of parliament] thinks about the interests of the nation as a whole." If the situation continues, he asserts, there will be no one left who can save Indonesia from becoming a failed state. "That is why a high sense of urgency is now needed among the political elite."[15]

If Wahid resigns or is forced from office before the official end of his term in 2004, he will be replaced by Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri. The daughter of Indonesia's first president, she has little constructive to offer. Her political popularity—like that of her father in the later years of his rule—depends almost entirely on playing to the nationalist gallery. Megawati could in fact be a dangerous president. Since her presidency would rely critically on military support, she would not take more than symbolic steps against the vested interests of the old Suharto regime.

It is a depressing prospect that the best remaining hope for Indonesia is arguably an authoritarian military figure who can return the country to the type of stability that existed under Suharto. It is possible that someone may emerge in Indonesia similar to former president Fidel Ramos of the Philippines. A former general, Ramos showed how one person, with the necessary authority, commitment, and sufficient integrity, can turn around the political and economic fortunes of a large and diverse archipelagic nation.

The Promise—or Threat—of Regional Autonomy

The underlying question basic to the future of Indonesia is whether promotion of regional autonomy can ease the resentment against Java's

[14] Lindsay Murdoch, "Indonesian Feuds Spell Disaster," *The Age*, Apr. 14, 2001.
[15] Ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dominant political and economic role. On January 1, 2001, more than 350 districts throughout the country assumed (theoretical) responsibility for the management of their own finances and administrations. District governments now communicate directly with the central government, rather than reporting to provincial administrations. The districts now bear responsibility for a long list of functions from public works, health, education, and culture to agriculture, communications, industry, trade, capital investment, and the environment. In addition, in an attempt to counter resentment at Jakarta's control of locally derived revenue, especially from natural resources, the central government has introduced a new system of revenue sharing with district governments.[16]

The sad truth, however, is that such administrative responsibilities are far beyond the capacities of Indonesia's autonomous districts. Opportunities for corruption, collusion, and nepotism, especially through exploitation of natural resources, were so rampant under the old regime that Indonesians refer to them simply by the acronym *KKN* (from the Bahasa *Korupsi Kolusi Nepotisme*). But shortly after the new arrangements came into force, an Australian expert observed that those nefarious characteristics, rather than diminishing under the new arrangements, were merely "finding expression in local politics."[17]

In any case, the devolution of responsibilities to local administrations may have been a ruse more than a real effort by the national government to cede power. It appears that the Indonesian parliament devolved some functions to the small district units because it feared that giving power to the larger and potentially much stronger provinces might propel Indonesia down the road to genuine federalism.[18] There is little hope for Indonesia if leaders at the national level perceive the one thing that might save the country as a threat to themselves. According to the *Economist*, a more genuine attempt to create a federal state may now be the only way "to avert the growing threat of national disintegration."[19] The granting of authority to the districts did not suffice to create any real sense of self-government in regions where resentment of Javanese control continues to fuel separatism. As Ben Anderson has written, "One of the biggest questions facing Indonesia today is whether a generally sensible federal political system can finally be created, or whether it is already too late."[20] It is virtually impossible to overstate the challenge of governing, as a single entity, a country of "thousands of islands spread over an area almost the size of the United States, and whose people are a religious,

[16] Mark Turner, "Major Change in Indonesia," *Canberra Times*, Jan. 29, 2001.

[17] Ibid., p. 9.

[18] "Devolve, but Do It Right," *Economist*, July 6, 2000.

[19] Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Briefings Indonesia—Political Forces," Oct. 31, 2000 (http://www.economist.com).

[20] Anderson, "Indonesia's Struggle."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ethnic and economic jumble." But, in the view of the *Economist*, the solution is plain: "If it does not devolve, it will not work."[21]

An Economy in Collapse

In July 1998, shortly after Suharto's fall, the World Bank issued a dire assessment of Indonesia's economic crisis: "No country in recent history, let alone one the size of Indonesia, has ever suffered such a dramatic reversal of fortune."[22] The failing economy has, of course, been behind much of the turmoil across Indonesia. With mass unemployment and perhaps half the nation's population of more than 200 million living below the poverty line, economic jealousies between different regions and ethnic groups have exploded in violence, stoked anger at the central government, and added weight to separatist demands.[23] An economic turnaround would likely reduce the violence and anarchy across Indonesia, but no sign of a turnaround is in sight.

In short, Indonesia is caught in a vicious circle. The 1997 economic crash undermined its political stability. And without political stability, Indonesia's economy is unlikely to recover. Two-thirds of central government expenditures go toward servicing international and domestic debt. In mid-2001, the currency's value had nearly reached the disastrously low level it had reached immediately before Suharto's ouster, a slide that one observer blamed on "recurrent bouts of speculation following episodes of political instability and communal violence."[24] The country's lack of political progress has also held up World Bank loans and other foreign assistance. In April 2001, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) refused to release a crucial $400 million package frozen since December 2000 until the Indonesian parliament agreed to new proposals to prevent a fiscal collapse.[25]

There are two concerns for Washington here. First is the perception in Indonesia that the United States is behind the IMF's hard line, and that the decision reflected Washington's international bias. At the same time as the fund refused to release assistance to Indonesia, it agreed to a new $10 billion bailout program for Turkey. As the *Jakarta Post* noted:

> As the ink dries on this deal, Turkey's third in six months, Indonesians will ask whether economic distress in their country ranks as highly on the IMF's agenda as that of NATO's ally on the edges of Europe. At the moment, the answer appears to be that it does not. Help for the Abdurrahman government has fallen off the agenda

[21] "Devolve, but Do It Right."

[22] Cited in McCawley, "Human Dimensions," p. 3.

[23] Ibid., p. 10.

[24] Jonathan Pincus, "Is the US Gunning for Wahid?" *Jakarta Post*, May 9, 2001. The rupiah dropped below 12,000 to the U.S. dollar in April 2001, the lowest level since the turmoil in 1998 that overthrew Suharto.

[25] Lindsay Murdoch, "Aid Donors Lose Patience with Wahid," *The Age*, Apr. 28, 2001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> in Washington, both in the United States Treasury, and, by extension, the IMF. From this perspective, the Fund's inflexibility in Indonesia has more to do with Washington's strategic calculations than with right and wrong.[26]

Secondly, to the extent the United States does influence the policies of the IMF, the World Bank, and other global institutions that could assist Indonesia, it should ensure that their demands do not undermine the very stability they should be encouraging in Indonesia. The intransigence of the IMF's policies in 1998 contributed to Suharto's downfall and the current turmoil across Indonesia. "Crash through or crash" financial policies on the part of the IMF will undercut political stability in Indonesia and hamper the development of stable democratic government.

Will Indonesia Disintegrate?

The ability and desire of Indonesia's remaining twenty-six provinces to break away from "Javanese rule" vary enormously. Some, such as Aceh, already have much of the necessary political organization and leadership in place. Others, such as West Papua, have perhaps even stronger motivation and are starting to organize properly, albeit still under the thumb of the military. The former sultanate of Aceh has a long and proud tradition and is fiercely conscious of its separate identity from the rest of Indonesia. Not even President Wahid's status as a respected Muslim leader has helped him to come to terms with this Islamic province. To the Indonesian army, Aceh is the most troublesome province in the country; to the people of Aceh, the TNI arouses fear and loathing. The Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement—GAM) has fought a sporadic but often bloody civil war against the TNI for twenty-five years. Many attempts to bring the two sides together have come to naught. During what was supposedly a seven-month cease-fire in mid-2000, for example, 500 people were killed in the ongoing conflict.

Among the substantial grievances of the Acehnese, Jakarta's exploitation of natural resources tops the list: "Indonesia is the world's leading exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG), and two-fifths of the country's LNG exports originate on Aceh's northern coast."[27] But this is only an issue Acehnese use to underline their desire for independence. Their deeper motivation comes from Aceh's strong tradition as an independent state until 1903, when the Dutch, after a thirty-year war, finally subdued it. What many Acehnese see as fifty years of "temporary" rule from Jakarta has done nothing to mitigate their desire for autonomy. What is more, the violence has caught up important American economic interests. Fighting between the TNI and

[26] Pincus, "Is the US Gunning for Wahid?"
[27] Emmerson, "Will Indonesia Survive?" p. 98.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GAM forced the closure of a giant ExxonMobil oil and gas field for at least two months.[28]

Aceh would not have to seek to break away if Jakarta agreed to "rechannel revenues back to a truly autonomous Aceh, possibly inside a federalised Indonesia." But Indonesia's ruling elites are as yet unwilling to loosen their grip on resource-rich provinces.[29] Thus do the legacies of the Dutch, Sukarno, and Suharto alike live on. Nor, so far at least, has Wahid or Megawati challenged those legacies, because both leaders fear that creation of a federal state would only encourage other provinces to declare independence.

Across most of Indonesia, a shared pride in obtaining independence from the Netherlands and a sense of common destiny as part of a single nation arguably still act as a moderating influence on centrifugal forces. The principal exception is West Papua (also known as West Irian or Irian Jaya), whose indigenous people feel no affinity for the rest of the country and harbor the greatest desire to break away. West Papua was incorporated into Indonesia only in 1969, after a U.N.-sponsored "act of free choice." That term, say some observers, belies the truth:

> The 1969 "Act of Free Choice" was a disgrace. There was no plebiscite as such but a sample of pro-Indonesian opinions drawn from 1025 tribal leaders selected by the Indonesian Government, all of whom supported integration into Indonesia. . . . The UN's involvement in the transfer of West Irian to Indonesia was one of the most dishonourable of the UN's activities.[30]

The indigenous people of West Papua are Melanesian and have far more in common with their neighbors in Papua New Guinea (which shares a land border with West Papua) than with their nominal compatriots elsewhere in the Indonesian islands. Indonesia has tried to integrate West Papua through a large-scale "transmigration" program (*Transmigrasi*) that has brought many thousands of settlers from other parts of Indonesia, but further alienated the local population.

Active opposition to Indonesian rule over West Papua goes back to 1963, when Indonesia assumed effective control over the territory, supplanting U.N. authority that had only recently been established.[31] Since that time, the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement—OPM) has waged a guerrilla war against the government. Despite the OPM's limited resources and lack of international attention or assistance, the Indonesian armed forces

[28] "No New Indonesia Mining Investment Until Political Issues Settled," Radio Australia News, Australian Broadcasting Commission, May 16, 2001 (http://www.abc.net.au/asiapacific/news/GoAsiaPacificBNA_297455.htm). At time of writing, the field had not reopened.

[29] Emmerson, "Will Indonesia Survive?" p. 100.

[30] Keith Suter, "West Papua Looms as the Next Big Crisis," *Canberra Times*, June 22, 2000.

[31] In 1962, West Papua was transferred from the Netherlands to the United Nations for six years until a referendum could be held to determine the province's political future.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have been unable to defeat it. The parallels are striking between the OPM and its counterpart in Papua New Guinea, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), which, after a bitter ten-year civil war, forced the Papua New Guinea government to the negotiating table. Chief among the BRA's grievances was the central government's exploitation of mineral resources. West Papua has the world's richest gold mine and second-largest open-cut copper mine.

Eventually, the United Nations will have to address the injustice of the 1969 events in West Papua. The very success of the United Nations in gaining independence for East Timor means it cannot continue to ignore the failings of a referendum process it organized in a neighboring province. Ultimately, there will have to be a new "act of free choice" in West Papua, even in the face of threats of violent opposition from the Indonesian military. Should West Papua achieve independence, its abundance of natural resources will give it as much chance as Papua New Guinea of being a functional modern state. However, this is not saying a great deal; an independent West Papua would need considerable support from the international community to survive.

Assessing Indonesia's Prospects

Some academics believe that Indonesia is not about to split apart and that its very diversity is one reason to believe the state may endure. The same facts that hinder Jakarta's hold on power throughout the country make it difficult to foresee how any individual or group could pose a nationwide challenge to it. Armed rebellions in Indonesia have, to date, involved assertions of separate identities, but have not included any direct action to overthrow the central government. Nor does Indonesia (unlike Thailand) have a history of military coups—indeed, the TNI currently lacks sufficient support among the middle class and students to mount one. Its strategy, therefore, is evidently "to do nothing and let violence fester, as the recent glaring example of Central Kalimantan makes clear." The military appreciates that the longer the current turmoil continues, the more Indonesians may come to see it as the last hope for stability. Or, in slightly more Machiavellian terms, "the TNI is on a slow ascendancy as politicians tear at each others' throats."[32]

Finally, the opposition in Indonesia lacks depth. In the end, Suharto's regime was brought down by student demonstrations. While the populace as a whole harbors anger and resentment about corruption and misrule, these feelings will likely find expression in violence against ethnic and religious minorities, not against the state apparatus. There is currently no force (such as a communist movement) capable of translating the huge economic dis-

[32] Derwin Pereira, "Indonesian Military Wants Gus Dur to Step Down," *Straits Times* (Singapore), Apr. 18, 2001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

parities and religious and ethnic tensions into an uprising against the whole system of government. Even the surging popularity of Islam seems unlikely to translate, at least in the short term, into a generalized insurrection against the government.

But these factors merely suggest why a rebellion to replace the central administration in Jakarta is unlikely. As we have seen, the more pressing question is whether the Indonesian state will survive in its current, unitary form. Emmerson's assessment is that "Indonesia . . . will survive. Aceh and Papua may not remain inside it, but their farewells, if they happen, are unlikely to set in motion a process that reduces the republic to the island of Java."[33] The departure of Aceh or West Papua, however, will have grave implications throughout Indonesia, and quite likely beyond. The violence in East Timor will be dwarfed by what will occur in Aceh or West Papua if either of these provinces secedes. If the GAM in Aceh or the OPM in West Papua establishes its own functioning, independent state, the result could be full-scale civil war and a military coup on the pretext of galvanizing the remainder of the nation to fight the rebels, thereby gutting Indonesia's fragile democracy.

Nor, for that matter, does the mere establishment of new states imply that they will be liberal democracies with benign external policies. Their leaders may not be eager to set up functioning democracies where their positions can be readily challenged at the ballot box—especially if, as now seems inevitable, they gained independence for their countries after protracted armed struggles.

The U.S. Stake in the Indonesian Problem

Violence within Indonesia must not be regarded as a purely domestic concern. Wholesale social and political turmoil in Indonesia would dramatically affect critical American interests throughout the surrounding region. As Singapore's Yeo said in Washington, "An Indonesia in disarray will affect the whole of Southeast Asia adversely and become a strategic problem for the United States and Japan."[34] The breakup of Indonesia could seriously destabilize a significant portion of the western Pacific. A disabled Indonesia would seriously disrupt the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional grouping of ten states with a combined population of 500 million. For over three decades, while the United States sought to contain great power rivalry in North Asia, it relied on a stable, united, and economically prosperous ASEAN to the south. But after the 1997 regional economic crisis, that organization is no longer a balancing force in the region. The political collapse of Indonesia and the panic it would cause among neighboring states would turn ASEAN into a strategic liability for the United States.

[33] Emmerson, "Will Indonesia Survive?" p. 106.

[34] "Asia without the U.S."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In addition, ever since the Asian economic crisis, Indonesia and ASEAN have been unable to counter China's southward influence, as amply demonstrated by the lack of any effective and united opposition to China's position on the disputed Spratly Islands.[35] If the region were further preoccupied with an Indonesian political crisis, China might try to extend its power and influence still further. In fact, Indonesia's Wahid has already begun to pursue closer relations with Beijing. Moreover, China keenly watches the fate of its 7 million "overseas citizens" in Indonesia, who have often become the targets of vicious, orchestrated attacks during periods of political instability. American decision makers need to take seriously the possibility not just of a stronger Chinese presence in Southeast Asia, but of heavy-handed intervention from Beijing in response to large-scale anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia.

The strategic concerns of Australia, the United States' closest ally in the Asia-Pacific, merit additional consideration. A popular opinion in Australia is that Indonesia will be less of a potential military threat if it splits apart. This is a wrongheaded view. In strategic terms, it is advantageous to Australia if a stable, democratic, and unified Indonesia stands astride Australia's vulnerable northern approaches. An Indonesian collapse, by contrast, would either force Australian defense planners and diplomats to juggle among the competing interests of several new states or else confront an authoritarian and xenophobic regime. No wonder Australians exhibit, to put it bluntly, a strategic paranoia about Indonesia.

Indonesia's disintegration could undermine the economies of much of Southeast Asia.

The disintegration of Indonesia could affect U.S. foreign policy in other ways as well. Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia all fear waves of refugees. Australia already has trouble coping with the few thousand people brought to its shores by rackets trafficking in human beings. But a collapse of the Indonesian state could bring many times more refugees, while in Malaysia, where racial tension has been managed well, but nevertheless simmers beneath the surface, the sudden arrival of a horde of refugees could rend the fabric of society.

Indonesia's disintegration would also have severe economic consequences that could undermine the economies of much of Southeast Asia and beyond. Major U.S. trading partners such as Japan, Korea, and China would feel the pinch of lost markets as well as lost imports of raw materials and finished goods. If conflict disrupts crucial sea lanes, economies all over the world could suffer.

Another consideration for the United States is the potentially serious repercussions of inaction in the face of prolonged turmoil. For example, the collapse of authority in Indonesia would inevitably threaten the fledgling state of East Timor, which has acquired an international prominence out of

[35] See Ben Bohane, "West Papuans Seek Beijing's Support," *Sydney Morning Herald*, May 19, 2001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proportion to its size thanks to the sympathy and considerable investment the global community has bestowed on it. Likewise, separatist violence in Indonesia could spark well-organized and widespread human rights abuses on an unprecedented scale, all but requiring a response from Washington. If the United States can act (through NATO) to save the Kosovars, the world will ask, why can't the United States and its allies in Asia stop ethnic cleansing in Indonesia?

It is worth noting that, just as U.S. inaction could threaten American interests, a productive U.S. role in resolving the Indonesian crisis could turn out to have unexpected rewards. Much of the current violence has a strong religious aspect. Savage conflicts throughout the islands have pitted Muslims and Christians against each other. The Islamic world will take sides in any breakup of Indonesia and the political struggle that will ensue. The United States would gain influence among Muslims worldwide by seeking to avert an Indonesian collapse. In addition, Indonesia's long tradition of moderate Islam is now threatened by a more extreme movement. The United States has a strong interest in encouraging moderate elements to build stable and democratic political institutions. Earning the appreciation of moderate Islamic leaders in Indonesia could give the United States a valuable go-between in its (problematic) relations with the rest of the Muslim world.

Ultimately, there is simply no sound alternative to U.S. involvement. In the recent case of East Timor, for example, Australia was the only regional actor willing and able to lead a U.N. force at short notice to counter the destruction of East Timor by the TNI. Australia's long-term ally New Zealand also contributed forces quickly, and Thailand and the Philippines proved to be reliable partners. Malaysia, however, deliberately sought to exploit the situation by offering only token support, questioning the wisdom of Australia's leadership of the mission, and even demanding that Australian forces stop treating the militia forces responsible for the mayhem "so roughly."[36] Japan provided no military support, and Vietnam and Myanmar contributed nothing at all.

Referring to Indonesia in the Senate hearing to confirm his appointment as U.S. secretary of state, Colin Powell said that the United States would "let our ally, Australia, take the lead, as they have done so well in that troubled country."[37] The return message from Australia is that the United States should also be involved at an early stage, with well-considered policies, clear long-term aims, and an appreciation of the critical U.S. role in influencing Jakarta. Australia might well take the lead in formulating policy toward Indonesia, but it will be reluctant to exert direct pressure on Jakarta lest it increase the risk of provoking friction or even armed conflict. (Indo-

[36] "Australia, NZ Deny 'Belligerent' Claims," *Australian Associated Press*, Sept. 30, 1999.

[37] Hamish McDonald, "An Unwelcome Pat on the Head from Uncle Sam," *Sydney Morning Herald*, Jan. 19, 2001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nesia's foreign minister and defense minister already suspect Australia of seeking independence for West Papua.) In addition, the United States could exert far more economic, diplomatic, and military pressure than Australia could ever bring to bear. Australia's defense burden has greatly increased with its de facto obligation to provide military protection for East Timor. It would be hard pressed to provide a shield for, say, an independent West Papua against a resentful Jakarta.

Policy Recommendations

Clearly, the best hope for Indonesia lies in the implementation of a federalized structure that devolves real authority to the provinces. The success of that process will depend, above all, on the willingness and political acumen of leaders in Jakarta—traits that have been notably lacking. The international community expects the United States, as the world's leading democracy, to provide practical and meaningful assistance in order to further the transition and avert humanitarian and political disaster.

What should the United States do? Above all else, as Theodore Friend has pointed out, "the U.S. government must recognize the true American interest in Indonesia. It chiefly consists in assuring geostrategic balance in Southeast Asia and the western Pacific Rim. . . . It is not economic in any dramatic way, however much individual American firms, corporations, and banks may be involved and affected."[38] As the leading world power, the United States can convince Indonesia that its troubles are high on the agenda of the international community. Keeping the international spotlight on Jakarta would encourage Indonesian leaders to focus less on infighting and more on achieving higher standards of governance. Furthermore, if they realize that the international community—especially global lending institutions such as the IMF—will support and not merely punish their country, they may find some way out of the current morass.

The United States could do great service to Indonesia in its travails by providing support for international lending, technical aid in areas ranging from public health and environmental management, to democratic institutions and the rule of law.[39] The Indonesian military's key role in provoking or preventing the country's descent into violent anarchy and disintegration also suggests that resumption of carefully targeted military cooperation between the United States and Indonesia would be prudent. Above all, the Bush administration should make clear that it supports the territorial integrity of a democratic Indonesia, and that the country ranks high on its list of strategic priorities in Asia.

[38] Theodore Friend, "Indonesia in Flames," *Orbis*, Summer 1998, p. 406.

[39] Theodore Friend, "Power Vacuum in ASEAN: Indonesia, Regional Security and the USA," *E-Notes*, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Apr. 9, 2001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Essays

Crumbling Pillars of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

by Frederick R. Dickinson

Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. By Herbert P. Bix. (New York: HarperCollins, 2000. 811 pp. $35; $18, paper.)

The Making of Modern Japan. By Marius B. Jansen. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 2000. 889 pp. $35.)

Edwin O. Reischauer must be rolling in his grave. Perceptions of Japan in the United States are not at all what they used to be when he, a professor of Japanese history at Harvard University, was *the* American authority on Japan and served as the Kennedy administration's ambassador to Tokyo. Those were the halcyon days of "modernization theory" when Reischauer and his disciples celebrated Japan as the only non-Western power to achieve modern industrial growth. It was a time when Americans could ignore mass protests in Tokyo over the U.S.-Japan security alliance and look benignly on a quaint Asian folk who seemed to have repented of radical nationalism and converted wholeheartedly to the American Way.

Nothing could be further from the attitudes prevalent today. Economic competition originally soured Washington on its adopted ally in the early 1980s, and the perception of Japanese "difference" has been sustained ever since by trade frictions, revelations of political corruption in Tokyo, new evidence of Japanese wartime atrocities (regarding the "comfort women," for instance), and dramatic proof of the failure of the Japanese economic "miracle." Historical analyses of Japan have as usual followed the contemporary public mood. Modernization theory is out, having been replaced by a new academic vogue that, among other things, views the Pacific War not as an aberration in an otherwise straight-line trajectory to modernity, but a conse-

Frederick R. Dickinson is Susan Louis Dyer Peace Fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace (2000–2001) and Associate Professor of Modern Japanese History at the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of *War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914–1919* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press East Asian Monograph Series, 1999).

© 2001 Foreign Policy Research Institute. Published by Elsevier Science Limited.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quence of such modern developments as the growth of mass culture and strengthening state-society ties over social welfare and reform.[1]

Changes in American scholarly coverage of Japan also reflect a generational shift. Each member of the intrepid triumvirate that pioneered modernization theory for Japan in the early 1960s has now passed away: Reischauer in 1990, Yale University professor John Whitney Hall in 1997, and Marius Jansen of Princeton University in December 2000.

Japan According to the Modernizationists

We are fortunate that, despite formidable physical ailments in his last years (including a heart attack that left him with a blood clot blinding him in one eye), Jansen still possessed the determination and energy to make an authoritative final statement on modern Japanese history. *The Making of Modern Japan* is a masterful survey from the early modern Tokugawa era (1600–1868) to the end of the millennium, both a testament to the strengths of the modernization generation and a sensitive response to recent American scholarly trends and vacillations of public sentiment toward Japan.

The chronology here is familiar. It begins with the battle of Sekigahara in 1600, which ended a century of feudal wars and established the military hegemony of the Tokugawa family. The highly "practical" governance of the Tokugawa over hundreds of semiautonomous feudal domains continued for more than 250 years in an unprecedented period of tranquility and prosperity known as the Great Peace. Japan, largely isolated from developments in the West for most of that time, nonetheless experienced substantial economic, social, and intellectual change. Thus, it was prepared to leap into the modern world in the mid-nineteenth century when pressured by the West into free and open intercourse. Under the able leadership of a handful of *genro* (elder statesmen), Japan rapidly industrialized and, following Western convention, adopted constitutional monarchy and built a continental empire. The death of the elder statesmen and completion of their nation-building project invited instability in the 1910s and 1920s, which, combined with the international economic crisis, beginning in the 1930s led to the occupation of Manchuria, the attempted conquest of China, and a suicidal war against the United States. But Japan's defeat in the Pacific War and subsequent occupation by the United States set the stage for a new era of democracy and dramatic economic growth.

Accompanying this familiar narrative is a roster of easily recognizable heroes and villains. The volume begins with the accomplishments of early modern Japan's three prominent unifiers: Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyo-

[1] For the best studies highlighting these two developments, see, respectively, Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); and Sheldon Garon, *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu. We discern the forward-looking nature of Japanese feudalism in the fascinating career of Sugita Genpaku, the eighteenth-century pioneer of Western medicine. Fukuzawa Yukichi, founder of Keio University and nineteenth-century Japan's "foremost modernizer," embodies the dynamic spirit of nation building under the Meiji emperor (1868–1912). Tokyo University professor Yoshino Sakuzo symbolizes the movement for democratic reform during the Taisho reign (1912–26). The perpetrator of the Manchurian Incident, Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara Kanji, represents the bold "nonconformism" that propels Japan to military overextension and disaster. Finally, the personal strength and unflagging confidence of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru steers Japan to new political and economic achievements after the war.

Jansen's chronology and choice of heroes and villains are all products of the modernization school of Japanese studies. They are the principal elements in a story of dramatic change and extraordinary accomplishment in the archipelago that by 1800 boasted the world's most populous city (Edo/Tokyo), the world's largest stores (forerunners of today's Mitsukoshi, Shirokiya, and Matsuzakaya), and the most literate agricultural society in the world. The story is that of a land transformed, in a single generation in the nineteenth century, from one of the world's most fractured polities into one of its most centralized states, which experienced rapid and dramatic urban and industrial growth and claimed the first representative government outside of the Western world. A country that in the 1920s could boast of a sprouting consumer economy blossomed within a few decades into an economic superpower. In this tale, change, speed, and descriptive accounts of the modern abound, while evidence of conflict, hardship, and disaster (particularly war) recede into the background. Although some Japanese scholars have described modern Japanese history as an unrelenting story of violence from the Sino-Japanese War to the Russo-Japanese War, the First World War, the War against China, and the Pacific War, only two of Jansen's twenty chapters focus on war. Rather, he seeks to present Japan as a "gifted, resourceful, and courageous" nation, "destined to play a major role in the millennium now begun" (p. 765).

A Tempered "Modernization Theory" for the Twenty-first Century

The conspicuous triumphalism of the modernization school evident here is, it seems, tempered by late-twentieth-century doubts. Economic growth and "happiness for the few" during the Tokugawa period, Jansen allows, came "at the cost of misery for the many" (p. 247). The rigid structure of social rank became worse as Tokugawa rule progressed, and the Meiji

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

revolution is less the "national Cinderella-story of modern times"[2] that it was during the heyday of modernization theory than the product of "trial and error, with little fanfare" (p. 334). The contrast between supposedly innate Japanese and Chinese proclivities toward modernization, so prominent in Jansen's study of Sino-Japanese relations a quarter century ago,[3] has here become simply a question of relative speed. Jansen acknowledges that domestic movements for political reform and international cooperation, including participation in the new League of Nations, elicited resistance as well as enthusiasm in interwar Japan. He grants that the postwar decades, too, have been rife with problems including "environmental degradation of every sort," unrealized promises of women's equality, broken families and absentee fathers, an increasingly strict education system focused upon exams, dangerous new forms of social protest (e.g., the Aum Shinrikyo cult that released sarin nerve gas in a Tokyo subway in 1995), a "labyrinth" of obstacles to free trade, and ongoing tensions in U.S.-Japanese relations (pp. 743–57).

A new sense of realism thus pervades Jansen's last work, but one may also note the active incorporation of new English-language scholarship on modern Japan. Modernization may be the essential focus here, but Jansen integrates more recent interpretive frameworks into the basic story of modernizing success. Thus, the old notion of a feudal realm "closed" to the outside world gives way to a recognition of the vibrant trade and diplomacy carried on by Tokugawa Japan, particularly with its Asian neighbors. Where modernization theory made a clear distinction between tradition and modernity, Jansen now locates much that is modern in the construction of new traditions such as the modern imperial institution in the nineteenth century. He displays new sensitivity to competing Japanese interpretations of their own history and, in an attempt to portray the Allied occupation as interaction rather than mere subjugation, he labels it "the Yoshida years" (after occupation-era prime minister Yoshida Shigeru), rather than simply "the U.S. occupation."

If newer interpretive models appear here, so too does a level of detail (much of it from recent scholarship) rich and arresting enough to give even the specialist a new sense of discovery. Thus the magnitude of Tokugawa contacts with the outer world is brought home by the description of a vibrant Chinese commercial and religious community in Nagasaki, where the shogun even allowed construction of branches of Chinese temples. Our sense of samurai hegemony is tempered by the picture of samurai officials at Ueda in 1761 communicating with a crowd of protesters by dangling messages from poles rather than risk a violent confrontation. The familiar story of a Russian *strategic* threat to the northern island of Hokkaido in the early nineteenth

[2] John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, *East Asia: The Modern Transformation* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 244.

[3] Marius B. Jansen, *Japan and China: From War to Peace, 1894–1972* (Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally, 1975).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

century is enriched by a discussion of the growing *economic* importance of the island due to the rapid expansion of the fish fertilizer industry. Among Commodore Matthew Perry's strong-arm tactics upon his arrival in Japan in 1853, we learn of a set of white flags presented to the Japanese negotiator, to be used in the event of Japanese resistance—and surrender—in a subsequent war. We sympathize with the zealous reformer Sakuma Shozan, who was assassinated for riding a horse with a Western saddle, but also with the Japanese resistance to foreign nationals, whose picnic excursions, for example, ended brazenly with target practice. Our familiar image of a fledgling nation eager to learn from the West likewise fades before the reality of political leader Itagaki Taisuke's sermonizing, and enraging, Herbert Spencer in London. The cultural excitement of the interwar period radiates from a description of Weimar Germany's inspiration of Japanese avant-garde artists. Our notion of an unengaged Emperor Hirohito is challenged by reference to his pointed questioning of Japanese generals about the Manchurian Incident and his suggesting to General Douglas MacArthur after the war that the United States retain custody of Okinawa. Finally, parallels abound here between the post- and pre-1945 periods, as when postwar economic reformers imagine themselves to be the successors of Meiji-era activists and achieve full sovereignty at a cost as high as that paid in the nineteenth century (unrestricted foreign travel then, American bases now). Even railroad politics after 1945 (including a new rapid transit line to Nagano for the 1998 Winter Olympics) recall similar log rolling under party leader Hara Takashi in the first decade of the twentieth century.

For all its orthodox framework, then, this book is a rich resource, imperial in scope, majestic in detail. As delightful as many of Jansen's anecdotes are, so too is his imaginative selection of original maps, charts, and photographs, many from his own personal collection. Included is a map of Japanese raids, wars, and settlements in Asia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; a photograph of a sacred bronze image of the Madonna and child, designed in the Tokugawa era to be trampled upon to prove the desecrator was not a Christian; and the remarkable image of a smiling emperor after the surrender, looking the bewildered parents of a war-weary family directly in the eye.

Admonition for a Younger Generation of American Japan Scholars

Still, one must ask why, as the author and editor of over a dozen pioneering monographs, edited volumes, and general surveys of modern Japan, Jansen undertook this compendium. At 765 pages (plus seventy-five more of notes), it is quite unwieldy as a classroom text. In light of its liberal references to recent scholarship, perhaps Jansen intended it as a final tribute to his students. It is, in fact, dedicated to them. But if this is a tribute, it is also

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a mild admonishment. For however pleased Jansen was by much of the work of America's young Japan scholars, he also had much to lament, including the passing of an age of intimate collegiality when U.S. specialists on Japan all came from the same mold (wartime language training, instruction at Harvard), shared a sense of mission, and worked as a "team" (p. xiv).[4]

Teamwork is much less evident among scholars today. "The flood of publications and variety of topics" over the last half century, Jansen regrets, "have forced students to specialize" (p. xv). And with specialization have come competition and a diffusion of focus. Jansen's lack of patience for those who cannot see the forest for the trees shows in his effusive praise for the founders of modern Japan, whom he considers to have been both "pragmatists" and "generalists" (p. 412). His dismay over the theoretical turn of the discipline may be gleaned from his abandonment of membership in the American Historical Association several years ago. At a time when academic discussion revolves increasingly around theoretical propositions and complex rhetorical debates, Jansen unapologetically employs the old-fashioned and now much-maligned device of narrative. History for him remains, as it was for the modernizationists, a story with colorful characters to be told in fluid prose. It should follow a well-defined chronology, offer a clear message, and provide a reliable exposition of important political and diplomatic events.

Jansen's passing marks the end of an era of larger-than-life authorities on modern Japanese history. From his perspective, no doubt, it resembles the descent into confusion and instability marked by the transition from Meiji to Taisho Japan. Just as Jansen and others long deplored the leadership vacuum following the death of Japan's "pragmatic" elder statesmen, one may regret the absence among the new generation of Japan specialists of men and women as proficient, urbane, and visionary as Marius Jansen. One can only hope that the universal respect for this remarkable man will generate new enthusiasm for the narrative, stylish prose, political and diplomatic history, and, above all, teamwork.

Modern Japan as Imperial Conspiracy

What will not return in the foreseeable future is the indulgent American attitude toward Japan that Jansen, Reischauer, and their associates worked so hard to encourage. Although mainstream U.S. scholarship on

[4] In a speech prepared for the fall 2000 Mid-Atlantic Regional Association for Asian Studies meeting (but left undelivered due to ill health), Jansen noted, "I do think my generation has been particularly fortunate. We had a sense of discovery and then of mission. Once Asian language and culture meant something to us, we were determined to see to it that our institutions made them available to our students and those who would follow." Marius B. Jansen, "Fifty-Seven Years in Japan Studies," Frank L. Chance, ed., *MAR/AAS Asia Newsletter*, Winter 2001, p. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Japan today is as concerned with the modern as was modernization theory, it does not by any means consider the modern either progressive or peaceful. Whereas Jansen and Reischauer labored in the early 1960s in tandem with official U.S. efforts to marshal Japanese support against the challenge of communism, the Vietnam War led to a markedly different approach. Appearing in the quarterly *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, this scholarship condemned the American Cold War effort and drew links between Japanese imperialism before 1945 and U.S. support for reactionary forces in Japan after 1945. Out of this mold came both John Dower, winner of the Pulitzer Prize for his recent study of the U.S. occupation of Japan,[5] and Herbert Bix, whose *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* is our second book under review.

It is ironic that Bix's *Hirohito* received a Pulitzer Prize for general nonfiction just four months after Jansen's death. For Bix draws his inspiration from the very strand of Japanese scholarship that Jansen and other modernization theorists hoped to supplant. In offering a positive image of a modernizing Japan in the early 1960s, Jansen and others sought to check the ideological challenge to the new U.S.-Japan security alliance posed by Marxist scholars who dominated Japanese academe after 1945. By contrast, Bix's 1971 doctoral dissertation at Harvard mimicked the Marxist censure of Japanese "monopoly capital," "fascism," and "imperialism" that propelled Japan into the greatest military debacle in its history.[6] A subsequent study of peasant protest in the Tokugawa era pointedly condemned the "modernization line" for promoting "a distorted picture of how power worked in the prewar state and an uncritical celebration of productivity growth and political consensus under Tokugawa rule."[7] But Bix remained decidedly outside of the American mainstream until the publication of *Hirohito* last year.

Bix's aim is to debunk the "orthodoxy" that Hirohito was only a figurehead.

Heightened U.S.-Japanese tensions after the end of the Cold War have, in other words, increased the persuasive power of Bix's portrait of modern Japan. Far from the "gifted, resourceful, and courageous" nation described by Jansen, Bix's Japan is a land where "contradictory logic" infuses its "entire modern political development" (p. 7), where the constitution does not limit, but rather expands monarchical powers, where a dynamic emperor masquerades as a passive symbol and thereby escapes responsibility for unfathomable death and destruction, and where "hierarchy and order" constantly struggle with democratic ideals.

Bix's focus is Hirohito, the Showa emperor whose lengthy reign

[5] John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: Norton, 1999).

[6] Herbert P. Bix, "Japanese Imperialism and Manchuria, 1890–1931," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1971.

[7] Herbert P. Bix, *Peasant Protest in Japan, 1590–1884* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986), p. xiv.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(1926–89) spanned a turbulent era of war, defeat, military occupation, and peace and prosperity. His declared aim is to debunk the "orthodoxy" promoted by General Douglas MacArthur and the U.S. occupation, namely, that Hirohito was only a figurehead and a puppet of the military (p. 14). Those familiar with postwar Japanese historiography know that this is by no means the orthodoxy among Japanese academics and will recognize Bix's profound debt to the Japanese debate accompanying the steady stream of new documents, diaries, and reminiscences pertaining to Hirohito since 1945. But not since David Bergamini's sensational *Japan's Imperial Conspiracy* or Edward Behr's *Hirohito: Behind the Myth* have English-speaking audiences encountered such a striking image of an emperor actively leading his country to imperialist aggression.[8] As the best documented of these three studies, Bix's book is unique and engaging.

The story begins with the education of a prince, an education notable for its rigor and its stress on military training, science, and tradition. It instilled in the young Hirohito a deep interest in military affairs (as emperor he was nearly always in uniform, except during religious festivals) and a sensitivity to the tension between rational inquiry and respect for the moral authority of the throne. Above all, it imparted a strongly conservative world view and an unprecedented sense of responsibility as the ruling authority.

From this emerged a monarch who exercised real power in Japan for over twenty years and who, in Bix's opinion, was seriously complicit in the wars against China and the United States. Hirohito was at times the best informed of all Japanese policymakers, shared Japanese conservatives' disdain for the decadent extravagance and party politics of "Taisho democracy" in the 1920s, and saw military preparedness and war as preferred solutions to Japan's internal and external problems. Above all, he was an active and influential member of the ruling circle, deeply engaged in policymaking, military strategy, and factional infighting. Sometimes he intervened, sometimes he stood aloof, but all told, Bix judges that Hirohito's behavior hastened the demise of party government, encouraged the forces plotting aggression in China, promoted the expanding war against China and later the United States, and delayed Japan's surrender.

Bix does not identify the emperor as *the* principal proponent of aggression in Japan. But the enthusiasm Hirohito displayed for war is at times remarkable. His delight at the success at Pearl Harbor is well known. According to the diary of his naval aide: "Throughout the day the emperor wore his naval uniform and seemed to be in a splendid mood" (p. 437). But the number of times during the war that Hirohito pressed his military commanders for a more aggressive posture is staggering. He sanctioned the decision in December 1942 to withdraw from Guadalcanal only on condition that Japan

[8] David Bergamini, *Japan's Imperial Conspiracy* (New York: Morrow, 1971); and Edward Behr, *Hirohito: Behind the Myth* (New York: Villard, 1989).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

launch a new offensive elsewhere. Apprised by Admiral Osamu Nagano, chief of the navy general staff, in 1943 that Munda airfield on New Georgia might be abandoned, he opposed any retreat. A month later, Hirohito asked Nagano why naval bombardment of Guadalcanal from Munda had not begun. In May of the same year, he pressed for a "real victory" over the United States and in August pointedly asked army chief of staff General Hajime Sugiyama, "When and where on earth are you [people] ever going to put up a good fight? And when are you ever going to fight a decisive battle" (p. 466)? Informed by his chiefs of staff in June 1944 that the situation in Saipan was hopeless, he issued orders to recapture the island and the next month informed the prime minister that he intended "to remain in this divine land and fight to the death" (p. 480). As late as the American offensive in Okinawa in April 1945, the emperor still pressed the army chief of staff to go immediately on the offensive and forbade him to pull back forces in China.

Outpacing the Historical Evidence

Given this evidence, Bix is amply justified in accentuating Hirohito's active enthusiasm and engagement as supreme commander and in identifying his continued belligerence as a significant source of pressure on Japanese generals and admirals. But Bix clearly overstates the degree to which the emperor was able to initiate or precipitate changes in national policy, especially prior to 1942. The rare instances in which he did so are already well documented: his pressure on Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi to resign in July 1929, following the assassination of Chinese warlord Chang Tso-lin, and his swift suppression of insurgent forces in the Imperial Army who attempted a coup d'état in February 1936. Added to the final decision in August 1945 to terminate the war, these events are usually marshalled to illustrate Hirohito's serious culpability. If he was able to have such a decisive impact on these occasions, surely he could have prevented the descent into war in the first place.

Bix holds Hirohito accountable not only for helping to lead his country down the road to war in the 1930s and 1940s, but for the precipitous decline of party politics in the late 1920s. His ambitious claims, however, depend upon a very liberal reading of evidence that comes almost entirely from second-hand accounts, principally observations by Hirohito's advisers. Although the emperor is said to have kept a diary from age eleven, it is unlikely ever to be freely accessible to researchers. There is little direct evidence, in other words, of Hirohito's innermost thoughts and motivations, and biographers must resort to inference to create a comprehensive picture of the man.

Thus, while Bix does an admirable job of constructing the context in which the Showa emperor acted, he uses misleading rhetorical flourishes to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

place Hirohito's influence in general matters of state on a par with his leverage in wartime operations. He refers, for instance, to "Hirohito's decision to quit the League [of Nations]" (p. 263), when, by his own account, the emperor simply ratified a policy chosen by the cabinet. He speaks of the emperor's "sacrificing" Minobe Tatsukichi (who was forced to resign from the House of Peers in the late 1930s for his theory of the emperor as an "organ" of the state), when in reality Hirohito simply refused to become involved in the debate surrounding Minobe. He uses the celebrated May 1937 text *Kokutai no hongi* (The Fundamentals of the National Polity) to illustrate the court's belief in "theoretical unassailable power from below," without any evidence of the emperor's involvement in crafting the Ministry of Education document. He refers to "Hirohito's insistence" that Japan pursue negotiations with the Soviet Union in July 1945, but all that is known is that the emperor approved a vague proposal to send a special Japanese envoy to Moscow.

Even in recounting the emperor's involvement in military affairs, Bix imputes to Hirohito a degree of volition and power out of proportion to the historical evidence. All one can accurately conclude when Hirohito signed his name to an imperial order or bestowed official sanction is that he did not object to the policy. But Bix interprets imperial sanction of an order calling for the punishment of a Chinese army in July 1937 as signifying that "Hirohito now pressed for a decisive, war-ending battle" (p. 321). Sanctioning the decision to send chemical-warfare personnel and equipment to China likewise is said to burden the emperor with "direct responsibility for the use of poison gas" (p. 361). His assent to the November 5, 1941, imperial conference decision to complete preparations for operations against the United States becomes, in Bix's hands, the assertion that "Hirohito made the actual (though next to last) decision for war" (p. 424).

Intentional exaggerations of this sort are peppered throughout the book. When the emperor abbreviates a vacation to be briefed about a July 1937 Chinese massacre of Japanese civilians at Tungchow, Bix describes it as "active support" for punishing the Chinese army and securing control of the Peking-Tientsin area (p. 322). When Hirohito in July 1941 questions General Sugiyama about the utility of the Japanese buildup in Manchukuo and a liaison conference (an intergovernmental body organized in November 1937) subsequently cancels plans for an invasion of the Soviet Union, Bix declares that "Hirohito's intervention thus prevented Japan from going to war with the Soviet Union . . ." (p. 399). Elsewhere, in response to Admiral Nagano's stated confidence in a military victory over the United States, the emperor scolds Nagano for abandoning diplomacy and asks whether he has plans for a protracted war. From this Bix concludes that "Hirohito came to believe that war with the United States and Britain had to be risked" (pp. 400–402). The degree to which Bix recklessly outpaces his sources can perhaps best be summed up by the juxtaposition of a candid admission with a bold declaration. Without further elaboration, he proclaims, "Though no documents

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

directly tie him to it, another feature of the brutal China war for which Hirohito should be charged with personal responsibility was the strategic bombing of Chungking and other cities . . ." (p. 364).

Despite the grandiose claims of this volume, Bix's own evidence tempts the reader to agree with what less zealous students of the Showa emperor have already observed. According to Peter Wetzler, Hirohito was an "important member" of the Japanese ruling circle who was nonetheless precluded from unilaterally determining policies in a way that a Western president or dictator might.[9] The Showa emperor was highly engaged, and, as Bix illustrates, his sanction invested policies with tremendous authority. But it is also clear that in general matters of national policy, Hirohito could do no more than support the agenda of his most politically powerful advisers. Beginning in the latter 1920s, the policy with the greatest political momentum in Japan was, unfortunately, one that erred on the side of aggression.

It is too bad that Bix did not lower his sights a bit to focus on the most compelling lesson of his study. Rather than follow the lead of his most ideologically charged counterparts in Japan in indicting the emperor for all crimes great and small, he might have staked out his own independent ground with a less ambitious but nonetheless compelling question: why were Japanese forces so willing to go to such extreme lengths to fight an unwinnable war? Much of the answer seems to lie in the pages of this volume: in the image of an emperor intimately engaged in wartime operations and strategy, pressing, cajoling, and rewarding his military commanders in order to get results. Hirohito was certainly no abstract "living god" in the minds of Japan's officers or fighting men. Through messages of encouragement and expressions of concern relayed directly to the troops, he was a tangible and monumental source of inspiration and motivation. One can almost sense the enormous shame that befell anyone unable to meet the expectations of this colossal patriarch.

Bix's daring in argument is also, unfortunately, reflected in the mechanics of this book. Mistransliterations abound here, and footnotes supporting controversial statements of fact or interpretation often point simply to other secondary sources. Bix relies on cultural stereotypes such as "the Japanese practice of irresponsibility" and "the age-old tradition of the power of Japanese spirit over material odds" (pp. 329, 490) to explain events, and his prose is lumbering and repetitive. One almost suspects that the publisher rushed through its editorial responsibilities to catch the wave of enthusiasm generated by John Dower's Pulitzer Prize.

Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan is an engaging read and highly recommended as food for thought. But serious students of modern Japan might lament the decline of scholarly discipline and style that it seems

[9] Peter Wetzler, *Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998), p. 185.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to represent. For observers of U.S.-Japanese relations, *Hirohito* accentuates the end of an era when American analyses of Japan served as a critical prop in support of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. As the second of three pillars of the alliance to fall since 1989 (together with firm political support in Japan), one wonders whether the last pillar, Washington's commitment to the current U.S. force structure in Japan, may not soon be far behind.

Post–Cold War Europe Up Close and Personal

by Stephen Winterstein

History of the Present: Essays, Sketches, and Dispatches from Europe in the 1990s. By Timothy Garton Ash. (New York: Random House, 2000. 426 pp. $29.95.)

Václav Havel: A Political Tragedy in Six Acts. By John Keane. (New York: Basic Books, 2000. 532 pp. $27.50.)

In 1993, a new ten korun coin from the Czech and Slovak Federated Republic entered circulation. This would have been wholly unremarkable were it not for the fact that the issuing country had ceased to exist at midnight on January 1 of that year. The national mint, it seemed, had not foreseen the "velvet divorce" that divided its sovereign sponsor into separate Czech and Slovak Republics. Indeed, for months after the split the old Czechoslovak paper money continued to circulate as well, each bill bearing a small stamp affixed to one side in order to distinguish the Czech from the Slovak. Since then, of course, both countries have issued their own currency, but it is worth recalling these numismatic curiosities if only as tangible evidence of the dizzying pace of political change in the former Soviet bloc following the end of the Cold War. Fundamental changes on the ground outstripped national institutions (and even, in some cases, nations themselves). But have they also overtaken our understanding, or is it possible, even before the dust has settled, to make sense of those sudden shifts and to draw meaningful conclusions?

In strikingly different ways, the two books under review take up the challenge implicit in that question, surveying the immediate European past for clues about the larger contexts into which it fits. Timothy Garton Ash's *History of the Present* combines journalistic reportage, prose portraits of famous and obscure individuals, and essays on a wide range of themes spanning virtually all of Europe. John Keane's biography of Czech president

Stephen Winterstein is managing editor of *Orbis*.

© 2001 Foreign Policy Research Institute. Published by Elsevier Science Limited.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Václav Havel, by contrast, closely scrutinizes the life of one key figure and uses it as a point of departure for a commentary on the nature of political power. Regardless of the criticisms that both books invite, their authors should be applauded for eschewing a facile view of the transitions in post–Cold War Europe as a fairy tale whose happy ending is already in sight. The tales they tell take place on a real stage, one that is large enough for flawed heroes, hapless quests, and new coins from defunct states.

Seems Like Only Yesterday

In approaching Garton Ash's volume, the reader's first challenge is to reconcile the "history" of the title with the "essays, sketches, and dispatches" of the subtitle. The latter suggests material that is immediate, spontaneous, and provisional, while the former implies material that has been considered, sifted, and selected. The idea of "history of the present" (a term borrowed from George Kennan's description of one of Garton Ash's earlier books) is to combine the crafts of the historian and journalist. In doing so, Garton Ash is unabashed in his attempt to demarcate a place for historiography that does not depend on the temporal distance of years or decades. Instead of a Rankean intention to portray the past "as it actually was," Garton Ash gives us "how it actually looked at the time." Although he is duly suspicious of eyewitness accounts, he nonetheless disputes the principle that "the person who wasn't there knows better than the person who was" (p. xii).

In addition to journalism and history, Garton Ash might have usefully included another literary genre that is also applicable in this case: the memoir. Having spent much of the past two decades studying Central Europe from the inside, he writes from the perspective of someone familiar with his subjects on an intellectual as well as a personal level, which makes for compelling prose and unusually persuasive arguments. But it also requires of the reader a certain critical eye. When the would-be historian of the present is a personal friend and occasional drinking companion of some of the most important and public subjects of his scrutiny and has, as an acknowledged and respected expert on Central Europe, shared the dais at debates and conferences with the national leaders at issue, then clearly his own role goes beyond that of reporter or recorder. In short, Garton Ash was himself a participant in the events—an awkward fact he recognizes by drawing an analogy to the "theater critic who is suddenly hauled up from the stalls to act in the play he meant to review" (p. 103).

Garton Ash's goal is to create a kaleidoscopic view of a kaleidoscopic continent (p. 371), for the most part avoiding broad-brush analyses in favor of brief vignettes and short essays. For example, the pieces jump from reflections on British-German relations and German reunification to a prison interview with the former East German leader Erich Honecker to post-1990 sketches of Vienna, Warsaw, and St. Petersburg. One is left with the impres-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sion of a man hovering above the continent, occasionally alighting here and there to gauge a mood or track a story—the impression, that is, of an exquisitely perceptive journalist plying his trade. The notable difference is that Garton Ash, free of the constraints normally imposed on journalists, is able to chart the progress not of armies, interest rates, or approval ratings, but of more philosophical developments such as individual and collective attempts to come to terms with the past.

Interspersed throughout the book are chronologies of events within and sometimes beyond Europe that are not necessarily discussed elsewhere in the volume, along with brief anecdotes, more or less in diary form, of a personal nature. One of the great merits of this record is the attention it can draw to sometimes jarring juxtapositions that are otherwise too easily filtered out or overlooked. In a brief chronology covering August–October 1990, for example, we find mention of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the beginning of a Serb insurrection in Croatia's Krajina region, the secret adoption of a Kosovar Albanian constitution, and the final acts of German reunification. Provided without elaboration, this one-page roster contains the threads of stories that all came to dominate the news at some point over the course of the decade. These threads, along with a handful of recurring themes in the essays, give the book its coherence.

Dignitaries sang hymns to "European" integration while the Balkans burned.

Among the book's principal themes is the need for Western Europe (and the West in general) to support the development of liberal democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. That argument in itself is unexceptional, but the change in Garton Ash's expression of the idea throughout the decade is revealing. In 1990, he wrote of Western democracies' "moral obligation" to help Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, which he considered the countries most important to the "fate of democracy," given the impossibility of helping all of the former Soviet satellites at once (pp. 39, 41). At the end of the decade, he wrote that European monetary union and integration were "simply the wrong priority" and called the war in Kosovo the price to be paid for "putting Maastricht before Sarajevo" (p. 327). One of the most notable features of this criticism is his concern for the whole of Europe—the entire continent—as distinguished from what he usefully, if somewhat awkwardly, calls "EU-rope." Over the course of the book, fragments and anecdotes accumulate into a pile of evidence suggesting that too often that distinction was ignored by dignitaries who blithely sang their hymns to "European" integration while the Balkans burned.

None of this means that Garton Ash opposes further integration among the countries of Western Europe. To be sure, in 1995 he objected to the "teleological-idealistic" understanding (especially French and German) of the project of European integration and monetary union, which wrongly imbued those goals with an air of inevitability. But in a 1990 essay on German

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reunification he argued that the greater danger would come not from further integration, but from less.[1] Instead, as an alternative to the priority of monetary union, he advocates the development of common foreign, security, and defense policies for the EU, which would address the more fundamental and pressing problem of disorder in the *rest* of Europe. And, having witnessed so much of that disorder at first hand in Sarajevo, Belgrade, and beyond, he perceives the urgency of that project more acutely than many and spells out in no uncertain terms the problems associated with treating events throughout the continent as if they were unconnected. "There is a surreal, even a grotesque, discrepancy," he wrote in 1995, "between the contorted, rapidly sleep-inducing, acronym-ridden, polit-bureaucratic detail of the current debate about reforming EU-rope and the huge, fateful, almost melodramatic challenges facing us across the rest of Europe after the end of the cold war" (pp. 137–38).

This book is avowedly not an attempt to reach systematic conclusions, which Garton Ash says will come only with the benefit of "a greater distance of time" (p. 371). Coming from one who defends contemporary history as much more than a "first draft" of history, this is a rather surprising statement, and it suggests the main reason why this book is to some degree unsatisfying after all. For all the fluid prose and poignant insights collected in *History of the Present*, one wishes for the book that might have been: a personal, detailed, and learned reflection on the past ten years that places the material compiled here in a broader portrait of the age. Which of these stories prove to have been representative (or key components) of the "big picture"? Which turn out to be mere anecdotes that illuminate countercurrents in long-term developments and remind us that the river of history does not always run in a single channel? Early on, Garton Ash avers that "there is nothing to compare with being there" (p. xv). He is also clearly wary of the "illusion of retrospective determinism," the procrustean tendency to make the historical record show that "what happened had to happen" (p. 185). But Garton Ash *was* there, which should make him better suited than most to evaluating critically all the evidence at hand and drawing systematic conclusions.

The Man Who Would Be King?

John Keane, professor of politics at the University of Westminster and director of the Centre for the Study of Democracy, is similarly well suited, it would seem, to write the life of Havel. As an author who has devoted considerable attention to civil society and edited the English-language edition of Havel's *The Power of the Powerless*, his interest in the prominent dissident

[1] See p. 44. He made a similar argument recently with regard to the UK in "Joining the Continent to Unite the Kingdom," *New York Times*, June 17, 2001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

turned president needs no explanation.[2] Nevertheless, writing a biography that does critical justice to a man so widely admired for his moral courage, intellect, literary skill, and statesmanship—and who is still in office—is a daunting challenge. Keane's book is in some ways seriously flawed, but it does succeed in portraying a simultaneously gifted and flawed human being engaged in familiar and all-too-human struggles for power.

The method behind this portrait, unfortunately, is rather more controversial. Keane announces in his prologue that he is a proponent of that genre known as "faction"—so called not because of its divisive effect in scholarly circles, but because it purports to be the legitimate offspring of fact and fiction. This may rankle readers inclined to suspect that the entire book therefore rests on shaky ground. Thankfully, Keane avoids the extreme of, for example, inserting an imaginary narrator into the real events he recounts or citing invented sources that are indistinguishable from genuine ones. The point of "faction," he suggests, reasonably enough, is that since any narrative involves the selection and omission of fact, it is therefore a construct of the author. As far as that goes, it is pointless to quibble; the importance of omitting or including evidence is plain. However, Keane takes a dangerous leap from selecting facts to "filling in the blanks" by inventing the subject's thoughts.

Keane's narrative of Havel's path from playwright to dissident gets off to a promising start. Especially good among the vignettes of Havel's early life is Keane's account of an informal intellectual group that Havel and his friends formed as teenagers. The precocious youths engaged in remarkably sophisticated explorations of art, philosophy, and politics, and Havel's own emerging talents as an organizer and leader are evident (pp. 101–12). As a plucky twenty-year-old, Havel delivered his first public speech at a government-sponsored literary conference in November 1956—just weeks after the Soviet invasion of Hungary. In that address he lambasted his colleagues' acceptance of the narrow confines of socialist realism and explicitly objected to the Communist regime's restrictions on artistic freedom (pp. 127–28). Havel's route from art to political engagement was thus charted early on.

Keane is at his best when describing Havel's subversive use of theater to indict the hypocrisy and inhumanity of the totalitarian state. In detailed discussions of several of his dramas and the events surrounding the 1968 Prague Spring and Soviet invasion, Keane traces Havel's transformation from a playwright making "a satirical attack on an imaginary world" in 1965 (p. 178) to a political critic who became persuaded "that forms of resistance against late-socialism might be possible" (p. 243). In this respect, Keane's

[2] Václav Havel, *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central-Eastern Europe*, ed. John Keane, trans. Paul Wilson (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1985). See also John Keane, *Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

retelling of the 1975 Czech premiere of Havel's *The Beggar's Opera* is especially good, evoking in dramatic fashion the play's opening moments as well as the tension and inherent danger of the illegal performance (Havel's plays were officially banned at the time).

> A tall man with a menacing face stepped in front of the stage from behind the drawn curtain. Artfully, in slow motion, he lit a cigarette, which glowed brightly in the darkness of the makeshift theatre. The invited audience of 300 people—painters, writers, actors, relatives, even Havel's ageing father—stilled. . . . The man's face began slowly to resemble that of a psychopath. He stared slowly at each person. . . . Time seemed to stop (p. 235).

Keane shows how the success of this performance—that is, the mere fact of it—revived the frustrated Havel's engagement as a dissident, and connects it directly to his involvement in drafting and publicizing Charter 77. That seminal 1977 statement openly challenged the Czechoslovak government's legitimacy on the grounds that it failed to guarantee the basic rights of its citizens according to the obligations it assumed as a signatory of the 1975 Helsinki Accords. The charter further called for citizens acting independently of the state to assume responsibility for the protection of their rights (pp. 243–46). That bold declaration attracted widespread and immediate attention both at home and abroad and firmly established Havel's reputation internationally as one of the leading opposition intellectuals in the entire communist world.

If Havel's evolution from playwright to dissident appears virtually seamless, Keane's account of his transformation from dissident to office-holder is more uneven. That is unfortunate, because one of the key questions facing any biographer of Havel, as Keane himself knows, is why a "playwright with an aversion to power-grabbing politicians has been dragged into politics" (p. 331). Keane draws an intriguing insight, by analogy, from an interview he held with Havel in 1989, not long before the Velvet Revolution. A frustrated Havel described his feeling that the ban on performance of his plays had rendered them mere scripts and therefore "only ever half-finished." Keane argues that a similar sense of incompletion led Havel not just to advocate, but to pursue actively—and take charge of—the political transformation of the country, to become, in other words, "both playwright and performer in a political opera" (p. 331). Other than that analogy, which is wholly speculative, Keane offers no explanation for Havel's decision to pursue the presidency, and instead serves up the generalized and banal observations that "the hunger for power over others is polymorphously perverse" and "the process of coming to power is usually a costly business" (p. 369).

Explanation or not, Keane's narrative does provide a useful corrective to the notion that Havel's rise to the Czechoslovak presidency immediately following the November 1989 revolution was somehow inevitable. The con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ventional story is that Havel's mighty prestige as a moral authority simply propelled the humble, reticent dissident-hero into the presidency, as if on a wave of the unanimous popular will. Through transcripts of deliberations among the opposition leadership and interviews with some of the principals, a less-flattering picture emerges of a Havel more than willing to hold power—and adept at maneuvering himself into the position to seize it (pp. 361–73). At one point in deliberations among opposition leaders, Havel intervenes to say that he would be willing—reluctantly—to accept a nomination to serve as president "for a short while," since he has always been willing to place the interests of the country ahead of his own, as his numerous stints in prison had demonstrated. Subsequent episodes suggested that Havel was anything but reluctant and that his success owed more to well-honed political instincts than to popular demand.

Havel's ascent to the presidency marks a distinct caesura in his life and in Keane's account of it. Prior to 1990 the story (in Keane's view) is a modern tragedy marked by prison terms, the ban on his plays, and the many other injustices large and small that Havel endured at the hands of a criminal government. The moment the dissident entered Prague Castle as president, however, the story becomes a classical tragedy hinging on Havel's own inherent flaws and the indulgence that power afforded him. Keane recounts his growing inaccessibility, aloofness, even imperiousness, as when he forbade messengers with bad news and instructed members of his staff that they "should like" his second wife (pp. 404, 485). As he grew ever more arbitrary and ever less responsive to voices outside his immediate circle, critics said that the president's hilltop castle "appeared to be drawing away into its own world, leaving the people behind and underneath, as if in a Kafka novel" (p. 489).

To make some sense of Havel's manner, Keane revives the idea of the "crowned republic," first discussed by the German writer, pen-name Novalis, two centuries ago. As Novalis conceived of it, a charismatic monarch would serve, paradoxically, "as an inspiration to the people to press for the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity" (p. 377). It is an intriguing notion, especially when applied to Havel, and—as Keane's copious evidence indicates—not entirely unfounded. It is indeed easy to begin to understand Havel as a tragically flawed philosopher-king, easier still if the king's ostensible goal is to build the foundations of a republic.

Ultimately, however, Keane pushes the evidence too far in support of the point, making it seem that Havel himself explicitly cultivated the idea, and necessity, of presenting himself as royalty. "After the break-up of Czechoslovakia, in the autumn of 1992 he clung to the role of the presidency," Keane writes, "telling friends . . . that the Czech Republic needed a monarch-like symbol of continuity with the immediate past" (p. 488). But the only source he cites for that claim is an interview with Paul Wilson, a translator and editor of Havel's works, who quoted Havel as saying "I can't see that I would have as much, or more, influence as a writer than as a president"—a far cry, that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is, from saying the country needed him to act as king. Elsewhere, Keane writes that "Havel was forced to call into question his own earlier presumption that a crowned republic . . . could serve effectively to replace the Communist order" (p. 446; see also p. 422). The problem is that Keane provides no evidence that Havel himself had ever presumed such a thing. What is called into question, in other words, is not Havel's, but rather *Keane's* presumption. A biographer has the responsibility for discerning his subject's motives, which are rarely simple or transparent, but not even a writer of "faction" may legitimately plant his own thoughts in the subject's mind and then claim to have found them there.

Keane's treatment is all the more puzzling because ample evidence suggests that Havel may not have been so hungry for power after all. First, Havel accepted serious restrictions on his presidential powers partially as a result of market-oriented reforms urged by Havel's political nemesis Václav Klaus and partially as a result of constitutional changes affecting his position as president of the Czech Republic following the "velvet divorce" (p. 445; Garton Ash, pp. 36, 117). Secondly, Keane acknowledges—even praises—Havel's push for his country's admission into NATO and the EU, *even though* Havel well understood that integration into EU institutions would entail the substantial constraint of presidential powers by supranational agreements and structures (pp. 475–76). Keane, somewhat mystifyingly, spots a "tragic irony" in Havel's pursuit of EU membership for the Czech Republic. It is not at all clear what makes this tragic: perhaps the tragedy is that Havel is a fool; he desperately wants power, but somehow keeps surrendering it. If, instead, one supposes that Havel foresees—and welcomes—the ultimate effects of integration in international institutions, then he appears to be neither tragic nor foolish, but "merely" a leader with a vision that extends beyond his own country's borders.

This is not to suggest that Havel is above reproach, or that Keane is wrong to probe Havel's apparent hypocrisy. Given the height of the pedestal on which much of the world has placed him, it is incumbent upon his biographer to call attention to the less laudable aspects of his career and his character. Thus, Keane makes a convincing argument that Havel's charismatic personal style probably stunted the growth of civil institutions, while his penchant for marital infidelities and manipulation of friends and foes belied his ideal of "living in the truth" (pp. 305–6, 487). Equally, one can readily appreciate how Havel, surrounded by sycophants, managed to deny for so long the serious medical problems that have plagued him in recent years.

Keane devotes a surprising amount of attention to Havel's illnesses in the closing sections of the book. Having announced at the outset that he wanted to write a study of power in biographical form, Keane seems to be using Havel's physical deterioration as an allegory for his political decline. Havel's physical struggles are surely both sad and human, but it does not follow that they have some intrinsic connection to what Keane argues is his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hubristic, tragic political career. It is farfetched, for example, to interpret old friends' laments that Havel is no longer a charming guest at dinner parties as criticism of his presidency, or to suggest that becoming president was "Havel's greatest misfortune in life" (pp. 398, 11). Doing either of those things reduces politics to melodrama.

Finally, it is worth noting that the book's prose occasionally succumbs to the opposite error—a penchant for what could be called baroque non sequitur. Two examples should suffice to convey the meaning of that term. Consider first this observation from the prologue: "Our century has had many unique features, including the way in which it . . . nurtured the widespread perception that the twentieth century was indeed a century, and that as a century it has meant various things to many different people" (p. 4). By book's end, some 500 pages later, Keane has given himself over to ruminations on mortality:

> The word death means the opposite of birth. It is the endpoint of dying, the moment at which the power of the living individual is finally extinguished—once and for ever. . . . Death is exhaustion, melancholia, sadness, guilt. Death is no laughing matter; it is solemnity, for around the dying and the dead wit and laughter are unseemly, if only because death means nothingness. There are of course many ways of dying. But from this conventional standpoint there is only one end result: you are no more, you are no longer to be found anywhere, you are dead (p. 494).

Perhaps those two constructions reveal nothing more than Keane's own wistful desire to pen absurdist dramatic soliloquies. But if meanings can be teased from them, let them be these: the twentieth century was indeed the century of communism, and at the end of the century communism is dead. The courageous dissidents who did more than anyone else to end authoritarian rule, however, have fit only awkwardly into the new Europe. It was scarcely more than a decade ago that masses of citizens abandoned the necrotic institutions of their communist states and began to follow the lead of courageous individuals. Now those same citizens pin their hopes on the institutions of the EU, and to fulfill their aspirations they look for guidance to armies of lawyers and legislators. There is more than a little irony in that, but no tragedy at all.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ERRATA

by ORBIS Editors

If in a thick quarterly journal the occasional typo or minor factual error may be considered "par for the course," then committing two major howlers in succession is surely a "double bogey."

First, the editor's column in *Orbis* 45:2 (Spring 2001), page 166, referred to a "five-year campaign led by William Kristol, Kagan's other son Robert, and their colleagues at *The National Interest*. . . ." This was an error not only because Kristol and Kagan's colleagues are in fact at *The Weekly Standard*, not *The National Interest*, but because the latter journal, edited by Owen Harries, published numerous articles over that period critical of the foreign policy agenda promoted by Kristol and Kagan. We apologize to all parties for this acutely embarrassing blunder.

PII S0030-4387(01)00091-6
Refers to: S0030-4387(01)00084-9

Secondly, in Christina D. Burnett's article, "The Case for Puerto Rican Decolonization," in *Orbis* 45:3 (Summer 2001), page 433, our staff inadvertently introduced into her second footnote a flagrant misidentification of one of the authors she cited. Rubén Berríos Martínez, far from being an autonomist, is in fact the leading spokesperson for Puerto Rican independence. We deeply regret this mistake, which all parties familiar with Puerto Rican affairs will know at once could not have been made by Ms. Burnett. We ask Mr. Berríos and Ms. Burnett to accept our apologies.

PII S0030-4387(01)00090-4
Refers to: S0030-4387(01)00066-7

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Take Advantage of the Authorities.

When leading authorities have mentioned your contributions in a well-respected publication like this one, it's time to order reprints.

That's because when praise comes from independent sources it's the perfect opportunity to share it with your colleagues and customers.

Reprints are available from Elsevier in quantities of 100 or more and can be customized to meet your requirements.

So if you are fortunate enough to have this opportunity, take advantage of it. You simply couldn't say it better yourself.

Commercial Reprint Sales
Attn: Anne Rosenthal
Elsevier Science Inc.
655 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10010
Call: **(212) 633-3813**
Fax: **(212) 633-3820**
Email: **a.rosenthal@elsevier.com**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INDEX TO VOLUME 45
Articles, Authors, and Subjects

NOTE: Wi—Winter; Sp—Spring; Su—Summer; Fa—Fall

"America, the West, and the World" (Hay): Su 329–32

"An Ambassador's Reflection" (Strausz-Hupé): Wi 13–14

Asia: (*see also individual countries*) strategic change in, Su 371–85; U.S. diplomacy in, Su 374–85

Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal: Wi 8, 33–34, 83–84

Australia: Fa 622–23, 626, 634–36

Austria: Fa 576

Ayoob, Mohammed: "South Asia's Dangers and U.S. Foreign Policy," Wi 123–34

Azerbaijan: and Turkey, Wi 88–89; and Russia, Fa 596

"Balkan Limits to Power and Principle, The" (Macgregor): Wi 93–110

Balkans: (*see also* Bosnia, Kosovo) and NATO, Wi 96–109; and U.S. diplomacy, Wi 93–110

Berkowitz, Bruce: "Intelligence Reform, The Third Act," Wi 152–61; "Ronald Reagan on Reaganism," Su 475–84; "Better Ways to Fix U.S. Intelligence," Fa 609–19

"Better Ways to Fix U.S. Intelligence" (Berkowitz): Fa 609–19

"Beyond Containment in the Persian Gulf" (Bronson): Sp 193–209

Bosnia: Wi 94–97; and U.S. humanitarian intervention, Su 394, Fa 495, 499, 524–26, 564, 566–67, 569–77; and NATO, Wi 95–97

Bronson, Rachel: "Beyond Containment in the Persian Gulf," Sp 193–209

Burnett, Christina D.: "The Case for Puerto Rican Decolonization," Su 433–52, Fa 657

Bush, George H. W.: Fa 498, 526–7

Bush, George W.: and Asia, Su 384–85; and diplomacy, Fa 490–94; and humanitarian intervention, Fa 503, 513–17, 527–28, 559, 564; and international economic policy, Su 402–14

Campbell, Kurt M.: "The Cusp of Strategic Change in Asia," Su 371–85

"Can the U.S. and India Be 'Steadfast Friends'?" (Starr): Wi 111–21

"Case against Puerto Rican Statehood, The" (Rubinstein): Su 415–31

"Case for Puerto Rican Decolonization, The" (Burnett): Su 433–52, Fa 657

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): Wi 153–54, 157, Fa 610–11

Chang, Felix K.: "Chinese Energy and Asian Security," Sp 211–40

Chechnya: and Russia, Fa 582–83; and Turkey, Wi 90

China: energy development in, Sp 211–40; and India, Wi 112–13, 116, 126; and Indonesia, Fa 621, 633–34; and Iran, Sp 237; and Iraq, Sp 236–37; and Japan, Su 383, Fa 638–40; military capability, Su 378, 390–91; and nuclear weapons, Sp 187, 189; and Russia, Sp 238–39, Su 377, Fa 585–86, 590–96; and the United States, Su 371–85, 390–91, 395, 402–3, 412

"Chinese Energy and Asian Security" (Chang): Sp 211–40

"Choosing Tragedy in Vietnam" (Gavin): Wi 135–41

Clark, Mark T.: "How Nations Decide to Go Nuclear," Su 466–75; "Seven Worries about START III," Sp 175–91

Clinton, William J.: and Bosnia, Wi 94–96, 109; and humanitarian intervention, Sp

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

163–64, Fa 497–98, 507–08, 512–15, 521, 523–24, 558, 573, 577; and India, Wi 120, 124–25, Sp 242–44, 247, Fa 613; and international economic policy, Su 402, 404; and legal realism, Su 364; and the Persian Gulf, Sp 93–94
Cold War: and anti-statism, Su 456, 460–63; and the Middle East, Sp 260–61; and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, Sp 175–83; and the triumph of the West, Su 343–45; and U.S. militarization, Su 453–66; and U.S. rollback tactics, Wi 141–52
Cornell, Svante E.: "The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics," Wi 31–46
"Crumbling Pillars of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance" (Dickinson): Fa 637–48
"Cusp of Strategic Change in Asia, The" (Campbell): Su 371–85
Cyr, Arthur I.: "Guides to Globalization," Sp 295–305
Czech Republic: Fa 648, 654–55
Czechoslovakia: Fa 648, 650, 653

deLisle, Jacques: "Legality, Morality, and the Good Samaritan," Fa 535–56
Desch, Michael C.: "Liberals, Neocons, and Realcons," Fa 519–33
Dibb, Paul, and Peter Prince: "Indonesia's Grim Outlook," Fa 621–36
Dickinson, Frederick R.: "Crumbling Pillars of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance," Fa 637–48
disarmament: Sp 165–73

East Timor: Su 380, Fa 571, 622, 626, 632, 635–6
"Editor's Column" (McDougall): Wi 1–11, Sp 163–73, Su 317–27, Fa 485–94
Erdmann, Andrew P. N.: "Cold War, but No Garrison State," Su 453–66
Estonia: Fa 580
"Euro-Atlantic Ostpolitik, A" (Serfaty): Fa 597–607
Europe: and George W. Bush visit, Fa 490–92; and the PKK, Wi 54–55; post–Cold War, Fa 649; and Russia, Fa 597–8; and Turkey, Wi 8–11, 15–30, 71; and the United States, Su 388, 406–7, Fa 597–607

"Future of America's Profession of Arms, The" (Noonan): Sp 305–15

Garfinkle, Adam: "Strategy and Preventive Diplomacy," Fa 503–17
Gavin, Francis J.: "Choosing Tragedy in Vietnam," Wi 135–41
Georgia: and Russia, Fa 586–89; and Turkey, Wi 85–87
Germany: and immigration, Su 413; and the PKK, Wi 54–55; and postwar reconstruction, Fa 565–66, 576, 599; and reunification, Fa 649
"Global Triumph or Western Twilight?" (Kurth): Su 333–41
globalization: Sp 295–305; and the United States, Su 338–41, 402; and the West, Su 329–30
Good Samaritan: in law, Fa 535–36, 548–56
"Guides to Globalization" (Cyr): Sp 295–305
Gündüz, Aslan: "Human Rights and Turkey's Future in Europe," Wi 15–30

Haig, Alexander M., Jr.: "Introduction," Fa 495–501
Haiti: and humanitarian intervention, Fa 498, 532, 569–71, 574
Harding, Warren G.: Fa 487
Havel, Václav: Fa 648–56
Hay, William Anthony: "America, the West, and the World," Su 329–32
Henze, Paul B.: "Turkey's Caucasian Initiatives," Wi 81–91
Holocaust: Su 347–48, Fa 521
"How Nations Decide to Go Nuclear" (Clark): Su 466–75
human rights: Wi 15–30, Su 359–69, Fa 535, 537, 542, 544–47, 561, 571–72, 653
"Human Rights and Turkey's Future in Europe" (Gündüz): Wi 15–30
humanitarian intervention, U.S.: and the George H. W. Bush administration, Fa

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

498, 526–27; and the George W. Bush administration, 495, 503, 513–17, 527–28; and the Clinton administration, Fa 523–26; diplomacy of, Fa 503–17; legal and moral aspects of, Fa 535–56; and the military, Fa 557–68; models of, Fa 569–78; and policy, Fa 495–501; politics of, Fa 519–33

"In Praise of Indifference toward India's Bomb" (Kampani): Sp 241–57
India: and China, Wi 112–13, 116, 126; and the Kashmir dispute, Wi 111–21; and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Sp 241–43, 247; and nuclear weapons, Wi 130–33, Sp 241–57, Fa 613; and Pakistan, Wi 111–21, 123–34; and Russia, Fa 586; and the United States, Wi 111–21, 123–34, Sp 242–44, 247–57
Indonesia: and Abdurrahman Wahid, Fa 627–28; and Aceh, Fa 625, 630–1, 633; and ASEAN, Fa 633–34; and Australia, Fa 635–6; and China, Fa 633–34; and East Timor, Fa 635–6; economy, Fa 629–30; and the IMF, Su 407–8, Fa 629–30; political history of, Fa 623–25; and Suharto, Fa 624–25; and Sukarno, Fa 623–24; and the United States, Su 377–78, Fa 621–22; and West Papua, Fa 631–3
"Indonesia's Grim Outlook" (Dibb and Prince): Fa 621–36
"Intelligence Reform, The Third Act" (Berkowitz): Wi 152–61
intelligence, U.S.: Wi 152–61, Fa 609–19
international economic policy, U.S.: Su 401–14
international law: and humanitarian intervention, Fa 535–56; and human rights, Su 367–69; and Kosovo, Su 360–61; and legal realism, Su 363–65; and the United Nations, Su 362–63
International Monetary Fund (IMF): Su 404–9, Fa 629–30
"Introduction" (Haig): Fa 495–501
Iran: and China, Sp 237; and Turkey, Wi 72, 76, 78
Iraq: and China, Sp 236–37; and Israel, Sp 264–65; and Turkey, Wi 70, 76, 78
Israel: and the Golan Heights, Sp 264, 274–79; and Iraq, Sp 264–65; and Palestine, Sp 264–65, 267–68; and security, Sp 259–80; and Syria, Sp 264, 274–78; and Turkey, Wi 65–79; and the United States, Sp 260–61, 274
Israeli, Raphael: "The Turkish-Israeli Odd Couple," Wi 65–79
"Israelis Ponder Their Long-Term Security" (Rubinstein): Sp 259–80
Italy: Fa 576

Japan: and China, Su 383, Fa 638–40; Hirohito, Fa 643–48; and international financial policy, Su 405–6; and military capability, Su 378; modern history of, Fa 637–43; and postwar reconstruction, Fa 576; and Russia, Su 377, Fa 592; strategic change in, Su 376–99; Tokugawa era, Fa 638–9, 643; and the United States, Su 376–77, 402, 405–7, Fa 637–8; and U.S. scholarship, Fa 641

Kagan, Donald and Frederick: Sp 165–73, Fa 560–61
Kagan, Robert: Sp 165–73, Fa 531, 657
Kampani, Gaurav: "In Praise of Indifference toward India's Bomb," Sp 241–57
Kashmir: Wi 111–21, 123–25, 128–34; and the United States, Wi 124–26
Kazakhstan: Fa 580, 586–7
Korea (includes North and South)**:** strategic change in, Su 377; and the United States, Su 373–74, 377, 379–82, 394, Fa 586
Kors, Alan Charles: "Triumph without Self-Belief," Su 343–56
Kosovo: Wi 97–106; and international law, Su 360–61; and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), Wi 97–103, Fa 514; and the North Atlantic Council (NAC), Wi 97–98; and NATO, Wi 97–106, Su 360–61; and U.S. humanitarian intervention, Su 394, Fa 499, 562, 569–71, 576–7
Krauthammer, Charles: Fa 526, 566–7
Kristol, William: Sp 166, Fa 531, 657
Kurdish minority: Wi 25–26, 31–46

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics, The" (Cornell): Wi 31–46
Kurdistan Workers' Party, see Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK)
Kurth, James: "Global Triumph or Western Twilight?" Su 333–41; "Lessons from the Past Decade," Fa 569–78; "Religion and Ethnic Conflict—In Theory," Sp 281–94

Latvia: Fa 580, 588
"Legality, Morality, and the Good Samaritan" (deLisle): Fa 535–56
"Lessons from the Past Decade" (Kurth): Fa 569–78
"Liberals, Neocons, and Realcons" (Desch): Fa 519–33
"'Liberty under Law' under Siege" (Presser): Su 357–69
Libicki, Martin C.: "A Ten-Year Rule for Defense Planning," Su 387–99

Macgregor, Douglas A.: "The Balkan Limits to Power and Principle," Wi 93–110
Marshall Plan: Fa 576
McDougall, Walter A.: "Editor's Column," Wi 1–11, Sp 163–73, Su 317–27, Fa 485–94
McNamara, Kevin J.: "Radios, Rebels, and Rollback," Wi 141–52
Menon, Rajan: "Structural Constraints on Russian Diplomacy," Fa 579–96
military, U.S.: and the Cold War, Wi 141–52; and escalation during the Vietnam War, Wi 136–41; and humanitarian intervention, Fa 519–26, 557–68; and military operations other than war, Sp 312–15, Fa 485, 523; and professionalism, Sp 305–15; and revolutionary change, Su 387–99; and Vieques, Su 416–17
Milosevic, Slobodan: Wi 97–102, Su 360–61
multiculturalism: and the United States, Su 330–31, 338–40; and the West, Su 349–51
Munk, Bernard E.: "A New International Economic Policy," Su 401–14

"New International Economic Policy, A" (Munk): Su 401–14
Nigeria: and the United States, Fa 515
nonproliferation: *see* proliferation **Noonan, Michael P.:** "The Future of America's Profession of Arms," Sp 305–15
norms: Fa 487–490
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): and the Balkans, Wi 106–9; and Bosnia, Wi 94–97; and humanitarian intervention, Fa 497, 516, 523, 561, 567–8, 576–77; and Kosovo, Wi 97–106, Su 360–61; and Russia, Fa 585–88, 593, 598, 601–06
nuclear weapons: and China, Sp 187, 189; and India, Wi 130–33, Sp 189; nuclear deterrence, Sp 177–82, 187–88, 245–46; and Pakistan, Wi 130–33; and Russia, Sp 184–86, 189, Fa 584; and the United States, Sp 187–88, Su 396–97

Öcalan, Abdullah: Wi 31, 47–63

Pakistan: and India, Wi 111–21, 123–34; and nuclear weapons, Wi 130–33
Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK): and the European Court of Human Rights, Wi 19; and Abdullah Öcalan, Wi 31, 47–63; and relations with the Kurds, Wi 38–46; and Syria, Wi 41–42, 52–53
Persian Gulf: domestic concerns in, Sp 196–200; U.S. diplomacy in, Sp 193–96, 201–9
"Post–Cold War Europe Up Close and Personal" (Winterstein): Fa 648–56
Presser, Stephen B.: "'Liberty under Law' under Siege," Su 357–69
"Price Paid by the Military, The" (Sarkesian): Fa 557–68
Prince, Peter, with Paul Dibb: "Indonesia's Grim Outlook," Fa 621–36
proliferation: Sp 188–89; and motives for, Su 467–73; and nonproliferation, Sp 247–50, 253–57, Su 473–75; and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Sp 241–43, 247, Su 470–71, 474; Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, Sp 175–91; as a threat to the United States, Su 396–97

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Puerto Rico: Su 415–52, Fa 657
Putin, Vladimir: Fa 491–2, 579, 604

"Radios, Rebels, and Rollback" (McNamara): Wi 141–52
Radu, Michael: "The Rise and Fall of the PKK," Wi 47–63
Reagan, Ronald: Su 475–84
realism: legal, Su 357–58, 363–65; philosophical, Su 352–56, Fa 520; 530
religion: Sp 281–94
"Religion and Ethnic Conflict—In Theory" (Kurth): Sp 281–94
"Rise and Fall of the PKK, The" (Radu): Wi 47–63
"Ronald Reagan on Reaganism" (Berkowitz): Su 475–84
Rubinstein, Alvin Z.: "The Case Against Puerto Rican Statehood," Su 415–31; "Israelis Ponder Their Long-Term Security," Sp 259–80
Russia: and China, Sp 238–39, Su 377, Fa 585; defense of the Caucasus, Wi 82–85, Fa 585–6; and the European Union, Fa 597–99; and George W. Bush visit, Fa 491–92; and Japan, Su 377, Fa 592; and Korea, Su 377, Fa 593; and military power, Fa 581–2; and missile defense (NMD), Fa 584–5, 596, 606; and NATO, Fa 585–88, 593–95; Fa 598, 601, 604–06; and nuclear weapons, Fa 584; Sp 184–86, 189, Fa 598, 601, 604–06; and reducing levels of strategic weapons, Sp 175–77, 182; and strategic change in, Su 377; and structural conditions and foreign policy, Fa 579–96; and the United States, Su 382, 403, Fa 593–4, 597–8, 601–2
Rwanda: Fa 498, 570

Sarkesian, Sam C.: "The Price Paid by the Military," Fa 557–68
Serfaty, Simon: "A Euro-Atlantic Ostpolitik," Fa 597–607
"Seven Worries about START III" (Clark): Sp 175–91
Sierra Leone: Fa 570
Somalia: Fa 498, 561–2, 569–71
South Africa: Su 412
"South Asia's Dangers and U.S. Foreign Policy" (Ayoob): Wi 123–34
Starr, Joel E.: "Can the U.S. and India Be 'Steadfast Friends'?" Wi 111–21
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START): Sp 175–91; and Russia, Sp 175–77, 182
"Strategy and Preventive Diplomacy" (Garfinkle): Fa 503–17
Strasbourg institutions: Wi 15, 18–20
Strausz-Hupé, Robert: "An Ambassador's Reflection," Wi 13–14
"Structural Constraints on Russian Diplomacy" (Menon): Fa 579–96
Suleyman the Magnificent: Wi 4–5
Syria: and Israel, Sp 264, 274–78; and the PKK, Wi 41–42, 52–53; and Turkey, Wi 69, 75–76, 78–79

"Ten-Year Rule for Defense Planning, A" (Libicki): Su 387–99
"Triumph without Self-Belief" (Kors): Su 343–56
Turkey: and Armenia, Wi 87–88; and Azerbaijan, Wi 88–89; birth of the nation, Sp 4–10; and the Caucasus, Wi 81–91; and Chechnya, Wi 90; and Europe, Wi 8–11, 13, 15–30; and Georgia, Wi 85–87; and Greece, Wi 78; human rights in, Wi 15–30; and Iraq, Wi 70, 76, 78; and Iran, Wi 72, 76, 78; and Israel, Wi 65–79; and Syria, Wi 69, 75–76, 78–79; and Russia, Wi 82–85, Fa 585; and the United States, Wi 13–14, 66
"Turkey's Caucasian Initiatives" (Henze): Wi 81–91
"Turkish-Israeli Odd Couple, The" (Israeli): Wi 65–79

Ukraine: Fa 587–88
United States: and the Balkans, Wi 93–110; and Bosnia, Fa 564–66; and China, Su 374–76, 383–84, 390–91, 395, 402–3, 412; and diplomacy in Asia, Su 374–85; and diplomacy in the Persian Gulf, Sp

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

193–96, 201–9; and Europe, Su 388, 406–7, Fa 598; and immigration, Su 413; and India, Wi 111–12, 123–34, Sp 242–44, 247–57; and Indonesia, Su 377–78, Fa 621, 633–36; and intellectual property, Su 411–13; and intelligence reform, Wi 152–61; and international commercial policy, Su 409–11; and international financial agreements, Su 404–9; and Israel, Wi 74, Sp 260–61, 274; and Japan, Su 376–77, 381, 383, 402, 405–7, Fa 637, 643; and Kosovo, Fa 558, 562; and nuclear weapons, Sp 187–88; parallels with British disarmament, Sp 165–73; and Russia, Su 382, 403, Fa 597–98; and Somalia, Fa 561–62; and Turkey, Wi 13–14, 66; and the West, Su 333–41

USS *Cole:* Fa 596, 612–13

Uzbekistan: Fa 586

Verne, Jules: Su 319–27

Vieques: Su 416–17

Vietnam War: Fa 521–22; and U.S. military escalation, Wi 136–41

West, the: and multiculturalism, Su 349–51; and philosophical realism, Su 357–58, 363–65; and Russia, Fa 593–96; sources of, Su 333–36; and the United States, Su 333–41

West Papua: Fa 625

Winterstein, Stephen: "Post–Cold War Europe Up Close and Personal," Fa 648–56

World Bank: Su 408–9

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INDEX TO VOLUME 45
Books Reviewed

Bix, Herbert P.: *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan,* Fa 637–48

Friedberg, Aaron L.: *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy,* Su 453–66

Garton Ash, Timothy: *History of the Present: Essays, Sketches, and Dispatches from Europe in the 1990s,* Fa 648–56

Gilpin, Robert: *The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the Twenty-First Century,* Sp 295–305

Goldstein, Avery: *Deterrence and Security in the Twenty-first Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution,* Su 466–75

Grose, Peter: *Operation Rollback: America's Secret War behind the Iron Curtain,* Wi 141–52

Held, David, et al.: *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture,* Sp 295–305

Hogan, Michael J.: *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954,* Su 453–66

Hulnick, Arthur S.: *Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century,* Wi 152–61

Jansen, Marius B.: *The Making of Modern Japan,* Fa 637–48

Kaiser, David E.: *American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War,* Wi 135–41

Keane, John: *Václav Havel: A Political Tragedy in Six Acts,* Fa 648–56

Logevall, Fredrik: *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam,* Wi 135–41

Lowenthal, Mark M.: *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy,* Wi 152–61

Micklethwait, John, and Adrian Wooldridge: *A Future Perfect: The Challenge and Hidden Promise of Globalization,* Sp 295–305

Mitrovich, Gregory: *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc,* Wi 141–52

Neiberg, Michael S.: *Making Citizen-Soldiers: ROTC and the Ideology of American Military Service,* Sp 305–15

Paul, T. V.: *Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons,* Su 466–75

Puddington, Arch: *Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty,* Wi 141–52

Rosecrance, Richard: *The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century,* Sp 295–305

Sassen, Saskia: *Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money,* Sp 295–305

Skinner, Kiron K., Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson: *Reagan in His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan that Reveal His Revolutionary Vision for America,* Su 475–84

Snider, Don M., John A. Nagl, and Tony Pfaff: *Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officership in the Twenty-first Century,* Sp 305–15

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sokolski, Henry D.: *Best of Intentions: America's Campaign against Strategic Weapons Proliferation,* Su 466–75 **Steele, Robert David:** *On Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World,* Wi 152–61

Utgoff, Victor A.: *The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order,* Su 466–75

Weiss, Linda: *The Myth of the Powerless State,* Sp 295–305

Wong, Leonard: *Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps,* Sp 305–15

Zegart, Amy B.: *Flawed By Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC,* Wi 152–61

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED


Georgetown Journal
of International Affairs
The world isn't flat. Why should an I.R. journal be?
Pick up something new.
Call 888.297.0757 or visit our Web site at http://journal.georgetown.edu
to subscribe for one year (two issues) at the rate of $12.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"A Little Journal with Big Ideas"
— *The Washington Times*

Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations

Current Contents (Volume II, Number 1)

A Dialogue among Civilizations
Giandomenico Picco — *UN Personal Representative*

Evolving Institutions and Transatlantic Relations
Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglesias — *President, European Court of Justice*
Philippe Maystadt — *President, European Investment Bank*
Thomas R. Pickering — *Under Secretary, U.S. Department of State*
Stuart E. Eizenstat — *Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury*
. . . and more

The Publisher

Seton Hall University's School of Diplomacy and International Relations offers a new and innovative approach to the study of contemporary global issues. Established in a unique alliance with the United Nations Association of the United States of America, the school has nongovernmental organization status with the United Nations and is an affiliate of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA).

✂ —

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____ Country _____

Individuals: ❒ One year: $20 ❒ Two years: $38
Institutions: ❒ One year: $50 ❒ Two years: $95

(Per year, outside the U.S. add either $5 for surface mail or $20 for air mail)

Send to: Subscriptions, *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*
Seton Hall University • McQuaid Hall, Room 134 • South Orange, NJ 07079 USA
Please make check payable to Seton Hall University

Visit our Web Site: http://diplomacy.shu.edu/journal/

New subscribers receive a free copy of the inaugural issue while supplies last.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Orbis (ISSN 0030-4387) is published quarterly for the Foreign Policy Research Institute by:

Elsevier Science Inc., 655 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10010-5107.

Editorial Offices: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102-3684.

Submission of Articles. The editors invite submissions of articles (preferably no more than seven thousand words, reference notes included) bearing upon contemporary international issues important to the United States. Preference will be given to articles including evaluations of different policy options. Authors are encouraged to request manuscript specifications and a style sheet from the editor before beginning to write.

Books and Publications for Review. Materials should be sent to the Book Review Editor, *Orbis*, 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102-3684.

Subscriptions. $85.00 per year for individuals in all countries except Europe and Japan; NLG 167 (euro 75.78) in European countries; $269 per year for institutions in all countries except Europe and Japan; NLG 530 (euro 240.50) in European countries. Address correspondence regarding subscriptions and bulk orders to ORBIS, Elsevier Science Inc., 655 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10010-5107. *Postmaster:* Send address changes to: Subscription Dept., ORBIS, Elsevier Science Inc., 655 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10010-5107. All subscriptions must be prepaid and are for the 2001 calendar year only. Periodicals postage paid at Ann Arbor, Michigan, and additional offices. Newsstand distribution is by Bernhard DeBoer, Inc., 113 East Centre Street, Nutley, New Jersey 07110.

Advertising and Permissions. Address all correspondence regarding advertising or permission to photocopy articles to Elsevier Science Inc.

Microfilm. Beginning with Volume 37, *Orbis* is available on microfiche from Elsevier Science Inc. Each volume is recorded separately and is obtainable at the end of the volume year. Volumes 1–36 of *Orbis* are available on microfilm from University Microfilms International, P.O. Box 1346, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106; call toll free 1-800-521-0600. Volumes 1–36 of *Orbis* are also available on microfiche from KTO Microform, Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546.

Reprints and Back Issues. Beginning with Volume 37, back issues are available from Elsevier Science Inc. Back issues of *Orbis*, Volumes 1–36, are available from Kraus Reprint and Periodicals, Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546.

The opinions expressed in articles and reviews in this journal are those of the contributors and should not be construed as representing those of the Foreign Policy Research Institute or the editors of *Orbis*. Reproduction of contents without permission is forbidden.

Orbis is a registered trademark of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Copyright © 2001 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute
except where otherwise noted.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Orbis®
A Journal of World Affairs
(ISSN: 0030-4387)

Periodicals
Postage Paid at
Montpelier, VT
and Additional Offices

Elsevier Science Inc.
655 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10010-5107
(Address Service Requested)

MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE
LIBRARY SERIALS DEPT
MIDDLEBURY VT 05753

00013493 R7029638

12-01 1

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED